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Letter from the Editors 
 
We are proud to present the 15th edition of Historia, a journal 
entirely written and edited by students of the Epsilon Mu Chapter of 
Phi Alpha Theta and the Eastern Illinois University’s history 
department.  Historia received a record number of submissions this 
year, leading to difficult decisions in what proved to be an arduous 
selection process.  These papers represent some of the very best 
student writing of the past year. 
The selection process was long and difficult.  Every editor read 
all sixty five submissions and voted on every paper.  The process, 
although long, helped to ensure that the best papers were selected.  
This year we had a wide range of selections, including papers on the 
Irish Famine and the Irish Rebellion; theories of slavery in the United 
States, including the idea of paternalism and an analysis of the slave 
clause during the Constitutional Convention; constitutional issues, 
including in Britain with both the problem of the abdication of 
Edward VIII and the abolition of capital punishment, and the issue of 
eugenics in the United States during the early twentieth century; the 
problem of war atrocities during World War II, including the practice 
of Nazism and the issue of the Korean comfort women in Japan.  Also 
included in this year’s Historia are an analysis of the lack of action by 
the United States during the Rwandan genocide and a student 
movement in Tlatelolco, Mexico; an examination of the shift from 
cotton to wool underwear in Britain; the role of the Cherokee in the 
Civil War; the relationships between women and food on the Overland 
Trail; and the influence of Machiavelli on Ivan IV. We are particularly 
grateful to Dr. Walter L. Arnstein, Professor Emeritus of History at 
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, for allowing us to 
print his plenary talk at the Regional Conference of Phi Alpha Theta, 
which was held this year At Eastern Illinois University.  
This journal was completed with the assistance of many people.  
First and foremost, we owe a debt of gratitude to our faculty advisor 
Dr. Michael Shirley. Without his guidance and sense of humor, this 
journal would not have been completed.  We would like to thank all 
the authors who submitted papers this year. For those whose papers 
were not selected for publication, we encourage you to submit again 
next year. We would also like to thank Ms. Donna Nichols and the 
history faculty for their assistance and support.  Finally, we thank the 
alumni, for without them, Historia’s audience is sorely diminished.  All 
of these people are a factor in the continued success of Historia, and we 
sincerely thank them.  
 
-The Editors 
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     HISTORY: A MATTER OF HONOR1 
 
Walter L. Arnstein 
 
 
Let me, first of all, thank Professor Shirley for his most 
generous introduction.   I am delighted to play a small role in this 
successful regional Phi Alpha Theta conference.   I have taken a 
personal interest in Phi Alpha Theta for a very long time. Indeed, 
Professor Shirley may have invited me to talk to you today merely in 
order to add chronological diversity to these proceedings.  I was first 
initiated into Phi Alpha Theta, after all, when Harry Truman was 
President of the United States. 
Now, if your first reaction is: “Who is Harry Truman?” then my 
response is: “Look it up in a History book!”   Looking things up is, 
after all, one of the purposes that the study of History serves.   But a 
study of History serves other purposes also.  As I shall try to suggest 
in the course of the next half hour, the study and the writing of 
History may even be defined as a matter of honor!  Admittedly, when 
you first informed your parents or other relations that you intended to 
become a History major in college, their reaction may have been less 
one of honor than one of puzzlement.  And why are you doing that?   
In the short run, after all, to become a History major does not teach 
you to become an engineer or a physician or an accountant or the 
CEO of a large corporation. 
In the short run, the study of history is more likely to 
encourage us to become generalists rather than specialists.  By that I 
mean that a historian is compelled to take some degree of interest in 
the many different ways in which human beings both organize their 
world and make it understandable to themselves.  Human beings are 
social creatures who almost always live in nuclear or extended 
families, and those families congregate in neighborhoods, towns, and 
countries.   They are also political animals who organize cities and 
states and nations that alternately send armies into the field or 
negotiate treaties with one another.  They are part of the economic 
world as well: as consumers and as producers, as managers and 
laborers and even as retirees.  They also demonstrate all manner of 
                                                 
1 A luncheon address presented to the Regional Conference of Phi 
Alpha Theta delivered on the campus of Eastern Illinois University on 
February 25, 2006.  Walter L. Arnstein is Professor of History Emeritus and 
Jubilee Professor of the Liberal Arts and Sciences Emeritus at the University 
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  His publications include Britain Yesterday & 
Today: 1830 to the Present, 8th ed. (Boston, 2001), and Queen Victoria (London & 
New York, 2003). 
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cultural, artistic, ceremonial, and ritualistic behavior and ways of 
explaining their world that we may define as religious in some cases 
and as secular in others.  
Obviously no single historian can be expected to become a 
specialist in all these various facets of human experience in all the 
different centuries and on all the different continents, but historians 
ought to be reminded at regular intervals that, even as they plow their 
particular furrow, their furrow is part of a broader landscape that 
extends as far as the horizon.   In both survey courses and more 
specialized courses, as students of the past we should retain at least 
some concern with facets of that past far removed from those that we 
may know best.     
Among the Ancient Greeks, Herodotus and Thucydides began 
to practice the trade of history two-and-a-half millennia ago, and in 
1400 the Islamic historian Ibn Khaldun declared that “History is a 
discipline widely cultivated among nations and races. It is eagerly 
sought after.  The men in the street, the ordinary people, aspire to 
know it.  Kings and leaders vie for it. Both the learned and the 
ignorant are able to understand it.”2   And yet there have always been 
critics who have argued that the trick cannot be done. There have 
been philosophers, for example, who have contended, with a surface 
degree of plausibility, that the past cannot be recovered, however hard 
we may try. "The past is a foreign country," we are told; "they do 
things differently there."3  Indeed they do, and yet with effort we may 
find it possible to understand the thoughts and actions of some of 
those foreigners, even if a perfect translation lies beyond our 
competence. Yet other skeptics have contended that we are 
permanently barred by our built-in biases and assumptions from ever 
understanding any nationality other than our own, any social class 
other than our own, any gender other than our own, even any age 
cohort other than our own.  How can a militant Palestinian truly 
understand the frame of mind of an Israeli, or—one might add—vice-
versa?  How can an ivy-covered academic possibly understand the 
daily life of either a hereditary monarch or an agricultural laborer?  
How can a patriarchal relic conceivably understand the mind of a 
dedicated feminist? How can an aging stuck-in-a-rut professor 
possibly enter into the mindset of a college freshman?   
My general answer to such skeptics is the same as the one that 
the eighteenth-century English sage, Dr. Samuel Johnson, applied to a 
dog walking on its hind legs:  "One does not expect to see it done well!  
One is surprised to see it done at all!"  Because, in defiance of the 
                                                 
2 Cited in review of Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to 
History in the Times Literary Supplement, Feb. 17, 2006, 11. 
3 The first sentence of L. P. Hartley, The Go-Between  (London, 1953). 
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philosophers and the skeptics, good history has been written and is 
being written all the time, history that has caused readers and 
listeners to conclude that they understand our own age and our own 
concerns better than before because a historian has placed them in 
context.  History has been written that throws genuine light on the 
institutions that define our society. History has been written that 
clarifies why the decisions taken by particular governments, including 
our own, have turned out to be either wise or extraordinarily foolish.   
And why can such history be written?  Because all human beings to 
some degree and some human beings to a very considerable degree 
possess the ability that we call empathy, the ability to place ourselves 
in the shoes of others, even others distant in time and place, distant in 
age and social status.    
Such history can be written secondly because the discipline of 
history is and remains a collective undertaking, an undertaking that 
involves built-in checks and balances.   A powerful and wide-ranging 
imagination may be a valuable characteristic for a historian to possess, 
yet it is a trait that does have to be kept within limits. Every fledgling 
historian who has ever had a bright idea and has wanted therefore to 
publish an article or even a book discovers--sometimes to his or her 
initial dismay--that it is not enough to complete the manuscript.  One 
has to persuade editors and reviewers before any given piece is 
accepted for publication, and once the book is published one has to 
anticipate that other reviewers will publicly judge one's work. They 
will remind you of all the "facts" that you failed to check, of all the 
sources that you failed to consult, and of all the inferences that you 
failed to draw. 
The difference between novelists and historians is that novelists 
too may use their imagination, but a novelist does not have to worry 
about an imagination that runs unchecked.  Nothing need stop a 
novelist from imagining an Abraham Lincoln who bids farewell to his 
Springfield neighbors and catches an American Airlines jet to 
Washington, D.C. where he arrives just in time to be interviewed on 
television by Tim Russert on "Meet the Press.” A historian who 
utilized his imagination in that particular manner would not be taken 
seriously, however, because collectively we know too much about the 
past.   We possess a very good idea as to what was and what was not 
technologically possible during any given century and even what was 
plausible in the realm of social custom and ideas. For a historian 
deliberately to claim the privileges that we grant to the writer of 
fiction is to commit the crime of anachronism.  
We ran into this phenomenon a few weeks ago when the author 
of a best-selling memoir called A Million Little Pieces turned out to 
have written a work of fiction.  Oprah Winfrey, whose imprimatur had 
first turned the book into a best-seller, condemned the author for 
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feeling “the need to lie,” and she apologized to her audience for 
initially leaving the impression that “the truth is not important.”4 
The truth ought to be important to all historians to the extent 
that it can be known. For historians, the recoverable past may 
appropriately be looked upon as a vast jig-saw puzzle for which we do 
not possess all the pieces.   On some subjects, we may have very few 
pieces—such as, for example, the original King Arthur, who lived (if 
he lived at all) in sixth century Britain at a time for which we have 
virtually no contemporary records whatever. We have one jigsaw 
puzzle piece but ninety-nine are missing.  Yet on many other subjects, 
such as the American Civil War of 1861-1865, we possess a 
superabundance of records. Even those historians who differ 
somewhat on the precise combination of conditions that led up to war 
agree on a great many highly important matters. They do not argue 
as to how many people participated or died or were wounded or what 
contemporaries read about the conflict at the time in their books and 
newspapers and in records of congressional debates. Unlike 
contemporaries, historians also have had access to numerous diaries 
and private letters and records of discussions in President Lincoln’s 
cabinet. In the case of the American Civil War, unlike that of King 
Arthur, we possess ninety-five pieces of the jigsaw puzzle pieces and 
lack at most five. 
Now, I concede that there have long existed historians who 
have felt sorry that history was not a branch of a so-called "social 
science" that imposes theoretical models on the past.  They regret that 
history has not become a branch of anthropology or a branch of 
sociology or political science or even a branch of psychology.  Such 
critics have regretted also that history as a discipline has been largely 
free from the kind of jargon that all too often seems to afflict 
professional educators and sociologists and psychologists.  Most 
historians have considered it a virtue to be able to communicate with a 
wide audience. They accept the need to use technical terms when 
talking about, say, the history of law or the history of naval 
construction, but they oppose the notion that historians as historians 
should create adopt a specialized language whose necessary 
consequence would seem to be to set themselves off from ordinary 
people as possessors of, and guardians of an esoteric knowledge all 
their own.   As the British scientist Peter Madawar phrased the matter 
a few years ago: "No one who has something original or important to 
say will willingly run the risk of being misunderstood; people who 
write obscurely are either unskilled in writing or are up to mischief."5  
                                                 
4 Cited in an Associated Press article in the (Champaign, Illinois) 
News-Gazette, Jan. 31, 2006,  C-3. 
5 New Humanist, December 1972, 314. 
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In recent years, other critics of the discipline of history have 
contended that historians should worry less about learning facts than 
about adopting theories and imposing them upon our understanding 
of the past.  Thus a generation of literary critics has maintained that it 
is altogether impossible for historians to study or to write about 
anything real.  All that historians have before them, according to such 
critics, are texts.  Texts, they go on, have no fixed meanings.  Every 
reader has the right to interpret every text in whatever manner he or 
of she finds plausible.  No interpretation is superior to any other.  All 
is open to interpretation.  All is relative.    
I have sometimes wondered what would happen if such a post-
modernist literary deconstructionist historian were to take his 
university pay check to his local bank in order to transform it into 
cash.  What if the bank clerk should explain to him:  "What you have 
called a pay check is merely a text, merely a piece of paper, and it is as 
appropriate for me to interpret that text as idle scribble as it is for you 
interpret it as an order to me to pay you cash. It is therefore as 
appropriate for me to deposit that piece of paper into a wastepaper 
basket as into that theoretical construct that you call your bank 
account." That type of deconstruction necessarily undermines 
altogether the notion that historians ought to be concerned with the 
systematic collection of evidence and the systematic drawing of 
conclusions.   
The fact remains that happily we do not live in a world today in 
which anything can mean anything to anybody.   The amount of 
money you have in your checking account at any given time is definite 
and not relative.  If you are driving a car, red means stop and green 
means go for everybody; nothing is relative there.   If you want to 
vote in the next election, then if you are seventeen you cannot 
register; if you are eighteen and a citizen and not in jail you can.   We 
may find aspects of our world confusing, and there may well be 
aspects of that world that we find difficult to understand—for 
example, nanotechnology and genetic engineering.  But our world is 
not, in every respect, arbitrary.  We can find maps on the internet that 
tell us precisely where specific people live and where particular stores 
are located and how to reach them.   Although you and I may never 
have met until today, you can understand the words I use, because the 
meaning of words does not change every day.  When somebody 
proclaims: “All things are relative,” the appropriate answer is: “Who 
says so?”   
If the world in which we live is sufficiently comprehensible to 
enable us to live in it, why should the world of one hundred or two 
hundred or even a thousand years ago be altogether unknowable—
provided that we do our research and draw the inferences that the 
available evidence permits.   Historians who seek truth are more like 
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to come close to finding it than are relativists who insist that there is 
no such thing as truth.    
The discipline of history ought to serve as a remedy for 
present-mindedness rather than as an excuse for having us in the 
twenty-first century impose our sensibilities on people and events of 
earlier centuries.   Historians cannot avoid judging altogether, and 
they should not, but surely their first task is to attempt to understand 
the past rather than to impose on that past the favored nostrums of a 
later era. The Marxist or Freudian or Social Darwinist or multi-
culturalist or feminist or post-colonialist or deconstructionist cart 
ought not precede the evidentiary horse.  The discipline of history can 
enable us to place the events of our own day—whether they be wars 
or hurricanes or supreme court decisions—in a context that makes 
them more understandable. 
Let me sum up then: 
(1) A good historian is a generalist who seeks to learn a little 
about a great many matters.  In the process that historian learns to 
understand better both his own society and that of earlier centuries.  
History remains a lynchpin of any liberal arts education. 
(2) Good historians develop and enhance, as a central skill, 
their powers of empathy. 
(3) Good historians learn that there is a difference between 
truth and falsehood. Absolute truth may elude us and, like many trial 
juries, we may often have to rely on circumstantial evidence, but such 
evidence should suffice to enable us to distinguish conclusions that are 
more probable from those that are less probable.  
(4) Good history adds that fourth dimension known as time to 
the often static models fashioned by social scientists.  It is the enemy 
of the provincial, of the parochial, and of the over-simple. Good 
historians do not take a holiday from complexity. 
All of these are virtues. All of these are honorable goals. All of 
these are values promoted by Phi Alpha Theta, and Phi Alpha Theta is 
an honor society that celebrates the discipline of history as an 
honorable activity and as an honorable profession. Why then ought 
we not look upon History as a Matter of Honor?  
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CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS:  
LIMITATIONS THAT LED TO ABDICATION 
 
Amanda Terrell  
 
 
The 1930s were a time of ambiguity. Subsequently, the reality 
fails to coincide with recollection, or, at least, the desired recollection.  
Despite being mired in economic hardship and diplomatic tensions, the 
thirties are remembered with a sense of dramatic nostalgia because it 
was the period before the world was plunged into war. Many 
historians have not escaped the trap of wistfulness when chronicling 
the abdication of Edward VIII—the British king who relinquished his 
throne in order to marry the woman he loved.       
The authors who are easily ensnared are the biographers and 
autobiographers.  Most prominent of these are the Duke and Duchess 
of Windsor.  In their respective memoirs, A Kings Story (1951) and The 
Heart Has It’s Reasons (1956), the Duke and Duchess recount the 
abdication with a sense of dramatic longing, the Duchess more so than 
the Duke.  James Pope-Hennessey, in his biography of Queen Mary 
entitled Queen Mary: 1867-1953, presents the abdication as the only 
thing to ever break the heart of Dowager Queen.  This representation 
gives the story more than just a flair for the dramatic.  Keith 
Middlemas and John Barnes in their 1969 biography of Stanley 
Baldwin, Baldwin: A Biography, present the abdication as a problem 
only Baldwin could have fixed. In making Baldwin the victim and 
hero, the authors added to the growing nostalgia.   
Other historians have tackled the whole issue of abdication 
instead of one person’s role or account. Christopher Warwick, in his 
1986 book Abdication, relays the entire story in abundant detail 
making one yearn for the days when kings were not forced to choose 
between love and the throne.  Susan Williams wrote her book The 
People’s King: The Betrayal and Abdication of the First Modern Monarch in 
2003 with the benefit of access to letters and papers that were 
previously withheld. Williams provides different angles to the 
abdication, telling the story from the King’s perspective as well as the 
Prime Minister’s.  However, Williams’ primary focus is the impact of 
the abdication on the English commoner.  
                                                 
 
Amanda Terrell, a native of Danville, Illinois, earned her BA in History with 
Departmental Honors in Spring 2006. A member of Phi Alpha Theta, she will begin 
graduate studies in History at EIU in Fall 2006. She wrote this paper for Dr. 
Michael Shirley’s HIS 2500, Historical Research and Writing, in Fall 2005. 
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 There are historians who have only offered one-sided analysis 
of the abdication in the form of the “blame game.”  Lord Beaverbrook’s 
1966 posthumous book, edited by A.J.P. Taylor, places the blame of 
the abdication on the shoulders of Stanley Baldwin.  Sir Oswald 
Mosely, in his 1968 autobiography My Life, accused Baldwin of 
manipulating the government in order to maximize his power. 
Conversely Robert Rhodes James reveals, in Memoirs of a Conservative: 
J.C.C. Davidson’s Memoirs and Papers 1910-1937, that Davidson, a 
Baldwin supporter, faulted Edward’s impossible demands for the 
abdication.   
Other historians have provided more balanced analysis of the 
abdication.  Some simply provide that the abdication was inevitable.  
Linda Rosenweig, in her 1975 article “Abdication of Edward VIII”, 
argues that Edward’s complex mental state cost him his throne. 
Rosenweig argues the abdication from a psychiatric point of view. In 
1964 Ronald Blythe wrote The Age of Illusion: Britain in the Twenties 
and Thirties 1919-1940. In this book he maintains that the abdication 
was inescapable because Edward was just too different and the 
establishment could not handle change.   
Still there are some historians who emphasize the political and 
constitutional aspects of the abdication.  Alan Clark, in The Tories: 
Conservatives and the Nation Sate 1922-1997, expresses the enormity of 
the Tories, traditionally being supporters of the monarchy, as the ones 
who dethroned a king.  M.M. Knappen proposes in the 1938 article, 
“The Abdication of Edward VIII,” that, since the abdication, the 
position of the monarch has been aggrandized while the influence of 
the actual monarch has been diminished.  Moreover, Arthur Keith’s 
1938 book, The King, the Constitution, the Empire, and Foreign Affairs, 
presents a similar argument.  He argues that the office of the Prime 
Minister was increased while Parliament, the cabinet, and the 
sovereign’s roles were decreased.  
Clearly the abdication has been researched and arguments made 
on nearly every aspect.  However, what was the real political climate 
like during the abdication?  Ignoring causes and results of the 
abdication, what did the two sides really want? Moreover, why could 
these two sides not come together and avoid abdication? I contend 
that that both Stanley Baldwin and the King wanted a pleasant end to 
the situation in which Edward remained king; however, each man’s 
means to that end were limited by constitutional constraints and thus 
a pleasant end could not be attained.1 
                                                 
1Examining constitutional constraints can prove tricky because of the 
fluidity of the British Constitution.  The British Constitution is made up of 
both written documents and unwritten precedent.  Therefore, determining not 
only the positions of the King and Prime Minister in the government, but the 
things that constrain them requires an in depth knowledge and understanding 
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 As a prince, Edward caroused and cavorted among London 
society.  Throughout his bachelorhood the Prince of Wales never 
wanted for the company of a woman; however, Edward’s companions 
tended to be married aristocrats.  Edward met Wallis Simpson, a 
married American, in November 1930 at the home of mutual friends.2  
The Prince’s initial romantic advances toward Mrs. Simpson failed 
when he first asked her about home heating systems in the United 
States.3  Nevertheless Edward’s frustrations did not persist.  Soon he 
frequented the Simpson’s flat for tea or dinner.  Edward found himself 
captivated and influenced by the social atmosphere.  Henry “Chips” 
Channon recorded in his diary several encounters with the Prince of 
Wales at Simpson’s home; he wrote, “We had cocktails at Mrs. 
Simpson’s little flat in Bryanston Court; there I found Emerald 
Cunard, David Margesson, the Prince of Wales and one or two 
others.”4  On another occasion Channon wrote, “Much gossip about 
the Prince of Wales’ alleged Nazi leanings; he is alleged to have been 
influenced by Emerald Cunard…through Mrs. Simpson.”5  Rumors 
about Edward’s political sympathies were rife; however, now that a 
woman was an influence, rumors began taking a serious overtone.  
Nonetheless, Wallis was sharp and funny and she surrounded herself 
with similar people and the Prince of Wales immediately fell in love 
with her.  Edward’s thoughts quickly moved to how he could marry a 
woman who already had a husband and had previously been divorced.6   
As Prince of Wales, Edward’s public life had been devoted to 
the service of the Empire.  Before he could make major life decisions 
the effects on the Empire had to be considered.  A prospective 
marriage proved no different.  Edward said of the situation, “a prince’s 
heart, like his politics, must remain within the constitutional pale. But 
my heart refused to be so confined.”7  However, Edward concealed his 
intentions, at least while his father was alive.   
                                                                                                 
of the Constitution.  Both Edward VIII and Stanley Baldwin demonstrated 
such an understanding of the British Constitution.    
2Duchess of Windsor, The Heart Has Its Reasons (New York: David 
McKay Co, Inc., 1956), 154.  
3Duke of Windsor, A King’s Story (New York: G.P. Putman & Sons, 
1951), 256.   
4Henry “Chips” Channon, Diary entry 14th May 1935; Accessed at 
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/MONedwardVIII.htm.  
5Henry “Chips” Channon, Diary entry 10th June 1935; Accessed at 
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/MONedwardVIII.htm.  
6 Wallis Simpson had been married before her marriage to Ernest 
Simpson.  She married Earl Winfield Spencer Jr in 1916.  Spencer was a naval 
pilot who was prone to alcoholism and spousal abuse and the couple divorced 
in 1927. Duke of Windsor, A King’s Story, 257-259. 
7Ibid., 259.  
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King George V died on 20 January 1936 after protracted 
illnesses.  Edward was now King and believed that he could now 
marry Simpson.  According to the Royal Marriages Act of 1772, as 
King, Edward could restrict the marriage of a family member but no 
one could restrict his marriage.  The only prohibition on a monarch’s 
marriage was that he, or she, could not marry a Roman Catholic.  
Since Simpson met the only written standard Edward looked to 
proceed with his intentions.8  However, when Mrs. Simpson began 
divorce proceedings against her husband the situation became more 
difficult.9  In the 1930s divorce was not looked upon favorably, 
especially by the elite.  In fact, Simpson did not meet any of the elite’s 
unwritten qualifications for acceptance into their social circle: she was 
American, she lacked status, she did not have money, and most 
importantly she was divorced.10   The Cabinet and politicians were 
part of the British elite; consequently, they would not tolerate 
someone as inadequate as Queen. 
Stanley Baldwin returned from a hiatus in mid October 1936, 
only to find a stack of papers waiting for him, all concerning the King 
and Simpson.11  The Prime Minister was hesitant to intervene in 
Edward’s personal life.  Nevertheless, the King and Prime Minister 
met on 14 October 1936 and had subsequent meetings on the 20 
October and 16 November.12  It was not until the last meeting that the 
word “marriage” was spoken.  Moreover, Edward communicated his 
intention to marry Simpson at the latter meeting.  Thus a 
constitutional crisis was in the making.   
                                                 
8Susan Williams, The People’s King: The True Story of the Abdication 
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 53.   
9Mrs. Simpson was granted a divorce hearing on 15 October 1936.  
The hearing was scheduled for 27 October 1926 at the Ipswich Assizes.  The 
different location was granted at the behest of Mrs. Simpson’s lawyer Mr. 
Goddard.  If the proceedings were held at Ipswich they would be done faster 
and there would be less publicity.  Duchess of Windsor, The Heart Has Its 
Reasons, 228.  Mrs. Simpson was granted a decree nisi at the 27 October 
hearing.  A decree nisi meant the divorce would not be final for six months. 
Christopher Warwick, Abdication (New York, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1986), 108.      
10Williams, The People’s King, 32.  
11Baldwin returned on 12 October after a several month sabbatical due 
to exhaustion.   
12The meeting on the 14 October was at the request of Stanley 
Baldwin because he wanted to gauge Edward’s relationship with Mrs. 
Simpson, but to his chagrin, the topic was never brought up. Williams, 57.   In 
the meeting on the 20 October the Prime Minister again skated around the 
issue of Edward’s relationship with Mrs. Simpson.  However, he did ask 
Edward to prevent Mrs. Simpson’s divorce, which Edward declined to do. 
Baron Beaverbrook, The Abdication of Edward VIII, (New York: Atheneum, 
1966), 47.  
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Why would a constitutional crisis be brewing? The only 
stipulation on Edward’s marriage pertained to religion, and, as 
aforementioned, Simpson met that qualification.  Well, at the meeting 
on 16 November, Stanley Baldwin told Edward that a marriage to 
Simpson would be unpopular with the people.13  All his life Edward 
had been fashioned by the will of the people and he was finding that 
being King did not change his circumstances.  However, as King, he 
could retaliate and responded to Baldwin’s warning that he would 
marry Simpson or abdicate.14  Edward did not disagree with Baldwin 
about the degree of public support; however, his resolve was strong.  
At the same meeting he received permission from Stanley Baldwin to 
meet with two cabinet members, Samuel Hoare and Duff Cooper, 
regarding the situation.  Mr. Hoare provided no help or sympathy for 
the King’s plight.  Duff Cooper offered advice Edward did not want to 
hear.  Cooper advised the King to wait until after his coronation to 
marry Simpson.  Cooper reasoned that the government would not be 
able to prevent the marriage if Edward was crowned.15  Perhaps 
thinking that by being crowned Edward would have garnered so much 
public support the government could not possibly oppose his 
marriage.  Nevertheless, Edward rejected Cooper’s proposal.  The 
King believed he would be misleading his people if he proceeded in 
that fashion.16  Instead, Edward wanted to marry Simpson before his 
coronation and either have her crowned with him or have her present 
at the ceremony and recognized as his wife. This led to Edward’s 
mantra “No marriage, No Coronation.”17   
Another reason for Edward’s insistence that the coronation take 
place with him either married, or not at all, was a religious one.  
Edward did not consider him self a religious man; nonetheless, he did 
recognize the religious aspects of coronation.  He tells in his 
autobiography that the coronation “is essentially a religious service.”18  
As head of the Church of England, he did not think he could 
participate in such a ceremony when he, as king “swears an oath to 
uphold the doctrines of the Church of England, which does not 
approve divorce.”19  Edward further noted: 
                                                 
13Stanley Baldwin believed that he could speak for the people because 
he represented a government that was elected by the people.    
14 This is important because many historians contend that abdication 
was thrust upon the King.  In fact, the King was the first to mention 
abdication as an option to the situation. Ibid., 34.   
15J. Murphy V., and J. Bryan III, The Windsor Story (New York: 
Morrow, 1979), 246.  
16Warwick, Abdication, 109.  
17Beaverbrook, The Abdication of Edward VIII, 16.  
18Duke of Windsor, A King’s Story, 340.  
19Ibid.  
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For me to have gone through the Coronation ceremony 
while harboring in my heart a secret intention to marry 
contrary to the Church’s tenet’s would have meant being 
crowned with a lie on my lips.  My soul contained 
enough religion for me to comprehend to the full the 
deep meaning attached to the coronation service.20 
 
Despite Edward’s overall ambivalent attitude toward the 
established religion and its leaders, he was decided on the fact that he 
could not blatantly disregard the church and be crowned intending to 
violate its teachings.21   
On 21 November the “King’s Matter”, as it was know among 
London society, took a new turn.  Esmond Harmsworth, heir to Lord 
Rothermer, presented Simpson with the idea of marrying the King 
morganatically.22  According to Simpson’s account neither she nor the 
King favored a morganatic marriage, but since both desired not only 
to marry, but a quick and favorable end to the developing crisis the 
option was explored further.  Edward met with Baldwin on 25 
November and had him pose the question of morganatic marriage not 
only to the Cabinet, but to the Dominion governments.23  This action 
exhibits Edward’s adherence to the Constitution.  Here he is seeking 
the advice of his ministers and acting through his prime minister.  The 
                                                 
20Ibid.  
21 Another person that would not accept a marriage between the King 
and Mrs. Simpson was Dr. Cosmo Lang, Archbishop of Canterbury.  Dr. Lang 
planned to use Edward’s coronation as revival for the Church of England. 
Lang’s proposed revival would serve as a counterattack on the increasing 
number of divorces in Britain.  Duke of Windsor, A King’s Story, 332.  
However, the movement would lack legitimacy if Edward, as head of the 
church, married a divorcee.  Edward’s thoughts about being head of the 
Church of England are unclear.  There are times like the aforementioned 
when he treats the church with respect.  There are other times when he 
displays his frustrations with the church. At his first, and only, state opening 
of Parliament, Edward objected to affirming the Protestant faith.  He realized 
the historical importance, but still he said “the duty of uttering this outmoded 
sentiment was repugnant to me.”  Duke of Windsor, A King’s Story, 325.  As 
head of the church, Edward’s thoughts are troubling.  There are also instances 
during the abdication crisis when Edward reveals his feelings toward the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, he said: “I fully appreciate the quandary in which I 
had placed Dr. Lang.” Duke of Windsor, A King’s Story, 332.  All of these 
occasions muddy the position of Edward toward the Church of England.         
22A morganatic marriage is one in which a monarch marries but his or 
her spouse is not recognized his or her equal; therefore the spouse does not 
become the monarch’s consort.  Also, any children resulting from the 
marriage are excluded from the line of succession. Beaverbrook, The Abdication 
of Edward VIII, 50.  
23Duchess of Windsor, The Heart Has Its Reasons, 240-241.  
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King’s personal advisors, namely Lord Beaverbrook, warned him 
against such action.  Beaverbrook argued that by posing the question 
to the government Edward was constitutionally bound to its advice 
and, hence, gave the government the upper hand.24  Given the 
circumstances, Edward did not have Baldwin rescind the question but 
did tell the Prime Minster via Walter Monkton that “he wanted no 
advice on the marriage.”25  Nonetheless, since the question of 
morganatic marriage had already been posed, Baldwin was bound to 
give the King the government’s answer.  Channon perceived the 
political mood and noted in his diary on 28 November that “the Battle 
for the Throne has begun.”26  
 By 2 December Baldwin had received answers from most of 
the Dominions and the Cabinet had reached a decision regarding the 
morganatic marriage.  Therefore, on the 2 December the King and 
Prime Minister met at Buckingham Palace.  There Baldwin told the 
King the unhappy news.  Both the Cabinet and Dominions had 
rejected the idea of morganatic marriage.27  With this the King’s cause 
took a terrible blow.  The next blow came from a most unexpected 
source.  Bishop Blunt gave a speech on 2 December and in it spoke of 
his desire for the King to be more religious.  Many newspaper editors 
believed Blunt was referring to the King’s relationship with Mrs. 
Simpson and the next day ran the story.28  According to the Duke of 
Windsor, then Edward VIII, the harsh words and actions of the 
                                                 
24Murphy & Bryan, The Windsor Story, 251.    
25 Walter Monkton acted as the King’s emissary to Baldwin because 
the King no longer trusted his Private Secretary, Alexander Hardinge.  
Hardinge wrote the King a letter, which the King received on 13 November, 
the letter stated the following: the British Press would report Edward’s 
relationship with Mrs. Simpson; the Cabinet was devising strategy on how to 
deal with the situation, one solution being resignation; a new government 
would not be able to function; new elections would be necessary and the 
King’s personal life would be a political issue; and lastly Mrs. Simpson should 
leave Great Britain.  Edward suspected Hardinge received his information 
from Stanley Baldwin and, therefore, utilized Monkton as his “go between.”  
Beaverbrook, The Abdication of Edward VIII, 49.   
26Henry “Chips” Channon, diary entry 28th November, 1936, accessed 
at http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/MONedwardVIII.htm.  
27Duchess of Windsor, The Heart Has Its Reasons, 244.  
28Until then the British Press had been silent regarding Edward’s 
relationship with Mrs. Simpson per a “gentleman’s agreement” that the press 
would not report on the King’s private life.  Fred Siebert, “The Press and the 
British Constitutional Crisis,” The Public Quarterly 1, no 4 (1937), 121.  Dr. 
Blunt, Bishop of Bradford, was not referencing the King’s relationship with 
Mrs. Simpson in his speech.  In fact, Bishop Blunt was hoping to rebuke the 
King into taking his duties as head of the Church of England more seriously in 
the form of going to church. Williams, The People’s King, 104.    
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newspaper editors are what made the matter a political one.  The 
Duke stated, “by that action the Monarchy was brought violently into 
politics.”29  Edward had been reared on the maxim ‘the Crown must 
remain above politics,’ so to be entrenched in such a situation was 
deplorable to him.30  Nevertheless, Edward’s next move was to meet 
with his Prime Minister in order to sort out his options.  As it turned 
out the King did not have many options. When the two met on 3 
December Baldwin presented the King with the following alternatives: 
give up the marriage, marry despite the government’s objections and 
deal with its resignation, or abdicate.  The King stood his ground.  He 
now tried to find a way to marry and keep his throne while still 
keeping within the means of the Constitution.31 
Despite holding firmly to his position, the King did weaken 
emotionally.  However when Simpson proposed the idea that the King 
address his subjects via radio, Edward perked up.  The King decided 
that even though the chances of the government allowing the 
broadcast were slim, he would prepare a speech and propose the idea 
to Baldwin for consideration.32  In his proposed speech Edward 
wanted to tell his side of the story, which included this line, “neither 
Mrs. Simpson nor I have ever sought to insist that she should be 
Queen.  All we have desired was that our married happiness should 
carry with it a proper title and dignity for her, befitting my wife.”33  
Edward went to London to meet with Baldwin and ask permission to 
address the nation.   Edward’s request was rejected on the grounds 
that he would be superseding the government.  However, something 
more important happened that day.  The King saw the crowds that 
had gathered outside Buckingham Palace.  Portions of the public were 
rallying to the King in defense of his cause.34  Nevertheless, the King 
would soon find other channels of support.  On 4 December the 
                                                 
29 The action the Duke is referring to is his harsh depiction in he print 
media. Duke of Windsor, A King’s Story, 358.   
30Ibid., 382.  
31Ibid., 355.  
32Ibid., 356-357.  
33 The King wanted to tell his side of the story because he thought the 
newspapers were portraying only one side of the issue. Ibid., 361.   
34Ibid., 365-367.  Edward’s supporters came to be known as the “King’s 
Party.”  According to Edward, the party was an unorganized group of young 
commoners spread throughout London and other cities.  Mostly the groups 
just carried homemade signs and sang “God Save the King” or chant “God 
save the King from Baldwin.”  Edward reflected that had he supported the 
“King’s Party” he would have begun a civil war.  Hostilities may have been 
averted but definite war of words would have ensued which would have been 
just as devastating.  The Duke wrote, “A civil war is the worst of all wars.  Its 
passions soar highest, its hatreds last longest.”  Duke of Windsor, A King’s 
Story, 383-84.    
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Catholic Times, an unlikely supporter, made Edward’s case.  The 
newspaper was anti-divorce, but sided with the King because it did not 
want to see the “Crown made the pawn of politicians.”35  However, 
ironically, the King’s next means of support would come from a 
politician, Winston Churchill.   
Churchill played only a small role in the abdication.  Per the 
King’s request, Lord Beaverbrook met with Churchill on 30 
November because Baldwin had prevented the King from doing so.  
Beaverbrook informed Churchill of the situation and the King’s 
position at that point.36  Churchill only became actively involved in 
the crisis after the issue of morganatic marriage was denied by both 
the Cabinet and Dominions.37  On 3 December Edward cut ties with 
his then advisor Lord Beaverbrook and received permission from 
Baldwin to confer with Churchill regarding his position.38  Churchill 
joined the King for dinner on 4 December and was against the King 
abdicating from the start.  Churchill reasoned that Simpson’s divorce 
would not be absolute until April, nearly five months; therefore, the 
government could not advise the king, and certainly not threaten 
resignation, on matter that did not exist. Churchill’s initial advice to 
the King was to delay.39  That same night Churchill almost declared 
himself the de facto leader of the “King’s Party” but thought better of 
it.  Churchill agreed with Edward that kings should not be in politics, 
and by endorsing the growing party Churchill would have done just 
that.40  Nevertheless when Edward did ask for help and advice 
Churchill did not hesitate.  Both the King and Churchill left their 
meeting charged and ready to fight for the cause.  In fact, the presence 
of Churchill seemed to reinvigorate all of the King’s camp.41  The next 
day Churchill wrote the King a letter.  The letter makes one think the 
two were still soldiers fighting the Germans.  Churchill wrote: 
News from all fronts!  No pistol to be held at the King’s 
head.  No doubt that this request for time will be 
granted.  On no account must the King leave the 
country. Windsor Castle is his battle station.  When so 
much is at stake, no minor inclinations can be indulged.  
                                                 
35Beaverbrook, The Abdication of Edward VIII, 71.  
36Ibid., 65.  
37Lewis Broad, Winston Churchill: The Years of Preparation (New York: 
Hawthorn Books, 1958), 391.  
38Beaverbrook, The Abdication of Edward VIII, 74.  
39Ibid., 76-77.  
40Roy Jenkins, Churchill: A Biography (New York: Farrar, Straus, & 
Giroux, 2001), 500.  
41Beaverbrook, The Abdication of Edward VIII, 78.  
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Good advance on all parts giving prospects of gaining 
good positions and assembling large force behind them.42    
By telling Edward to entrench at Windsor Castle, Churchill 
evokes monarchical sentiment.  He tried to persuade Edward to defend 
his throne like kings of old.  He succeeded, but only momentarily.  
The previous night Edward had been geared to defend his throne; 
however, something changed overnight.  The same morning Churchill 
penned his letter, Edward sent Monkton to Baldwin in order to 
forewarn him that Edward would personally tell the Prime Minister of 
his decision to abdicate later in the day.  At this point the King had to 
see no bright spots in his situation.  However, Monkton quickly 
presented an optimistic point.  Monkton told the King to ask Baldwin 
to add with the Bill of Abdication a bill finalizing Simpson’s divorce, 
so she could marry right away.  This proposal enlivened the King a 
bit.43  But of course, once proposed, the matter was in the hands of 
Baldwin and the Cabinet. 
Baldwin seemed receptive to the idea and according to both 
Beaverbrook’s and the Duke of Windsor’s accounts, Baldwin promised 
to resign if the two bills were not passed simultaneously.44  
Nevertheless the Cabinet rejected the divorce bill and it was never put 
before the House of Commons.45  Thus, Edward was left with nothing.  
His abdication would not be complete until 11 December and the 
intervening six days was a big hullabaloo, the proverbial beating of a 
dead horse.  The newspapers did not cease attacking Edward and 
Simpson. All throughout the crisis the papers daily called for the King 
to act wisely.  The Times reminded the King and all of London that 
“the King is responsible for the Monarchy and for the Empire.”46  
Readers of the Daily Dispatch read that “the privileges of kingship 
carry with them tremendous responsibility.  The personal element 
must be subordinated.”47  Due to the majority of newspapers printing 
stories with the aforementioned sentiment, the public perception of 
the Edward was bound to seem selfish.  People could not see how a 
                                                 
42CV, V, pt 3, pp. 455-6; Quoted in Jenkins 500-01, n. 34. 
43Duke of Windsor, A King’s Story, 386. 
44Beaverbrook, The Abdication of Edward VIII, 80 and Duke of 
Windsor, A King’s Story, 391.  
45The bill carried no support in the Cabinet.  Non-Conformists argued 
that allowing a twice divorced person to remarry went against their doctrine.  
Anglicans simply considered divorce an “abomination” and thus refused.  
Other members of the Cabinet refused the bill because the believed they would 
lose support at the polls if they supported it.  Beaverbrook, The Abdication of 
Edward VIII, 80-81.   
46The Times (London), 4 December 1936, 18.  
47Ibid.  
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king could choose love over a throne.  Edward disagreed.  In his 
memoirs he wrote: 
I certainly married because I chose the path of love.  But 
I abdicated because I chose the path of duty.  I did not 
value the Crown so lightly that I gave it away hastily.  I 
valued it so deeply that I surrendered it, rather than risk 
any impairment of its prestige.48 
Conversely to the public’s and media’s opinion, Edward did 
consider other matters beside his own feelings.  In fact all throughout 
the abdication crisis Edward adhered to his constitutional role.  He 
never consulted anyone without the permission of his Prime Minister.  
He did not address the nation despite his plight, nor did he rally his 
supporters.  Edward maintained a working relationship with Stanley 
Baldwin, and when the situation came to a head could not take the 
advice of his ministers so he abdicated rather than plunge the nation 
into uncharted political waters.  
Baldwin, the Prime Minister, never wanted to get involved in 
Edward’s personal life.  Baldwin considered himself a close friend to 
the King and did not want to jeopardize that relationship.49  
Nonetheless, after Baldwin’s aforementioned hiatus he was compelled 
to action.  Lord Beaverbrook and Winston Churchill claimed that 
there was no constitutional basis for Baldwin’s actions.  In other 
words there was no constitutional crisis, and thus Baldwin stepped 
outside his carefully crafted constitutional role.50  However, according 
to the Parliamentary Council, Baldwin was still well with his role.  On 
5 November 1936 the council drafted a memo addressing the topic of 
ministers and their advice to a monarch.  The memo stated that if a 
monarch refused the advice of the government the government can 
resign.  However this action is a last resort, and to ensure that it does 
not happen the government should take the effort that no other party 
would form a government, hence forcing the monarch into 
submission.  The Parliamentary Council reasoned that a monarch can 
no longer rule in Britain without ministers, thus he, or she, would 
have no other option but to abdicate.51  Therefore, Baldwin was well 
within his limits when he consulted the oppositional parties to ensure 
that they would not form governments if he was forced to resign.  
                                                 
48Duke of Windsor, A King’s Story, 385.  
49Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography (London: 
Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1969), 980.  
50Beaverbrook also disliked Baldwin; therefore, that also fueled his 
suspicions.  Beaverbrook, 76-77.  
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Baldwin covered all his bases.  He spoke with both the Liberals and 
the Labour parties.  Sir Archibald Sinclair was the leader of the 
Liberal Party and he wrote this to Beaverbrook years after the 
abdication: “It is true that Mr. Baldwin consulted me about the King’s 
proposal to marry Mrs. Simpson and again on two or three other 
occasions about the development of the crisis, and the proposed 
morganatic marriage.”52 
Sinclair does not explicitly say Baldwin asked him not to form a 
government but that was the implied question and answer.  In fact, 
Middlmas and Barnes write in their book Baldwin: A Biography that 
the Prime Minister met with both Sinclair and Clement Atlee on 25 
November and the purpose of the meeting was to ensure neither man 
would form a government should Baldwin resign.53  
Once Baldwin had garnered support and guaranteed the 
stability of his government he could tackle the “King’s Matter” head 
on. The first issue was the morganatic marriage.  It has already been 
noted that both the Cabinet and Dominion governments rejected a 
morganatic marriage between the King and Mrs. Simpson.  However, 
there was logical, constitutional reason for them to be involved—they 
did not wholly reject the marriage out of spite.  Great Britain holds no 
precedent for morganatic marriage.  Therefore, the government would 
have had to enact legislation to set the precedent.54  Since the Cabinet 
and the Dominions refused the morganatic marriage, Baldwin could 
do nothing else with the issue.55   
As soon as Edward decided to abdicate in favor of marrying 
Mrs. Simpson, Baldwin was faced with the issue of the including a 
divorce bill with the Bill of Abdication.  Previously mentioned was 
Beaverbrook’s assertion that Baldwin promised to resign if the two 
bills were not passed concurrently.  According to Middlemas and 
Barnes, Baldwin never made that promise.56  Baldwin presented both 
bills to the Cabinet on 6 December and was met with a flood of 
opposition.  Neville Chamberlain stated that if Parliament passed both 
bills it would be looked upon as “an unholy bargain,” people would see 
the passing of the divorce bill as a prerequisite for the King’s 
                                                 
52Beaverbrook, The Abdication of Edward VIII, 58.  
53Churchill was also at the meeting on the 25 November, but he did 
not cooperate with Baldwin’s request. Middlemas & Barnes, Baldwin, 999.  
54Beaverbrook, The Abdication of Edward VIII, 52.  
55Beaverbrook has alleged that Baldwin influenced the Dominions by 
the wording of the telegrams sent about the morganatic marriage.  However, 
this is not true because Baldwin did not write or sent the telegrams; they were 
sent by the Dominions Office.  Middlemas & Barnes, Baldwin, 1000.    
56Ibid., 1010.  
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abdication.57  Baldwin tried, but to avail.  He could not convince the 
cabinet and the bill was struck down.  
There have been other allegations that Baldwin’s actions were 
fueled by a personal vendetta.  People have claimed that Baldwin 
never wanted Edward to be king and that he used the marriage issue 
to force Edward off the throne.  This assertion is not altogether true.   
Baldwin often found himself preventing others from being too harsh 
on the King.  For instance, on 9 November Neville Chamberlain and 
other members of the Cabinet drafted a letter containing an 
ultimatum, telling the King to give up Simpson at once or else.  
Baldwin did not approve of the ultimatum and was able to tactfully 
dismiss the issue when he took the letters home with him to review 
them and never brought them back.58  Another example that signals 
Baldwin’s desire to resolve the situation and keep Edward on the 
throne is when he arrived at the King’s home on 6 December prepared 
to spend the night.  Baldwin intended to be available to the King to 
talk out the issue, in case there was any possibility of avoiding 
abdication.59 
Stanley Baldwin was not the villain in the drama of abdication.  
At every turn he acted constitutionally.  Whether it was consulting 
the Cabinet, or Dominions, or advising the King according to the 
merits of the Constitution Baldwin adhered to his role.  Despite 
Baldwin’s compassion for the King, he did not abuse or misuse his 
position in order for the King to keep his.   
Edward VIII ceased being King of England in the afternoon of 
11 December.  His reign had lasted less than eleven months. the 
shortest reign by an English monarch in 453 years.60   These facts 
leave no room for ambiguity.  The abdication of Edward VIII has 
attracted much research.  Scholars have propounded theories of cause 
and effect.  Nevertheless, the actions of each of the principal players-- 
the King and the Prime Minister--have not been analyzed as to what 
constrained them, the Constitution, and that factor being the means 
for abdication until now.  Indeed, both men adhered to their role 
circumscribed in the Constitution so adroitly that a pleasant end could 
not be attained.  Perhaps, if one man had stepped outside the 
limitation of his office, abdication could have been averted; however, 
this was not to be, and was never really likely. Abdication occurred, 
Edward left England for self-imposed exile, and the story was left to 
be told, nostalgia and all.  
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King. Duke of Windsor, A King’s Story, 398.  
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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN: 
THEORIES CONCERNING ABOLITION 
 
Ashley Tomlinson 
 
 
As early as 450 B.C., records report the death penalty being 
used as criminal punishment in England.  Though kings generally 
decided what type of punishment should be inflicted, those sentenced 
to death were most commonly thrown into a quagmire and left to die.1  
As the Middle Ages unfolded, the number of capital crimes increased, 
as did the cruelty of the punishment.   It was not long until methods of 
burning, drawing and quartering, boiling, and hanging were used for 
commoners, while beheading, an honorable death, was left for the elite 
classes.2 
Despite all the possible approaches, hanging replaced most 
other methods of capital punishment by 1547.3  This became the 
English tradition. For example, those executed at Tyburn in London 
were routinely paraded through the town, usually sitting on a coffin, 
wearing a shroud.4  Crowds gathered in the street to mock the 
condemned, and there were rarely fewer than three thousand present 
to watch the execution. With similar execution traditions developing 
around the country, public support of execution lasted well into the 
twentieth century.5  Yet, the death penalty was abolished in 1969. The 
reason England, having such strong tradition and public support 
behind capital punishment, voluntarily eliminated capital punishment 
from their penal code is still debated.  
 Four central theories, all centering around twentieth century 
occurrences, have been developed to offer a solution.  First, scholars, 
such as Victor Bailey, conclude that the public developed sympathy for 
the condemned during the twentieth century and, as a result, pushed 
for abolition.   Others believe that abolition resulted from a shift in 
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English penal philosophy after World War II.  Another theory claims 
abolition is the result of the twentieth century Labour Party pushing 
for the issue in their newly formed platform.  Finally, some reason it 
was a series of controversial trials in the mid 1900s that changed 
England’s opinion on the death penalty.    
All four of these theories provide significant information 
concerning the abolition of capital punishment in Britain, but none 
proves completely correct.  Abolition was not won by a single set of 
twentieth century circumstances.  Instead, the path to abolition was a 
two hundred year struggle against tradition and strong public 
opinion.  Tom Phillips described the course of capital punishment in 
Great Britain as “a disease whose… symptoms slowly got better until 
a complete cure was effected in 1965.”6  With roots in the eighteenth 
century, the cure was found by a series of select individuals and 
interest groups who met strong opposition but kept persistent until 
they accomplished their goal in 1969.  By examining all the possible 
theories, it becomes obvious why the road to abolition was gradual 
development, not a twentieth century phenomenon. 
    
Benevolent Sympathy for the Condemned 
Some, including Professor Victor Bailey, claim that during the 
early and mid- twentieth century a majority of the public was 
“disturbed” and turned their support from the “barbarous and 
immoral” death penalty out of feelings of sympathy for the 
condemned.7  Evidence proves otherwise.  The public was never fully 
supportive of abolition, and those who were rarely felt compassion for 
the criminal.  
The early twentieth century Gallup polls provide evidence 
demonstrating that the majority of the public supported the use of the 
death penalty, before and after abolition.  For instance, in November 
of 1938, fifty-five percent expressed they would not support abolition.  
Interestingly enough, as the year of abolition came closer, the 
numbers rose.  A poll from March of 1953 said the use of the death 
penalty was acceptable to a seventy-three percent majority. As late as 
1960, seventy-three percent of the public believed that abolishing the 
death penalty would increase the crime rate. When a five-year trial 
period for abolition drew to a close in 1968, a majority still supported 
capital punishment.  A few years after abolition, in 1973, sixty-six 
percent still thought that death was an acceptable form of 
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punishment.8  However, the public’s opinion was never asked in the 
form of an official government referendum or vote.  Executioner 
Albert Pierrepoint9 expressed in his autobiography that he “would not 
pretend that, …in 1964, and for many years afterwards, a national 
referendum of the population of Great Britain would ever have cast a 
majority for the ending of the death penalty.”10  In fact, there were at 
least five new applications every week from men and women to 
become executioners.11  
 Those of the general public who did support a push for 
abolition were not always behind it for benevolent reasons.  Many 
supporters were not concerned with the suffering of the condemned 
but expressed that death was no longer a successful deterrent.12   
Pierrepoint suggested that if capital punishment was a successful 
deterrent, he “might be expected to know.”  Instead, he witnessed 
“young lads and girls, working men, grandmothers” walk with 
courage to their death.  He explained that death “did not deter them 
then, and it had not deterred them when they committed what they 
were convicted for.”13  Many abolitionists stood behind this claim, 
producing evidence from other countries where the death penalty was 
already abolished. If these countries crime rates had gone anywhere, it 
was down.  There obviously were more successful ways to deter a 
crime.14   
 In addition, pointing to the suicide of a public executioner in 
1932, many were concerned for the mental well-being of the person 
performing the execution, not the condemned.15  Pierrepoint 
supported this by stating that he “sincerely hope[d] that no man is 
ever called upon to carry out another execution,” due to the effects it 
had on him and his family.16  
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 Despite the emotional impacts of the duty, executioners had 
their job down to a science.  They calculated various human weights 
and sizes to perform the most humane drop possibly.  Only a few on 
the record had not been performed absolutely perfectly.17  Because of 
this, few could make a strong argument that capital punishment was 
inhumane or barbaric. Death was efficient and instantaneous. This is 
not to say that compassionate arguments towards the criminal were 
not used.  C.O.P.E.C. (Conference on Christian Political and Economic 
Citizenship) of 1924, held in Birmingham, refuted capital punishment 
by stating that “the business of the Christian Community is to redeem 
the offender.” Nevertheless, these arguments were held by a minority 
population.  
 
Shift in Penal Philosophy 
Near the end of WWII, Britain had become “a laboratory of 
social engineering.”18  Public ownership of at least one fifth of the 
economy left many believing this is when the real foundations of the 
welfare state were erected.19  Historian Ken Morgan agreed when he 
stated, “Not since the Washington of the early New Deal in 1933 had 
the governmental agencies in a democratic country been so caught up 
in experimentation and social advance.”  Consequently, many believed 
that the beginnings of criminal justice reform served as a primary part 
of the postwar transformation.20  Actually, none of the efforts made 
during this era producedvreal effects on the push for abolition.  If 
anything, the movement went backwards during this time.21  
Postwar Britain was much less welcoming to penal reform than 
many let on.  The atrocities of the war and the flood of postwar human 
rights activation did not alter any opinions of capital punishment in 
Great Britain; rather, it justified them.  The Nuremberg Court, 
beginning November 20, 1945, sentenced twelve of the twenty-two on 
trial to death.  Ten of these men were hanged, and public opinion held 
that they deserved it.  For many, these and similar trials served as 
justification to a “retributive approach to indigenous murder.”22  
Consequently, attempts in 1947 and in years following to reintroduce 
the Criminal Justice Bill of 193823 failed, and no legislation concerning 
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capital punishment would be passed until the Homicide Act of 1957.  
Even then, this bill did not mention abolition, only “amendments of 
law relating to homicide and the trial and punishment of murder.”  
Specifically, it addressed the death penalty surrounding issues of 
“abolition of ‘constructive malice’, persons suffering from diminished 
responsibility, provocation, and suicide pacts.”24   
If the shift in penal philosophy in the years following the 
Second World War was as strong as some claim, there would have 
been more advancement seen in the area of abolition, especially from 
the Labour Party.  This party, which was supposedly the main 
supporter of abolition, took office in 1945 with a parliamentary 
majority of one hundred and forty-six.  The bill, if not easily passed, 
should have been at least reintroduced, but there was no 
progression.25  
 
Labour Party Platform Issue 
Emerging in 1906, the Labour Party appeared to provide a 
realistic opposition to the Conservative Party, changing 
“parliamentary dynamics of the capital punishment debate.”  This led 
many to believe it was the Labour Party’s support and influence that 
caused the push for abolition, but in reality, they did very little.26  
Capital punishment was usually divided right down party lines, 
regardless of evidence.  For instance, a 1930 Select Committee was put 
together to examine the possibilities of abolition. Convincing 
arguments both for and against abolition were presented, yet neither 
side shifted at all. With seven Labour party members, six 
Conservatives, and two Liberals, the evidence proved of small 
influence, and the vote was split right down party lines.27    
If abolition was such a party issue, it would seem that, once in 
power, the Labour Party would strongly focus on abolition.  This was 
not the case.  The first two Labour Governments, 1924 and 1929-31, 
were met with limited success.28  Parliament refused to allow time to 
even debate the issue.  As Elizabeth Tuttle points out, the Labour 
Party was not “truly zealous for the abolition of capital punishment, or 
time would have been allocated for a debate on the subject.”  Time for 
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the first two Labour Governments slipped away.  It would be up to the 
next victorious Labour Government to get the ball rolling again. 29  
When the party took control of the Parliament by a large one 
hundred and forty-six majority in 1945, the time seemed perfect. 
Abolitionist groups like the National Council for the Abolition of the 
Death Penalty (NCADP) felt the end of WWII and the majority of the 
Labour Party “should bring success to our efforts for Abolition within 
the next few years.”30  However, it would be close to twenty years 
before abolition was passed.    A few strong individual abolitionists 
would continue the push, not the party itself.  In fact, the trend of the 
Labour Party was beginning to worry abolitionists in the mid 
twentieth century.  It seemed “the Labour’s leadership tended to be 
more enthusiastic abolitionists when in opposition than when in 
government.”31  This left the work up to leading groups and 
individuals truly devoted to abolition.  
 
Controversial Trials 
 Tom Phillips argues that it was “not rational arguments but a 
series of controversial individual cases” that finally passed abolition 
legislation.32 Some of these cases included that of Derek Bentley and 
Timothy Evans.  In 1953, Bentley, a nineteen year old boy with 
mental handicaps, had already been taken into custody for a break-in 
when his accomplice shot and killed a policeman.  His companion, only 
sixteen years of age, was not sentenced to death, but Bentley, who did 
not pull the trigger, was. Pierrepoint was forced to carry out the 
execution despite much public outrage.  In the second case, Evans’s 
daughter, Geraldine, had been found dead next to her murdered 
mother, Evan’s wife.  With the help of a principle witness, John 
Christie, Evans was tried, convicted, and executed for his daughter’s 
murder.  However, as the years passed, this “credible witness” turned 
out to be a “self –confessed necrophiliac murderer of seven women,” 
including Evan’s wife.33   This led many to question if they had hung 
an innocent man. Crimes like these struck an interest from the public, 
but not the kind of interest that could be used to abolish capital 
punishment.34  
The truth was that many felt Evans’ execution was an 
unfortunate mistake but not a case for legislative reform.  During this 
time, the Gallup Poll asked if the death penalty was applied in too 
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many cases.  Only five percent of the respondents said yes, and fifty 
percent said it was not applied enough.  Of those individuals who 
supported the death penalty, only nine percent would change their 
mind if an innocent man was wrongly executed.    As for the Bentley 
case, the Homicide Act of 1957 provided for those with “abnormality 
of the mind” to be taken into special consideration.35  
It seems the real outcries that came from controversial cases 
were merely “propaganda versions of various controversial trials.”36  
Pierrepoint gives an example of how these trials were used more for 
entertainment purposes then actually confronting the issue of 
abolition.  Take the two cases of Ruth Ellis and Mrs. Christofi, both 
women. Females had been executed before but in much fewer number 
than men.  Ellis directly killed her lover, firing at leave five bullets 
from point blank range, whom she wrongly suspected was having an 
affair. Christofi hit her neighbor during a confrontation, inflicting 
injuries that later caused death. Happening only one month apart, 
Pierrepoint received many petitions, even a check for ninety pounds, 
not to carry out the execution of Ellis.  It seems unusual that Ellis, 
killing in cold blood, received the attention.  It would seem more 
logical to defend Christofi, whose intention was only to argue, never 
to kill someone. Pierrepoint reasoned it was because Ellis was pretty.  
The “blonde night-club hostess” won the hearts of the public, while no 
one gave notice to “a grey-haired and bewildered grandmother who 
spoke no English.”37  If people were actually paying attention to these 
trials to promote abolition, Christofi should have received wider 
attention then Ellis.  As Pierrepoint claims, “all public life is field for 
controversy and misrepresentation…a denial never gets the publicity 
of the first false publication.”38 People read into these trials what they 
wanted, and they did not want to abolish the death penalty.   
 
Two Hundred Year Struggle 
Clearly, the war for abolition was not won by any one single 
twentieth century battle but many, over the course of two hundred 
years.  Pushed largely by individuals and interest groups, abolitionists 
were essentially realistic in their strategy.  They realized they were up 
against two strong factors, public opinion and years of tradition, and 
“neither of these responded readily to argument.”39  It was these 
abolitionists’ determination and endurance, even when they were 
repeatedly rejected, that would eventually win the fight.  Each one of 
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the movers was a necessary component because they developed 
arguments and goals that would last through generations.  Though 
the struggle is much more complex, the theory can be best examined 
by a combination of three major pushes: Origins of Abolition, New 
Intensity, and Twentieth Century Push.   
 
I. Origins of Abolition 
In 1764, Cesare Beccaria wrote Essay on Crimes and Punishments, 
expressing a view on capital punishment that widely contrasted his 
contemporaries.  In his view, humans, not being the creator of life, had 
no right to take it away.  Capital punishment could only be justified in 
two ways: if the death of an individual would save a popular 
government or if death was the only way to deter others from 
committing the same crime. These views directly influenced Jeremy 
Bentham and Sir Samuel Romilly, through whom English culture got 
its first dose of abolitionary thought.40   
 Later in the eighteenth century, Bentham created a few 
arguments against the death penalty that would leave a lasting 
impression.  First, he claimed the threat of death was not deterrent, 
and worsened criminals would be more influenced by “the 
contemplation of perpetual imprisonment, accompanied with hard 
labour and occasional solitary confinement.”41  This point was later 
picked up by Albert Pierrepoint, who felt no criminal he witnessed 
walking up to the scaffold was deterred by death. Bentham also 
stressed that judges and witnesses are both fallible, another argument 
that kept strong through the twentieth century.42 
 Sir Samuel Romilly pushed abolition into the political arena.  
During his time, there were over two hundred and twenty offences 
punishable by death.  While addressing Parliament, fellow Commons 
member Fowell Buxton reinforced Romilly’s main argument when he 
said, “Kill your father, or catch a rabbit in a warren—the penalty is the 
same! Destroy three kingdoms, or destroy a hop-bine—the penalty is 
the same!”43   Romilly made a hard push but was only successful in 
passing three bills, which concerned the repeal of capital punishment 
in certain instances of theft.  However, his work was not done in vain.  
He, together with other early abolitionists, had brought the cause to 
the surface. Later abolitionists readily picked up their ideas with new 
intensity.   
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II. Nineteenth Century New Intensity 
After Romilly’s death, the seeds of his ideas were cultivated by 
two men, Sir James Mackintosh and Sir Robert Peel.  In March of 
1819, Mackintosh’s request for a Select Committee on abolition was 
accepted, and as a result, many bills formally supported by Romilly 
were eventually revised and passed.  When Peel became Home 
Secretary in 1822, action started to increase.  By 1827, eight acts were 
passed that took at least 250 old statutes off the books.44  
These two men’s intensity was met and possibly surpassed by 
Quaker John Bright.  He spent the majority of his life speaking and 
voting in favor of abolition in the House of Commons.  Two main 
arguments solidified when Bright entered the field.  The first of these 
was that the “certainty of punishment was more important than 
severity in preventing the development of crime.”  Secondly, he 
argued, drawing from Becceria, man “was usurping a power only 
belonging to God”45 by practicing the death penalty.     
These men’s intensity spurred the creation of the Royal 
Commission of 1833, which concluded: 
That the punishment of death ought to be confined to 
crime of High Treason (happily on of rare occurrence) 
and (with perhaps some particular exceptions) to offence 
which consist in, or are aggravated by, acts of violence to 
the person or which tend to endanger human life.46  
As a result, a bill was passed that removed twenty one of the 
remaining thirty seven offences punishable by death.47  
Though some limited success had been made, the majority of 
England still agreed with Sir George Grey who said that the feeling 
towards abolition, including those of newcomer William Ewart, were 
“contrary to the general feeling of the House and to the country.”48  
Nonetheless, Ewart and Bright pushed on, producing bills in 1848, 
1849, and 1850, and were denied every time.  Again, though their 
persistence did not produce a new law, it brought their issue to the 
front.  A Royal Commission was set up again in 1864, but again, its 
success was limited.  The commission produced only the suggestion of 
outlawing public executions.49      
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 Two new players would emerge after the 1864 Commission, 
Sir Eardley Wilmot and J.W. Pease.  They stirred up one of the most 
convincing arguments used in abolition; focusing on other countries 
that had already abolished the death penalty.  This argument was 
expressed by Bright when he said: 
The Attorney General…says, what murders would be 
committed if hanging were abolished? The burglar or the 
garrotter would be tempted to kill his victim; but the 
answer to that is, that in all countries where capital 
punishment has been abolished, there is not one atom of 
proof that any such thing has occurred.50 
 
Although a later bill by Pease was defeated two hundred and sixty 
three to sixty four, these men’s arguments “laid the foundation upon 
which the twentieth century case for the abolition of the death penalty 
was built.”  From then on, the arguments changed very little right up 
to abolition.51    
 
III. The Twentieth Century Push 
With only murder, treason, piracy, and arson left punishable by 
death, the twentieth century push was met with a strong resentment.52  
However, a few individuals did continue to push, including former 
executioner James Berry and Penal Reform League founder Captain 
Arthur St. John.  The historical cycle was continued with bills that 
were continually drafted, printed, and never heard of again.  Like 
always, these individual’s fruitless sacrifices helped bring ideas to 
other’s attention. Roy Calvert, the leader of the NCADP, was one of 
those individuals.  Writing Capital Punishment in the Twentieth Century, 
Calvert capitalized on the logical arguments of abolishing the death 
penalty.  Again, these included death as an unsuccessful deterrent and 
the stationary or declining murder rates in capital punishment free 
countries.53        
In 1930, a Select Committee suggested that a test period of 
abolition be tried during peace time, but again, the bill went no where.  
The same failure occurred in 1938.  In 1948, abolitionists inched a 
little closer with an amended Criminal Justice Bill, but it was defeated 
by the House of Lords.  With all the commotion, another Royal 
Commission was set up in 1949 to look into the issue.54  Things for 
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abolitionists were not looking any better, but the sacrifice and 
determination sparked a debate which resulted in the Homicide Bill of 
1957.  Discussed above, this act gave Britain a mild taste of abolition 
because it severely limited the number of executions. Just as 
abolitionists had been claiming for years, there was no increase in the 
murder rate.  
The last influential individual was Sydney Silverman.  Just like 
his predecessors, he continually pushed for bills, was rejected, then 
picked up and pushed again. Finally, in 1964, Silverman gave one last 
push.  He presented an abolition bill that was read three times and 
adorned with an amendment.55   This amendment stated that abolition 
would expire in five years unless it was directly implemented again by 
both houses to keep it permanent.  It passed, two hundred and four to 
one hundred and four.  Four and a half years into the experiment, it 
was deemed a success and voted in permanently on December 18, 
1969.56       
 
Conclusion 
From the evidence, it is obvious that all of these key players 
were needed for abolition to conclude the way it did. Though the 
theories focusing just on the twentieth century provide important 
information, no single event or theory originated from that time alone 
was responsible for abolition. The death penalty had been a long 
standing tradition in England, and it took over two hundred years of 
individuals and groups pushing for abolition, despite being continually 
rejected and knocked down.  These fighters created arguments and 
determination that were taken up by generations after.  With these 
types of roots, the process of abolition was nothing sudden.  Instead, 
capital punishment had “been on its way out since the first 
murmurings of doubt about its efficacy were heard in the eighteenth 
century.”57
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THE EXCUSE OF PATERNALISM IN THE  
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH: IDEOLOGY OR PRACTICE? 
 
Josh Cole 
 
 
Slavery was a major economic contributor to slaveholders in 
the antebellum South.  Their livelihood depended on it, and slaves 
were exploited as much as possible in order to benefit their white 
masters.  Abolitionists, mostly in the North, viewed the institution of 
slavery as a non-Christian practice that took advantage of a less 
fortunate group of people simply because of their skin color.  They 
thought that the small amount of slaveholders present in the South 
treated their slaves inhumanely and committed atrocities that had no 
place in the states.  Historian Eugene Genovese re-examined the 
master-slave relationship a few decades ago.  He agreed with past 
historians that slavery was a cruel institution that treated the slaves 
unfairly.  However, he believed that extreme forms of mistreatment 
were very minor.  Genovese introduced slave-owner “paternalism,” 
not a good, painless, or benign slavery, but a slavery in which masters 
took personal interest in the lives of their slaves.1   
Genovese believes that paternalism “brought white and black 
together and welded them into one people with genuine elements of 
affection and intimacy.”2  It was a compromise between master and 
slave--the master would provide for the slave as long as the slave 
produced for him.  Genovese fails to distinguish between paternalism 
as an ideology and as a way of life.3  This sense of paternalism that 
Genovese mentions was a self-justifying ideology and, with a few 
exceptions, not a very visible practice in the slaveholding South.  The 
institution of slavery was meant to fully exploit the slaves, while the 
ideology allowed whites to exercise their “superior” status with 
relatively no guilty conscience. Compromise involved the participation 
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of both master and slave, and most slaves in the South did not agree to 
this pact.  They did everything in their power to defy the master’s 
authority due to their own brutal conditions and treatment by whites. 
The ideology of paternalism meant that the masters took care 
of their slaves because they were personally attached to them.  
Genovese believes that this was especially true because slaves were 
given an abundant supply of food by their masters, and they retained a 
plentiful, if not nutritionally, balanced diet.  Also, he points out that 
medical care on the plantations exceeded that of Southern whites, and 
slaves were relatively healthy under the care of their worried masters.4  
Masters closely governed the nature of slave life on their plantations; 
this was a central feature to Genovese’s paternalism.  He states that 
slaves had many outside contacts with whites that extended far 
beyond the exploitation of labor. 
During the 1930s, many ex-slaves were interviewed about their 
time in bondage by the Works Progress Administration (WPA).  One 
major theme that was constantly revealed by these former slaves was 
the prevalence of mixed-race ancestry between master and slave.  In 
the eyes of many slaves, these relationships between white masters 
and black servants were usually matters of forced sex between the 
powerful and the powerless.  This is in direct opposition to Genovese’s 
theory of voluntary association with whites outside of the labor circle.   
As one former female slave noted, “Immoralwhite men have, by force, 
injected their blood into our veins.”5  Ex-slaves understood sexual 
relationships as strictly coercive with white owners and overseers 
being the aggressors while slave women were the victims.  White 
masters not only included the male and female heads of the household 
but also their sons.  Former Kentucky slave Henry Bibb even 
suggested “that the strongest reason why southerners stick with such 
tenacity to their ‘peculiar institution’ is because licentious white men 
could not carry out their wicked purposes among the defenseless 
colored population, as they now do, without being exposed and 
punished by law if slavery was abolished.”6 
Many of these former slaves recalled how some slave women 
actually sought sexual relationships with owners or overseers to 
improve their own or their families’ lives and futures.  Ellen Craft 
claimed that masters sometimes promised slave women that they 
would educate and emancipate the children of their union.  However, 
Craft added that “a great majority of such men care nothing for the 
happiness of the women with whom they live, nor for the children of 
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whom they are the fathers.”  Craft’s own master never educated nor 
freed her, as he had promised her slave mother.  The possibility of 
better accommodations, increased food rations, and luxuries also 
prompted some slave women to seek out their white masters or 
overseers as sexual partners.  Several former slaves suggested that the 
long-term mistresses of white men fared much better than field 
hands.7  This evidence does support Genovese’s argument that some 
slaves did seek out whites outside of labor.  However, it is important 
to note the motives of these slaves for doing so.  They felt that the 
only way to survive the system was to form “beneficial” relationships 
with powerful whites.  They did so in order to feed, clothe, and care 
for themselves and their families.  Keeping the master happy allowed 
the slaves to stay alive, while also sending a few extra provisions their 
way.  Paternalism does not apply to these situations because the slaves 
felt forced to bend to the desires of their masters.  
Most masters handpicked their mistresses, and no “plain” black 
woman could throw herself at the sexual mercy of her master if he did 
not desire her.  These womenhad little power to refuse the sexual 
advances of their superiors.  Anthony Christopher’s family avoided 
punishment and received better treatment because of his sister 
Deenie’s relationship with the master, Mr. Patton.  Deenie understood 
that her family faced negative repercussions if she denied the master 
sexual access to her body, and consequently, she decided not to refuse 
him.  After all, Southern white men owned slave women as property, 
and the law permitted them great latitude in the treatment of their 
human property.8   
Slave men were forced to endure this humiliation of knowing 
that their masters and overseers could demand sexual access to their 
partners and wives.  They often stood by helplessly while their female 
partners and daughters endured the unwanted attention of white men.  
If male black slaves did attempt to interfere with the master’s 
advances on slave women, they could be severely punished.  Some 
masters even castrated their black rivals for coveted black women.9  
Slave wives often did have two competing intimate relationships – 
with husbands and with masters.  The ultimate authority in these 
relationships rested solely with the white masters and overseers.10  If a 
black male slave got in the way between the master and concubine, the 
white master could simply separate the couple through sale.  White 
men were not going to allow inferior black males keep them from 
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exercising their sexual urges, even if it meant severing family ties.  
The master’s own personal ambitions mattered more than those of any 
of his chattel.  
Wives of slave masters also practiced miscegenation with 
blacks.  By choosing a slave lover, an elite white woman could coerce 
the silence of her sexual partner because she could threaten him with 
an accusation of rape should he refuse her advances or reveal their 
relationship.  Black male slaves accused of this crime were swiftly and 
severely punished, often resulting in death.  Sexual codes of the time 
assumed that the concept of rape did not apply to men, especially not 
black men, because all men “welcomed” the sexual advances of women 
due to their instinctual, masculine nature.  This standard failed to 
recognize white women as sexual aggressors.11  This hardly 
represents a paternalist relationship between female master and slave.  
The female master, knowing that she could sexually exploit a black 
male slave, demanded affection from her black victims unless they 
wanted to suffer the consequences by refusing her.  Once again, the 
slave had no chance but to give into her demands so that he would not 
lose his family or life. 
Harriet Jacobs is an example of the sexual domination that 
white slave owners attempted to exercise over their black female 
slaves.  Jacobs was a Louisianan slave owned by Dr. Flint.  At the 
tender age of eleven, and while being forty years her senior, Flint 
began to sexually harass her.  Jacobs viewed Dr. Flint as any other 
white slave owner – he considered women of no value, unless they 
continually increased his stock.  When Harriet grew into adulthood, 
she began to engage in a relationship with a black carpenter from 
another plantation.12  Flint discovered her relationship with this man 
and disallowed her from marrying him or even seeing him again.  She 
would end up becoming pregnant and delivered a baby boy, and Flint 
flew into a rage over this.  He threatened to sell her child if she did not 
consent to his future sexual demands.  Flint also threatened to shoot 
the carpenter and made plans to build a cottage on the outskirts of 
town to incorporate Harriet as his “permanent” concubine.13  Harriet 
estimated that he already had eleven slave mistresses prior to her, and 
he sent them away with their babies when his lechery turned 
elsewhere.   
His lewd lust became a lifelong obsession to bend her to his will 
and to force her to submit voluntarily to his sexual demands.  She 
refused to become his “cottage concubine” and managed to escape 
from his clutches when he handed her over to his son.  Harriet did 
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believe that humane slaveholders existed, but they were “like angel’s 
visits – few and far between.”14  She did not feel comfortable in a 
sexual relationship with her master, but he insisted that she persist in 
one unless she wanted to see harm come to her and her loved ones.  
Genovese states that for the masters, paternalism meant reciprocal 
duties within which the master had a duty to provide for his people 
and treat them with humanity.  Also, it was the slave’s duty to work 
properly and to do as they were told.  Whites thought that slaves had 
an obligation to be grateful.15  Dr. Flint took this idea and reworked it 
to his liking.  He wanted Harriet to perform sexual labors for him, 
while completely giving into his power and being thankful for it at the 
same time.  Her refusal caused her to be separated from her family.  
There was no understanding or common ground between Dr. Flint 
and Harriet. 
Genovese describes slavery as a paternalist system that saved 
blacks from extermination.  He states that “it gave the masters an 
interest in the preservation of the blacks and created a bond of human 
sympathy that led to an interest in their happiness as well.”16  He fails 
to mention that the masters were only interested in the preservation 
of “superior blacks” or mulattoes.  Miscegenation between the white 
master and mulatto slave was a common trend in the antebellum 
South, and Thomas Reade Rootes Cobb of Georgia favored this 
superior race as the result of their mixture of white and black blood.  
He blamed miscegenation on the “natural lewdness” of blacks but 
found the problem mitigated because race mixture was beneficial to 
slavery.  Light-skinned mistresses served as regular partners to 
Southern whites, and quadroon balls were held in New Orleans where 
gentlemen arranged liaisons with beautiful black slave women.  In an 
auction of “nigger wenches,” slave traders presented their sexual 
victims as warranted virgins, excellent concubines and valuable for 
the manufacture of light colored slaves.  Slave masters preferred 
mulattoes to darker blacks and provided them with better 
opportunities in slavery and in freedom.17 
Proprietors generally preferred mulattoes as house servants 
and plantation tradesmen and gave them more opportunities to 
acquire skills for these occupations than they gave darker slaves.  
Masters chose mulattoes for household chores because, it was alleged, 
the “mixed race” was more susceptible to improvement and could 
handle tasks requiring higher capabilities.  More often than darker 
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skinned bondsmen, mulattoes were provided some education, enjoyed 
good food, clothing, and shelter, and had opportunities to move 
around both inside and outside of the plantation.  Sometimes they had 
just as much authority as plantation managers.  Mulattoes were major 
beneficiaries of manumission.  Masters usually granted them this 
freedom because they did not want their own children to grow up in 
bondage.  Due to all of these advantages that mulattoes enjoyed, they 
considered themselves superior to other slaves.  This feeling of 
superiority allowed mulattoes to associate with their masters on a 
more personal level.18  
However, slaveholder opinion remained divided about the 
mulattoes’ potential role in a crisis.  Some viewed their feelings of 
superiority and independence as a dangerous sign, while others 
believed that it would make them loyal and trusted friends of the 
white man.  The latter believed that the failure of Denmark Vesey’s 
conspiracy of 1822 showed the truth of this expectation because 
mulatto servants reported to their masters the plans for revolt before 
they could be put into action.19  Mulattoes and masters seemed to be 
more capable of paternal bonds because the masters treated mulattoes 
like human beings rather than heathen barbarians.  This relationship 
also shows that masters did favor a certain sect of slaves over another; 
The sect that more closely resembled themselves rather than the 
“unknown” purebloods.  Therefore, paternalism was an ideology that 
justified the better treatment of one people over another, although 
both peoples were “black.”  
 Slavery was a ruthless system of controls designed with 
deliberate intent to employ any form of degradation considered helpful 
in exploiting slave labor for profit.  As evidenced by the master-
mulatto relationship, castes were maintained among slaves and 
espionage was rewarded to divide slaves against slaves to support 
white control.20  However, slaves struggled fiercely against this 
growing power of the master class and their determination to reduce 
black people to labor and little more.  They created new economies 
and societies that tried to protect themselves from the harshest 
aspects of the slave regime and provide a measure of independence to 
counter the trauma of enslavement.  This trauma was a result of the 
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atrocities of slave life: towering rates of mortality, endless work, and 
the omnipresent violence of white masters and overseers.21  
The vision of the natural inferiority of peoples of African 
descent became a mainstay of the defense of slavery and certain proof 
that the proper and most humane place for black people was under the 
watchful supervision of a white master.22  The paternalistic 
compromise, as Genovese described it, implied a basic agreement 
between master and slave.  Slaves thought that they were entitled to 
sufficient autonomy within slavery to fashion their own lives and that 
masters would respect this arrangement because slaves would hold 
them to it.23  The problem with this theory is that slaves were not able 
to resist or rebel against white oppressors, who always worked to 
constrain slave autonomy.  Slaves had no one to appeal to except the 
masters or overseers, and masters would not be told by their slaves 
how to manage their chattel.  
From the mainstream masters’ perspective, slaves were 
property that had no control over their own possessions because all of 
their things actually belonged to their white masters.  Family 
formation and child rearing were business matters to be handled by 
whites.  Masters and slave mothers usually argued over how to care 
for the children in these families.  At Rosswood plantation near 
Natchez, Mississippi, the owner, Dr. Walter Wade, who fancied 
himself an expert on the care of newborns, always blamed mothers 
when children died of starvation (the mother failed to provide 
sufficient milk) or suffocation (the careless mother rolled over the 
child asleep at her side).  Former slave Fannie Nicholson related how 
her cousin’s child was treated by the master, recalling  “One day my 
cousin’s marster didn’ want to feed her chile, and when de chile kep’ 
on asking for food, her marster beat her and tied her up in de attic and 
de chile died.  ‘Cause of disawful thing my cousin went crazy.”24 
Slaveholders, such as South Carolinian politician James Henry 
Hammond, viewed these deaths as “the deliberate design of heaven to 
prevent me from accumulating wealth and to keep down that pride 
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which might in such an event fill my heart.”25  White attitudes similar 
to these did cause the blood to boil in some blacks, and these 
individuals defied white authority as much as they could without being 
killed.  The endless cycle of work with no freedom in sight was too 
much to bear for these rebels. 
Many planters were psychotically possessive in regards to their 
human property in this slave economy.26  Paternalism not only spared 
these planters from having to justify an oppressive system of force, 
intimidation, and ceaseless struggle, but it cast all responsibility for 
that reality elsewhere.  They wanted slaves to look at them as all-
knowing, all merciful, and all-powerful, and they bombarded slaves 
with words and deeds telling them that they sprang from savages and 
could be nothing but slaves.  They treated the slaves inhumanely, and 
almost all slaves concealed a burning indignation against their 
enslavement and the illegitimacy of those whose authority was rooted 
in it.27  They did not cooperate with each other in order to provide 
protection, rather they looked to defy each other by any means 
possible.  Genovese recognizes that this system of exploitation 
encouraged kindness and affection for mulattoes while also 
encouraging cruelty and hatred for purebloods.28 
Paternalism was a way of life that, in the words of Genovese, 
“necessarily involves harshness and may even involve cruelty so long 
as it is within the context of a strong sense of duty and responsibility 
toward those in dependent status.”  Herbert Gutman thinks that 
Genovese has utilized little evidence to prove “that the typical slave 
viewed himself or herself as bound in an ‘organic’ relationship” in 
which they depended on their masters for support.  He concludes that 
Genovese has not shown how slaves either benefited from the 
ideology of paternalism or acceded to these “mutual obligations” that 
were necessary for the unpractical system to operate.29  Paternalism 
was an ideal system in which slaves were to be treated fairly and as 
human beings, and the way that the majority of masters treated their 
slaves does not reflect this mindset. 
Masters exerted their superiority over their slaves through 
physical and psychological means.  They whipped slaves for various 
and often-insignificant reasons, branded them to reaffirm their 
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domination over them, and sometimes had their ears cut off if they 
disobeyed direct orders.  Slaveholders also constantly looked for ways 
to trim the costs of feeding their slaves and threatened to sell them if 
they did not produce enough for their masters.  As mentioned earlier, 
the slave family was not only at the base of masters’ most effective 
control mechanism, but it was also the source of their most persistent 
aggravation of the runaway.  Owners also awarded slaves sporadic 
holidays so that they could effectively pacify and control the slaves for 
a little longer.30    
Slaves felt the wrath of their owners because the owners were 
unhappy, intoxicated, or just in the mood to abuse their property.  
These acts of brutality became much easier once the masters ceased to 
identify or empathize with blacks and began to regard them as 
“subhuman beings.”  This subhuman status of black slaves allowed 
slaveholders to resort to curtailment or the complete denial of food 
allotments as punishment for “unproductive” slaves.  Masters also 
pierced their slaves with forks, burned them with tar, skinned them 
with knives, and killed them outright with pistols and whips.  Many 
more graphic accounts of slave brutality are available to us through 
slave accounts.  In his memoirs, Horace Muse illustrated the 
thoughtless sadistic master class, claiming, “I ‘member a marser in 
Ashland, Virginia what backed one o’ his slaves in a barn an’ shot an’ 
stabbed him to death ‘cause he said de slaves was ‘jarrin’ at him.’”31 
An unidentified former slave in Georgia said that his master 
“had a barrel with nails shove in it that he would put in when he 
couldn’t think of nothin’ else mean enough to do.  He would put you in 
this barrel and roll it down a hill.  When you got out you would be in 
a bad fix, be he didn’t care.  Sometimes he rolled the barrel in the river 
and drowned his slaves.”32  Punishments such as this hammered black 
slaves with the reality that they were a despised race, oppressed for 
their skin color.  They dealt with the world on those terms, thus 
further underlining the gap between master and slave.  Rejected by 
white society, blacks rejected white judgments in turn and developed 
their own moral system and mental world in opposition to the 
master’s.33 
Solomon Northup recorded his terrible experiences after his 
servitude. Tibeats, an overseer, was constantly abusing him for menial 
offenses. He even attempted to split open Solomon’s head with a 
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hatchet and then axe because he falsely accused him of ruining a crop, 
which Solomon claimed he did not do.  Solomon’s future owner, 
master Epps, treated his slaves far worse.  His chief delight was in 
dancing with his “niggers,” or lashing them around the yard with his 
long and heavy whip, simply for the pleasure of hearing them screech 
and scream as the great welts were planted on their backs.34  Recalling 
these pitiful festivities, Solomon recorded being “bent with excessive 
toil – actually suffering for a little refreshing rest, and feeling rather as 
if we could cast ourselves upon the earth and weep, many a night in 
the house of Edwin Epps have his unhappy slaves been made to dance 
and laugh.”35   
Epps did not care one bit that his slaves were made to suffer 
under his ownership, and no one knew this any better than Solomon.  
He claimes his master “could have stood unmoved and seen the 
tongues of his poor slaves torn out by the roots – he could have seen 
them burned to ashes over a slow fire, or gnawed to death by dogs, if 
it only brought him profit.  Such a hard, cruel, unjust man is Edwin 
Epps.”36  Obviously, Northup did not encounter any notions of 
paternalism from his various masters.  He constantly lived in fear for 
his own life and viewed whites as evil human beings bent on greed and 
power.    
Charles Ball lived forty years in Maryland, South Carolina, and 
Georgia as a slave under various masters.  One of his masters tied him 
with a clothesline to a mill post and left him there overnight.  The 
cord was bound so tightly around his wrists, that before morning the 
blood had burst out under his fingernails.37  Under another master, 
Charles was falsely accused of murdering a white woman.  The master 
brought a doctor onto the plantation to examine Charles.  The doctor 
assorted his instruments, felt Charles’ pulse, and told him that it 
would not do to skin him since he was so full of blood.  Instead, the 
doctor thought it was necessary to bleed Charles in the arms, as to 
reduce the quantity of blood before taking his skin off.  He then bound 
a string around Charles’ right arm, and opened a vein near the middle 
of the arm.38  He bled until he lost consciousness, but he was not 
skinned after all.   
Charles recalled other incidents that he witnessed as a slave.  
One slave was whipped until he crumpled to the ground.  A heavy 
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block of wood was chained to one foot, which he had to drag after him 
at his daily labor for more than three months.  This slave escaped to 
the woods by cutting the irons from his ankle, but he was caught 
about a week later.  He was whipped again and had an iron collar 
placed on him, which extended from one shoulder over his head to the 
other, with the bells fastened to the top of the arch.39  One master was 
murdered by one of his own slaves, a black woman, whose husband he 
had sold to a man who was going to New Orleans.  The woman 
accomplished her task by sneaking into the master’s chamber through 
the window, and then cutting his throat with a carving knife.  Two 
murder convicts were hung together, and another slave who 
attempted to conceal the murder of his master received five hundred 
lashes.  This slave was tied to a tree and whipped until blood flowed 
down in small puddles at the base of the tree.  Charles saw flakes of 
flesh as long as his fingernails fall out of the gashes in the slave’s 
back.40  Charles’ experiences with masters also suggest that 
paternalism was simply an ideology that did not reach fruition in the 
antebellum South. 
J.S. Lame was a slave in the South as well, and his reflections on 
the institution mirror that of Northup and Ball.  His master starved 
his slaves and punished them most severely for crimes both real and 
imaginary.  Genovese’s paternalism maintains thatslaves ate more 
than most other laborers.  He acknowledges that starvation did occur 
with the slaves but was infrequent.41  One imaginary crime involved a 
few missing chickens at the master’s home, which was attributed to 
the theft of one of his slaves.  The slave “lied” about the theft, and the 
master proceeded to place one end of a rope around his neck.  He then 
fastened the other end to his carriage and dragged him along the 
roads surrounding the plantation.  Lame “needed no works of fiction 
to illustrate the evils of slavery.”  They were seen in the social, civil, 
spiritual, and mental degradation of the blacks, and in its 
corresponding influence on the whites.42   
Edmund Covington was a Mississippi slaveholder who 
represented these evils of slavery.  He minimized expenditures on food 
and health care and increased work loads of female and child laborers 
to the point of exhaustion.  Slave families that lived on his land lost 
nearly ninety percent of all children born on the plantation, a 
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horrendously high rate of child mortality even for a coastal rice 
plantation in Mississippi.43  He simply replaced dead slaves with new 
property in order to maintain high levels of production.  Slavery was a 
purely economic matter to him, and if killing a few dozen slaves meant 
saving a few dollars, he would gladly accept this fate.  
Jermain Wesley Loguen attributed the cruelties of his white 
masters to evil temptations instead of their natural wickedness.  His 
masters and their mistresses were made beasts of as a result of the 
whiskey from their distilleries.  They were endurable while sober for 
the most part because the slaves knew how to perceive them and how 
they could and could not act around them.  Loguen’s master and 
mistress were always intoxicated though, and the slaves sensed that 
they were never safe in the presence of their white superiors.  They 
became very short-tempered, intolerant, and physically violent toward 
their chattel.  Loguen thus viewed slaveholders as licentious and 
intemperate, or in “kindred evils.”  Their “sensuous spirits looked 
downward to the earth, where they held their human chattels only as 
instruments of their pleasures, and neverupwards to the heavens.”44  
The white superiors treated the slaves as wild animals because they 
felt that they had the right to do so, and the spirits enabled the 
masters to exercise this power without blame.  Loguen believed that 
the only way to live through a life of servitude under a white master 
was to resort to “trickery,” or pretending to be content with his 
bondage.45 
The concerned efforts of Southerners to hide these less 
attractive features of their slave society caused an almost total 
censorship of information in local publications about the more hideous 
aspects of slavery.46  This makes Genovese’s argument for the practice 
of paternalism that much more doubtful, simply because there are so 
few sources besides slave narratives to rely upon for accurate details of 
slavery.  He argues that sinister treatment by cruel masters was in the 
minority, but we simply do not know to what extent this cruelty was 
practiced.  The narratives that are available to us though make clear 
that slaves were not “pitiful infants but angry men and women who 
had to endure unfavorable conditions that were not in their power to 
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change.  They retained their self-respect and sense of justice and hated 
the master for his cruelty toward them.”47 
Many slaves resisted the authority of their masters through 
violent and nonviolent means.  Genovese mentions this resistance, but 
he focuses more on the occasional, organized slave rebellions rather 
than the everyday acts of resistance.  Feigned illnesses were 
widespread, and this allowed the slaves to get out of work for a day if 
they were able to successfully fool the overseers.  Others stole from 
their masters as often as possible simply to resist complete control.  
Arthur Greene shifted the blame of stealing from the slave to the 
master class, claiming “White folks certainly taught niggers to steal.  
If dey had give ‘em nough to eat dey wouldn’ have no cause to steal.”48  
Slaves also participated in work slowdowns on a large scale in an 
attempt to hinder the master’s economic gains.  A small percentage of 
bondsmen helped fugitive slaves escape and sneak across the 
countryside.  Arson and poisonings were more lethal objections to the 
master’s authority.  These acts were mostly committed by domestic 
servants since they personally prepared the master’s family’s meals.  
These frequent acts of resistance helped spread a sense of moral and 
spiritual autonomy among the slaves – something that paternalism 
failed to do because it was not practiced by many Southern 
slaveholders. 
The most fractious and courageous bondsmen were removed 
from the slave quarters by sales and voluntary departures, and this 
greatly depleted the human resources for antebellum rebellions.  The 
fear of betrayals by other slaves also played a very influential role in 
minimizing revolutionary activity.  The infrequency of mass rebellion 
allowed slaveholders to hold firmly onto their ideology of paternalism.  
However, masters only behaved paternally toward their “perfect” 
black slaves.  These were slaves who produced greatly for their 
masters and peaceably lived their lives in servitude.  Patriarchs 
thought nothing of destroying kinship ties when “forced” to sell those 
who had breached the “contract.”  They were more concerned with the 
loss of valuable laborers than with the dissolution of any paternal 
bonds when a chattel died.49  This reinforces the suggestion that 
paternalism was more of an ideology than an actual practice in the 
antebellum South. 
Disdain of masters as a whole often inspired a complete distrust 
of whites in general.  Slaves instructed their youngest offspring to 
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view masters as evil and powerful adversaries with whom they should 
have as little contact with as possible.  Some masters were liked more 
than others, but slaves rarely allowed any kindness or humoring to 
blur the reality that the principal objective and motive of planters was 
to enrich their own pockets and their power at the complete and utter 
expense of slave labor.  The grapevine and personal observation 
taught the slaves that all planters, however “different,” were potential 
sadists capable of unleashing barbaric rage whenever they chose to do 
so.50  Former slave Robert Ellet shared in this disgust of the white 
race, especially the master Class, recalling “The overseers was white 
and of the lowest grade.  The slave always hated them.”51 
Some slaves did want to use “friendly” whites to secure pardons 
or milder punishments for stealing.  Genovese says that such appeals 
by servants “strengthened the doctrine of paternalism among the 
whites as well as among themselves.”  This type of situation is as close 
to paternalism as slavery represented.  Slaves considered bondage an 
evil that would cause the damnation of anyone who advocated or 
supported it. Bondsmen knew that the possibility of freedom depended 
on their correct behavior and that only faithful and “deserving” slaves 
would be rewarded, therefore the prospect of liberation became an 
effective mechanism of control in itself.  The small minority of 
pureblooded slaves who consummated paternalistic bonds came about 
exclusively from the top of the domestic hierarchy: mammies, butlers, 
and lady servants.  These slaves knew it was in their best interests to 
wear masks of loyalty and docility so that they could live favorably 
above the standards of field hands and other outdoor manual 
laborers.52   
Genovese asserts that paternalism demanded protection for 
blacks “in a strange and hostile white world.”53  The problem is that 
blacks were not offered this protection at all because they were the 
everyday victims of white cruelty and exploitation.  Genovese believes 
that paternalism insisted upon “mutual obligations – duties, 
responsibilities, and ultimately even rights – which implicitly 
recognized the slave’s humanity.”54  Slaves had little to no rights 
under their white masters, and their superiors viewed them as 
property to be controlled in every aspect of their lives.  There was not 
much compromise or affection between master or slave either, and the 
two groups could not have been more socially fragmented from each 
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other.  Paternalism was simply an ideal that allowed slaveholders to 
justify the exploitation of blacks in bondage.  Genovese’s description 
of the ideal is accurate in a few different areas. However, I have not 
been able to find many existing examples of it in the slave narratives.  
Paternalism was not the reason that slaves and masters coexisted; the 
slaves had no legal identities, few social connections, and relatively no 
organized resistance movements due to the support of slavery in the 
South.  They had no means to end their oppression to the “superior” 
white race; they were forced to live in bondage or to die resisting it. 
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KOREAN COMFORT WOMEN 
 
Krishna Ignalaga 
 
 
Whenever I think of the events of the past or talk about 
them, I get headaches and am unable to sleep for many 
nights. Even if I cry aloud, I don’t think I can feel 
relieved. My anger has become a kind of disease. It 
shoots through me, and even in the depths of winter, I 
can only sleep with my door open.1 
 
The plight of the comfort woman is of vital importance in 
discussing sexual violence in Asia. Brought to attention almost five 
decades after the end of World War II, the story of comfort women is 
a sad reflection of women’s rights in Asia. The extent of Japanese-
inflicted destruction and atrocities in Southeast Asia need not and 
cannot be repeated within the scope of this essay.  However, it is 
integral to examine the issue of comfort women within the context of 
World War II, prior Japanese settlement of Korea and the Greater 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.  
Indeed, the concerns involved in the comfort women issue stir 
up the question of military prostitution, transforming into one of 
sexual slavery based on race, class and ultimately, gender. While one 
cannot precisely determine the number of women forced into 
“voluntary” labor corps, the numbers range from 80,000 to almost 
200,000 women, approximately eighty percent of whom where 
Korean.2 With the sheer velocity of women subjugated into these 
corps, it is no wonder that there was both controversy and hesitancy 
on the part of the Japanese government to admit guilt. Accordingly, 
repatriations and even formal apologies from the Japanese 
government have been withheld, an issue that has created much 
antagonism with neighboring Asian countries. Indeed, the view taken 
throughout Asia is that unless and until Japan seeks responsibility for 
all its atrocities, including sexual crimes against women in what were 
then its colonies, Japan will continue to lose its credibility.  
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The purpose of this paper is to deepen understanding of the 
complex issues surrounding comfort women by concentrating on who 
these women were, why Koreans were a vast majority and why 
women were used for comfort.  
 
Who Were The Comfort Women?  
While official military documents on the recruitment and 
retention of comfort women during World War II have long since 
been destroyed, much research on the issue has hinged on the 
testimonies of aging comfort women hailing from Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines.  Perhaps one of the most disturbing 
features of this phenomenon is the serious and systematic involvement 
of the Japanese military in the testimonies of comfort women. Indeed, 
to prevent public criticism of atrocities, such as the Rape of Nanjing, 
where Japanese soldiers raped and murdered tens of thousands of 
Chinese women, and to combat the spread of venereal disease, 
Japanese military leadership called for the institution of military 
comfort stations. 
Nationalities, age, class, marital status and methods of 
recruitment do not seem incredibly varied among surviving women’s 
testimonies. It is generally accepted that eighty to ninety percent of 
comfort women were Korean, primarily because Korea was a colony of 
Japan and because Koreans were considered racially inferior. Health 
documents by Aso Tetsuo, a former military surgeon stationed at a 
comfort station in Shanghai in 1939, illustrates that most comfort 
women were in fact Korean.3 Another important factor in this issue is 
the relative youth of many women and girls recruited as comfort 
women. While the legal age for prostitution in Japan was eighteen and 
for Korea seventeen,4 there appears to have been no age restrictions 
for comfort women. Some were reported to have been as young as 
eleven. Indeed, Howard states that considerably younger girls were 
preferred by the Japanese soldiers because Japanese women that were 
recruited likely had been prostitutes before the war. Yet another 
interesting perspective is how most of the comfort women came from 
poor farming communities, with very little, if any, formal education. 
As such, the Japanese government has been duly criticized as it 
appeared that the government systematically took comfort women 
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from the poorer classes, with no real voice, in order to minimize public 
criticism of such practices.  
 
Why Were So Many Comfort Women Korean?  
According to Pyong Gap Min, the victimization of Korean 
comfort women had three major components: first, their forced 
recruitment into sexual slavery; second, their suffering inside comfort 
stations and finally, their decades-long silence.5 In 1905, Korea 
became a protectorate of Japan, and by 1910 Korea was annexed by 
Japan.  This simultaneously ended diplomatic ties with other 
countries, remaining this way until Japan’s defeat in 1945. In the end, 
Korea exported not only rice, other agricultural products, minerals 
and laborers, but also thousands of young, unmarried Korean women 
to satisfy the Japanese war machine.  
Min adds that colonial power and racial prejudice intertwined 
with gender relations in this mobilization of Korean women to 
Japanese military brothels.6 Indeed, for sheer convenience, it was 
considerably easier to draft and transport Korean women for sexual 
service because of Japan’s imperial dominance. Varying methods of 
recruitment were used, such as abduction, coercion and false promises 
of employment. As colonial subjects, the Korean people were governed 
exclusively by Japanese officials and military police. At the same time, 
with so much agricultural produce being shipped to the Japanese 
motherland, many rural communities were willing to let their 
daughters go abroad for more lucrative employment.7 The issue of 
racial prejudice is also highlighted in the fact that the only military 
tribunal after the war concerning sexual abuse of comfort women took 
place in Jakarta, Indonesia in 1948, wherein thirty-five Dutch women 
were repatriated.8  
Various testimonies from aging comfort women state that it 
was their powerlessness as young girls in a colonized state to be the 
reason for their mistreatment. Park Ok-Sun, for example, expressed 
her anger at the Korean government, saying:  
We were taken to the military brothel by the Japanese 
military mainly because our country, colonized by Japan, 
was not strong enough to protect us. Therefore, this is 
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not our individual problem, but our nation’s problem. 
Until the Japanese government resolves the Jungshindae9 
issue, it cannot have normal relations with Korea. The 
Korean government should put pressure on the Japanese 
government to acknowledge the crime and compensate 
the victims.10 
 
Why Were Women Used For Comfort?  
Wartime exploitation of women for sexual services has been 
part of wartime tradition for a long period of time, even before 
Japanese institution of comfort women. Indeed, in the context of 
combat and uniform, battlefields have been described as one of the 
most stressful environments, as ‘temporary derangements’ as one 
Japanese Army medical officer has said.11 While not condoning the 
blatant abuse of women for sexual services during wartime, more or 
less institutionalized means of catering to this sexual need have been 
found for various armies in history. The Roman Empire, for example, 
had a comfort system similar to that of the Japanese. A proponent of 
institutionalized slavery, the Romans instituted a system wherein 
captive females were made slaves for military brothels attached to 
every Roman garrison or campaigning army.12 During the 16th 
century, the Spanish Duke of Alva’s army, when invading the 
Netherlands with the Armada, was followed by ‘400 mounted whores 
and 800 on foot.’13 The British Empire was by no means immune to 
this phenomenon. With a prostitutes’ quarter attached to each 
cantonment,14 military prostitution was at first an official policy, later 
to be rescinded in favor of a more fluid policy based on voluntary 
participation.  
In feudal Japan, prostitution was quite open, making infamous 
the pleasure districts of Kyoto, Osaka and Tokyo. Indeed, Edo (as 
Tokyo was then called) was epitomized as ‘the nightless city.’15 
Accordingly, sexual superstitions, a dominant feature of culture, 
pervaded the military along with death and suffering superstitions. 
Advocating the belief that sex before going into battle worked as a 
charm against injury, the Japanese ritualized the practice of visiting 
comfort women, especially before a unit was to leave for the front. 
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Amulets would be made with the pubic hair of comfort women, or 
from something taken from them. Kim Il Myon, although critical of 
Japanese militarism, highlights the plight of the armed forces, saying, 
“To soldiers in the frontline, ever surrounded by the sound of guns, 
wrapped in smoke stinking of death and not knowing when death 
come… a visit to a comfort station was no doubt the only form of 
relief. It was the only kind of individual act in which one was 
‘liberated’…. It was their ‘oasis.’”16 
 
The Decades Long Silence and the Movement for Redress  
Although factors such as the destruction of official documents 
and the understandable reluctance of surviving comfort women to 
bring up memories of the past contributed to the five-decade long 
silence, another factor is also quite important. Indeed, the cultural 
legacy of a patriarchal society is a major player in this silence. Soh 
states that in the traditional Korean patriarchy, sexual freedom for 
men was enthusiastically encouraged, whereas women’s sexuality was 
rigidly controlled.17 As such, comfort women returning from the 
enclaves of Japanese military brothels were often ostracized by family 
and friends, a huge detriment in a society where family kinship is 
integral to one’s place in the society. At the same time, it is interesting 
to note that one of the Dutch women in Indonesia was deemed unfit to 
be a nun because she had been forced to be a comfort woman.18 
Within this cultural legacy, it is not surprising to note that 
many comfort women actually committed suicide, or were adamant 
about keeping their shame to themselves, at least until 1991, when 
Kim Hak-Sun came forward to testify her life as a comfort woman.19 
So all encompassing was this silence that the international community 
came to hear about militarized sexual slavery only when a class action 
suit was filed against the Japanese government, demanding 
compensation for this gross violation of human rights, and primarily, 
women’s rights. Perhaps the most contentious issue in both South 
Korea and Japan involving comfort women has been the official role 
and responsibility of the Japanese government during this time period. 
Indeed, Japan did not admit its involvement in the recruitment, 
management and supervision of comfort stations until mid-1992.20  
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While the movement for redress and compensation cannot fit 
within the scope of this paper, it is highly interesting to note that the 
debate on comfort women has come at a time when women’s rights are 
slowly but surely gaining momentum in the patriarchal societies of 
Asia, creating not only an awareness of women’s rights but also one of 
true pan-Asianism. Whereas nationalism has at times played a 
detrimental role in the movement for redress, feminist activists have 
been able to forge international coalitions across Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand to help 
bring this movement to the forefront. In 1995, for example, the Asian 
Women’s Solidarity Forum held its conference in Seoul, adopting a 
resolution to denounce the intention to forego responsibility by 
allowing Japan to pay indemnities from nongovernmental funds.21 Yet 
another example is the vast representation of these countries at the 
U.N World Conference on Women in Beijing in September 1995,22 as 
well as various war crime mock-trials spearheaded by many feminist 
organizations in Japan and Korea.  
 
Conclusion  
While it has taken five decades to interrupt the silence, it has 
also taken the rise of feminism among Asian women to bring the 
comfort women to the forefront of women’s rights. There is a 
substantive link between wartime exploitation of women and 
patriarchal societies, as Asian politics and governments are still 
overwhelmingly dominated by males. But then again, fate is never 
destiny. Indeed, the Korean comfort women movement for redress can 
be seen as a victory for feminist political activism. It is integral to see 
this issue as part of the universal moral issue of human rights, along 
with sex tourism in various parts of Asia and rape during wars, such 
as in Yugoslavia, Bosnia, and more recently, Liberia.  
Alongside infamous atrocities, it is unlikely that this issue of 
comfort women will be easily forgotten.  Until and unless Japan 
completely announces its responsibility for the institution of comfort 
women, it will continue to lose its credibility as a major advocate of 
human rights. At the same time, it is integral to note that while Japan 
created a systematic institution for militarized prostitution, the Allies 
also failed to address the concerns of comfort women at the end of the 
war. While addressing this issue will never bring back lost years, it 
must be emphasized that continuous work in the fields of feminism 
and humanitarianism is required in order to promote global 
egalitarianism and prevent the spread of various forms of violence 
against women. The need to address global issues relating to women 
is not just good politics; it is a fundamental right. 
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MASSACRE AT TLATELOLCO 
 
Lauren Berggren 
 
 
Mexico in 1968, much like in many other countries throughout 
the world, experienced a student movement to demand political and 
social changes. Although this was not the first time students in 
Mexico had initiated protests, the events that took place at Tlatelolco 
became a tragedy in Mexican history. The movement officially began 
on July 22, 1968 and lasted only a few months until the massacre at 
Tlatelolco on October 2, 1968. The casualty estimates in the massacre 
range from around twenty or forty nine, as government accounts 
suggest, to well over seven hundred.1 The movement succeeded in 
uniting people and bringing political discussions into the public to 
attack “the one party system that had ruled Mexico for over forty 
years.”2  Even though the government ended the student movement in 
October through the use of extreme violence, the students left a legacy 
that is still felt today. 
The student movement came about in a political climate that 
was dominated by the Partido Institucional de la Revolución Mexicana 
(Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI), which had come to power in 
the 1940s.3 The party saw itself as the embodiment of the Mexican 
Revolution.4 One of the characteristics and criticisms of this party has 
to do with the Cardenista myth.5 The key was to maintain the façade 
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of the president being “the personification of a perpetually strong, 
progressive state,” 6 and there was also an emphasis on modernization 
and economic growth. But, during the last few years of the presidency 
of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970) the myth of the strong executive 
branch of the government began to be criticized. The student 
movement in Mexico City showed the weakness of the Mexican state. 
The only response the government had for the students was violence 
and repression, displaying the flaws in their political system. 
 It was not the first time that students in Mexico had 
organized and protested. The difference was that in the past the 
students’ demands and protests related directly to school issues. 
Students demanded “easier exams, higher grades, or the removal of an 
unpopular administrator,”7but those were not the goals of the students 
in 1968. The Mexican government was quick to accuse the students of 
subversion. Rather than see the students’ critique of the political 
system as valid, the government chose to point the blame at 
communist groups, foreign influence, or anyone else who wanted “to 
embarrass Mexico before the world.” 8 
 The student movement coincided with the 1968 Olympics, 
held in Mexico City. For those in the government, this was an 
opportunity to show the world how much Mexico had developed and 
that the Mexican Revolution was a success.9  This put a lot of pressure 
on the government to make sure that there were no problems while 
they had the attention of the entire international community. Mexico 
invested 140 million dollars in preparing for the Olympics. The 
government constructed high-rise apartment buildings, hotels, a 
transportation system, and a stadium with murals by the famous 
Mexican painter, Diego Rivera.10 All of these projects were supposed 
to show that Mexico was a modern, “stable, and democratic” nation. 11 
The student protests and the way the government dealt with them 
portrayed a different Mexico. 
Early in 1968, there were no apparent problems with the 
students. It seemed like the country came together in order to make 
the Olympics a success. There were no anti-war protests like in Paris 
and the United States and no incidents like at the Democratic 
National Convention in Chicago in 1968. Student and government 
relations had remained fairly peaceful. Soon that changed, relatively 
quickly.  
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The Mexican generation that came of age in the 1960s had been 
influenced by a variety of sources. They had witnessed the Cuban 
Revolution, the rise of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara and even the 
Mexican labor disputes in the 1950s and 1960s.12 Also, unlike the 
demonstrations of the past, the student participants were middle 
class.13  
The problems began on July 22, 1968. It was a conflict between 
groups of students from rival schools that was eventually joined by 
street gangs.14  The conflict flowed over into the next few days.  The 
conflict itself did not start the protests, but rather the way the police 
reacted to this conflict. The protests began after the government sent 
in their riot police, known as the granaderos.  
The granaderos went after any student that they saw in the area, 
whether or not they were involved in the conflict. There were also 
reports of the students fleeing to avoid the violence, only to be 
pursued by the granaderos.15 During these events, students were jailed 
and tortured.16  
As was expected, there were discrepancies between government 
and eyewitness accounts. The government claimed that the students’ 
violence was what caused them to call in the granaderos. This story 
made it easy for the government to defame the students. The 
eyewitness accounts, which were not reported in the papers, described 
a scene in which the granaderos were provoking violence and “looting 
and breaking windows.”17   
One of the main student groups at this time was the Federación 
Nacional de Estudiantes Técnicos (National Federation of Technical 
Students, FNET). Following the first few days of violence, FNET 
organized a peaceful protest march on July 26, 1968. They wanted to 
protest the use of violence against the students and the efforts of the 
government to make the students look bad. Even though the march 
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was legal and peaceful, the police were called in and violence ensued.18 
This set the tone for the rest of the movement. The protesters 
intended to have peaceful demonstrations, but they were met with 
police violence. This police violence helped bring the movement 
together and resulted in students responding with militancy. 
While FNET was mainly protesting the use of police violence, 
other student groups were participating on more ideological grounds. 
Students from Central Nacional de Estudiantes Democráticos (National 
Center of Democratic Students, CNED) and Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México (National Autonomous University of Mexico, 
UNAM) were being criticized by the government for being too 
politically liberal. Some in the government referred to these groups as 
communists.19 However, the government did not stop at simply 
harassing students. On July 26, the day of the protest, the police 
invaded the Communist Party headquarters and arrested Eduardo de 
la Vega Ávila and other members of the party, who were referred to as 
the “76 red agitators” in the newspapers. 20  The government 
continued to justify their actions by asserting that the communists and 
other students did pose a threat to the government. 
The students responded by going on strike, and the members of 
UNAM and Instituto Politécnico Nacional (National Polytechnic 
Institute, IPN) created a list of demands. The list included the release 
of the students that had been arrested, disbandment of the granaderos, 
and compensation for students and families of students who had been 
injured.21 None of these demands were met. The government refused 
to negotiate and violence continued into August. 
The next major step in the student movement was the creation 
of a new student organization that would represent all the schools in 
the country.22 The organization was the Consejo Nacional de Helga 
(National Strike Council, CNH). They had a six-point petition, which 
outlined the demands of the students: 
1. Liberty for political prisoners 
2. Dismissal of [police chiefs] Generals Luis Cueto Ramírez 
and Raúl Mendiolea, and Lt. Colonel Armando Frías 
3. Abolition of the granaderos corps, direct instrument of 
repression, and prohibition of the creation of a similar corps 
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4. Abolition of Articles 145 and 145 bis of the Penal Code, 
judicial instruments of aggression 
5. Indemnification of the families of the dead and injured who 
had been victims of the aggression since July 26 
6. Clarification of the responsibility of officials for the acts of 
repression and vandalism committed by the police, granaderos, 
and army23 
 
Just as before, the government was unwilling to negotiate. The 
government believed that it could not have met any of the demands 
without appearing to have lost control. This would then lead to more 
requests.24 Even though the demands of CNH were very specific, there 
was a greater goal of the movement. By demanding rights and 
attempting to hold the government responsible for its actions, they 
were calling for a true democracy in Mexico. 
Since the government did not respond to the demands, the 
students continued with mass demonstrations, winning the support of 
professors and other intellectual groups. One of the more successful 
actions of the CNH was its use of brigades. Brigades were small 
groups within the organization that printed flyers, made speeches, and 
helped rally popular support for their cause. Each brigade “went far 
beyond the aims and policies of the CNH.”25 Michael Soldatenko 
stated that “the key was not the leaders or organizations but the 
actions of thousands of students that educated and incorporated 
increasing numbers of Mexicans.” 26 Women played a large role in this 
aspect of CNH.27 This method of using participatory democracy to try 
and reform the political system was the strongest strategy of the 
CNH.  
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The period from August 13 to August 27 has been recognized 
as “the Golden Age of the Movement.”28 Marches taking place on 
these two dates to the Zócolo29 were among the largest and “most 
festive.”30 The scene that Elena Poniatowska and Michael Soldatenko 
describe resembles that of a festival. They describe the atmosphere as 
optimistic; the students believed they had already made some impact 
on the political system and society. The students thought President 
Díaz Ordaz could not refuse to open dialogue between the opposing 
factions.31 The demonstrators had pictures of famous revolutionaries 
such as Poncho Villa, Zapata, Hidalgo, and Ernesto “Che” Guevara.32 
Salvador Martinez de la Roca, a member of the action committee of 
UNAM, stated the goal of the students that day. “We had to take over 
the Zócolo; we had to deconsecrate the Zócolo—and we did, three 
times.”33  
 Despite the optimism of the students, President Díaz Ordaz 
refused to negotiate. In an address to the nation on September 1, 1968, 
he said: 
It is evident that non-students had a hand in the recent 
disturbances; but it is also evident that, whether 
intentionally or just by going along, a good number of 
students took par…. The other road is open. We would 
not like to see ourselves forced to take measures against 
our will, but if it is necessary we will do so; whatever is 
our duty, we will do; just as far as we are forced to go, we 
will go.34 
In his response, Ordaz hinted that the government was not going to 
tolerate the demonstrations or disruptions anymore, especially since 
the Olympics were right around the corner.35 Yet, the CNH still 
continued with their public discussions and distribution of flyers.  In 
an attempt to further the movement, they organized another march. 
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This march would be both nonviolent and silent. Students 
placed white tape over their mouths in protest.36 They then marched 
to the Zócalo in silence. This was an attempt to change the way that 
the media and others perceived them. Their peaceful demonstration 
showed that they were neither violent nor “out of control.”37 The 
Great Silent March also served as inspiration for other groups who 
had not yet become involved. Mainly, it showed that students were 
not powerless.38 
The government eventually agreed to written negotiations 
with the students in the days following the Great Silent March. But, 
on September 18, 1968, the army invaded University City in an effort 
to break-up UNAM. The government stated that UNAM was the 
center of subversion and had been controlled by outside forces.39 
The students responded with violence, and the army then took 
over the IPN. After this, violence continued to spread to other schools. 
The leaders of CNH and other groups were forced to stay in hiding to 
keep from being arrested. This was all happening as the Olympic 
visitors were beginning to arrive. President Díaz Ordaz seemed to 
think that he had beaten the students into submission, so he sent two 
representatives to negotiate. The students refused to negotiate until 
the army pulled out of UNAM. The army left UNAM on September 
30, and the representatives from CNH met with the president’s 
representatives on October 2.40 
Events seemed to quiet down until protesters began to 
assemble in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas for another rally. Soldiers, 
tanks and jeeps surrounded the plaza, but nothing was done by the 
army to prevent the rally.41 With the military blocking off the plaza, 
the organizers decided to cancel the march to IPN. However, the 
soldiers still invaded the rally. Some soldiers were dressed in civilian 
clothes, distinguishing themselves with a white handkerchief or glove 
on their hand. A helicopter began dropping flares, and soldiers calling 
themselves the Olympic Battalion fired into the crowd. The plaza 
erupted into absolute chaos. One of the eyewitnesses said: 
There was nothing we could do but keep running. They 
were firing at us from all directions…. A girl came by 
shouting “You murderers, you murderers!” I took her in 
my arms and tried to calm her down but she kept 
screaming, louder and louder until finally the youngster 
behind me grabbed hold of her and started shaking her. I 
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noticed then that her ear had been shot off and her head 
was bleeding. The people in the crowd kept piling on top 
of another.42 
The military would not let the Red and Green Cross ambulances into 
the plaza until much later. By then, many of the dead and injured were 
already taken by the military.43   
There were differing versions of what happened that night in 
the Plaza. The soldiers and the government claim that they only used 
violence in response to being fired at by students. There are also 
differing accounts of how many people were killed that night. The 
government estimated twenty-nine casualties, but many who were 
present that night believe that hundreds, possibly as many as seven 
hundred people were killed.44 They even accused the government of 
disposing or burning many of the bodies to hide the truth.45 In the 
official history the students are painted as the instigators. However, 
most people know and believe the story told through the eyewitness 
accounts and testimonies of the survivors. Paco Ignacio Taibo, a 
writer and participant, wrote: 
Here is the truth confronting the official version 
propagated by the Grand Commission of the Senate that 
the students had incited the shooting. Today, all the 
world knows that the provocateurs were soldiers in 
civilian clothes and with a white glove belonging to the 
Olympia Battalion.46 
Following the massacre, there were many that were trying to 
find out why this happened. But, there was not much available 
evidence because the government had quickly covered it up. The 
massacre ended the 1968 student movement. The government stood 
by their story that some of the students were armed, and the police 
only fired into the crowd after being shot at. The government also 
came up with confessions from some of the movement’s leaders who 
acknowledged the CNH had communist goals and that the students in 
the Plaza de las Tres Culturas were armed. The army also added to 
the case against the students with “a list and photographs of arms it 
found in buildings around the plaza,” which proved there was a 
“revolutionary conspiracy.”47  Although this supposed evidence is not 
convincing, considering the power that the government had in 
coercing these confessions, there has been a period of silence 
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concerning the true story of what happened in Tlatelolco. Even as late 
as the 1990s, there was no mention of the Tlatelolco protest in 
primary-school textbooks. Ernesto Zedillo, when he was minister of 
education before becoming president, tried to insert a neutral 
paragraph about the protest into a textbook, but he was forced to take 
it out, due to pressure from government officials.48 
Recently, there has been more interest in what actually 
happened that day in October, specifically in finding out what real role 
the Mexican government played in the massacre. On June 10, 2002, 
President Vincente Fox signed a freedom of information law in 
Mexico. With this law, many secret police, military and intelligence 
documents were made available to the public.49 Currently, new 
investigations are being performed to see what measures the 
government took to hide the events. Some soldiers have come forward 
to confirm the eyewitness accounts.50 
Just as these Mexican documents have been opened, United 
States CIA documents on this topic have also been made public. The 
CIA documents showed that the United States government had been 
informed on the students’ actions in Mexico. A White House memo 
from July 31, 1968 talks about communist involvement. The Mexican 
government claimed to have proof that the communists were behind 
the disturbances. Although the CIA did not have evidence to back this 
claim up, they agree that the USSR might have somehow been 
involved.51 
Many historians recognize the massacre at Tlatelolco as a 
turning point in Mexican history. Even though the students were 
defeated, they struck a large blow against the government, leading to 
political changes. The way that the government responded to the 
demonstrations and protests showed the weakness of the political 
system, and it also showed the lengths to which the government 
would go to hold on to power. The extreme use of violence in the 
Plaza de las Tres Culturas and the subsequent government has not 
been forgotten. The student movement was a large step towards 
democracy in Mexico.  
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GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 
 
Meghan Houlihan 
 
 
In April 1994, the systematic slaughter of almost one million 
men, women, and children began in Rwanda.  On May 5, 1998, the 
United States House of Representatives held a special meeting 
concerning the genocide in Rwanda, four years too late.  The genocide 
in Rwanda was not a high priority in the United States in 1994 and 
only years later would Americans appreciate the extent of the horror 
and death of the genocide.  In 1994, the U.S. was already devastated 
by failure in Somalia and had seen the devastating results of ethnic 
warfare in Burundi. Due to these events, it did not want to intervene 
in Rwanda.  The U.S. played no role in Rwanda and contributed to the 
massacre by not recognizing the genocide early enough and not 
offering military and humanitarian support in a timely fashion. 
The origins of genocide in Rwanda reside in the colonial era.  
Rwanda was ruled by Germany from 1894 until the end of World 
War I.1 At the conclusion of WWI, Belgium took control of Rwanda 
and neighboring Burundi. In 1924, the Belgians enforced a system of 
indirect rule to govern the two newly acquired territories.2   To 
separate the native people of Rwanda, short and dark people were 
categorized as Hutus; taller, lighter-skinned people were categorized 
as Tutsis.  The colonial powers believed that the Tutsis were 
descendents of the Oromo tribe who originated in Ethiopia.3  The 
German colonizers believed this attribute made the Tutsis more 
“white,” and thus superior to sub-Saharan Africans. 4   Another way to 
classify a person as Hutu or Tutsi was by occupation.  Hutus generally 
worked in agriculture, whereas Tutsis usually worked as herdsmen.5  
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This proved to be a horrible way to classify Hutus and Tutsis.  Many 
Hutus were classified as Tutsis if they owned ten or more heads of 
cattle.6  Many Hutu chiefs bribed government officials to change their 
identity cards to say they were ethnically Tutsi so they were 
supported by the colonial government.7 The lines defining one as a 
Hutu or Tutsi were very thin and often altered to accommodate those 
in power at the time.  In reality, the Hutus and Tutsis were not 
ethnically different. The two groups had similar religions and cultural 
beliefs, a common mythology, and near identical languages.8  Both the 
German and Belgium governments supported Tutsi monarchies.  The 
Tutsi monarchy suppressed the Hutu population and encouraged 
education and literacy for the Tutsi population only.  Small incentives 
such as these created hatred among the Hutu and Tutsi of Rwanda.   
The United Nations and Rwandan government officials decided 
Rwanda deserved its independence, setting 1962 as a tentative date.  
With Rwanda on the brink of independence, the Belgians realized that 
in order to continue to profit from its soon to be former colony, they 
would have to side with the Hutu majority.9 Once Rwanda achieved 
independence, the Hutu population would control the government 
because they made up a majority of the population. The Hutu 
population knew that they would soon be leading Rwanda and tried to 
prepare for the task ahead. 
In 1957, an extremely important document was written that 
would play a vital role in the genocide in 1994.  Nine Hutu 
intellectuals wrote the Bahutu Manifesto, which outlined the unjust 
treatment of Hutus. The authors believed the privileged lifestyle the 
Tutsi population had been living had to be ended.  The document also 
called for identity cards to distinguish the different ethnic groups.   
The most influential part of the Bahutu Manifesto was the “Ten 
Commandments,” which listed rules that the Hutu population should 
support and obey. The Commandments were supposed to lead to Hutu 
political, economic, and social control of Rwanda.  The most 
influential of the Ten Commandments were: 
1) Every Hutu must know that a Tutsi woman, wherever she 
may be, is working in the pay of her Tutsi ethnicity.  
Therefore, a traitor is any Hutu who marries a Tutsi woman, 
makes a Tutsi his concubine, or makes a Tutsi his secretary 
or protégé. 
5) Strategic posts such as political, administrative, economic, 
military, and security posts must be given to the Hutu only. 
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6) The armed forces of Rwanda must be exclusively Hutu.  No 
member of the military should marry a Tutsi. 
8) The Hutu must stop feeling pity for the Tutsi. 
9) The Hutu, wherever they may be, must be united, show 
solidarity, and be preoccupied with the fate of their Hutu 
brethren.  The Hutu must be firm and vigilant in their enmity 
against their common Tutsi enemy.10 
 
Tension between the two groups obviously began to escalate 
after the release of this document. In 1959, the Hutu, with the support 
of Belgium, overthrew the Tutsi monarchy and took control of the 
government. During the overthrow, Hutu extremists massacred many 
Tutsis.  Some estimate that as many as 130,000 Tutsi refugees fled to 
other African counties to avoid persecution.11  This event planted the 
seeds for future genocide. 
After Rwanda claimed its independence on July 1, 1962, the 
Hutus continued to control the government through force.  The 1960s 
proved to be an extremely bloody and violent decade.  Refugee Tutsis 
living in exile in Burundi banned together to battle the Hutu.   The 
group moved north and began to attack Hutu extremists and political 
figures.  In retaliation for the attacks, Hutus attacked local Tutsis.  
Lemarch wrote, “In late 1963 and early 1964 thousands of innocent 
Tutsi were wantonly murdered in what has been described as a 
genocide.”12   
In July 1973, Major Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, overthrew 
President Kayibanda and declared himself the new Rwandan 
president. A dictatorship was established under his rule.13   The Tutsi 
minority was oppressed, although a few Tutsi were allowed to 
participate in government or hold officer positions in the army.  
Habyarimana continued to rule Rwanda until 1991, when opposing 
political parties were allowed to run against his party.   Refugee 
Tutsis living in exile in Uganda formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) to run against Habyarimana’s party.14  The clashes between 
these two groups led to the death of thousands of Hutus and Tutsis.  
Hutu extremists staged mini-massacres of Tutsis. The international 
community failed to take notice, setting the stage for a worse genocide 
a few years later.   
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 On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana’s plane was shot 
down.15  It is believed that Hutu extremists shot the plane down 
because before confirmation of the president’s death, roadblocks were 
set up in Kigali that checked identification cards and executed Tutsis, 
human rights activists, and Hutus who sympathized with Tutsis.  The 
state-controlled radio Milles Collines spread the call for genocide and 
urged revenge upon the Tutsi population.  It aired propaganda against 
the Tutsis and encouraged the mass murder of men, women, and 
children.16  Over the course of three months, 500,000 to one million 
Tutsis, Hutu who sympathized with Tutsis, and peace activists were 
killed. 17 Machetes were used to mutilate the bodies, inflicting a slow 
and painful death.  Many victims were violated, raped, and humiliated.  
Inhumane crimes were committed against women and children:  
fetuses were taken out of wombs, doctors killed patients, teachers 
killed students, and neighbors killed neighbors while the world sat 
watching.   
After the atrocities of World War II and the Holocaust, the 
United Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide was established.  This was an agreement among the 
members of the international community that if a genocide occurred, it 
would be put down by members of the United Convention.  It also 
ensured that those responsible for the crimes would be brought before 
a tribunal to be punished.   This group did nothing about the 
Rwandan genocide.  The UN describes genocide as “acts committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial or 
religious group.”18  The Rwanda genocide put the UN, the global 
community, and legal polices to the test.  The international 
community did put down genocide a year later.  In 1995, genocide in 
Bosnia gained international attention. The United States and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization sent troops on a peace-keeping 
mission to Bosnia.19  By formally recognizing the genocide in Bosnia, 
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the U.S. was able to protect the Muslims from the Serbs. However, 
nothing was done to protect Tutsis from Hutus in Rwanda.   
During Clinton’s campaign for president in 1992, he promised 
to be directly involved in the consolidation of democracy throughout 
Africa.20  He also wanted to support UN preventive diplomacy and 
peace-keeping missions where needed.  In 1993, civil war broke out in 
Somalia, and President Clinton sent troops under Operation Restore 
Hope to preserve order.   During the mission thirty U.S. soldiers lost 
their lives.  As a result, Americans lost faith in the cause and wanted 
their troops to return home safely.    In 1994, President Clinton 
removed troops from Somalia.  Also beginning in 1993, 50,000 people 
were killed in an ethnic dispute in Burundi.21  Hutus and Tutsis made 
up the majority of the population in Burundi, and similar tensions to 
those in Rwanda took place.  Uneven distribution of wealth, political 
power, and economic power between the Hutus and Tutsis led to 
physical altercations.22 These altercations turned into massacres but 
were not inspected by the UN or the international community. These 
two events kept the U.S. from promising military aid to help end the 
genocide in Rwanda.    
The events in Somalia and Burundi helped shaped American 
and international policy.  The U.S.  implemented the presidential 
decision directive, which refused U.S. aid to some UN missions which 
were not in the interest of U.S. relations.23  This policy was intended 
to “allow systematic slaughter that did not implicate national 
interests.”24  Another aspect of the presidential decision directive said, 
“The United States would henceforth be extremely wary of non-
military involvement in humanitarian crises and of peacekeeping 
missions undertaken by other countries-because these could lead to 
eventual U.S. entanglement.”25 In order for the U.S. to support a 
peace-keeping mission, all financial support, equipment, and troop 
requirements must be met without the support of the U.S.  This policy 
was put into effect to try and reduce the amount of money the U.S. 
was putting into the UN.26  This policy made it extremely difficult for 
the UN to go on peacekeeping missions without the approval of the 
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United States. When the U.S. decided it did not want to intervene in 
Rwanda, it also made that decision for the world.   
The United States received classified information on January 
11, 1994 from Canadian General Romeo Dallaire that hinted towards 
a possible genocide in Rwanda.27  Dallaire was the Force Commander 
of United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) in Kigali 
and was present during the genocide.28 While stationed in Rwanda, 
Dallaire learned that the government was paying people to create lists 
of Tutsis to be executed.  He also learned there was a plan to start a 
civil war and kill several Belgian peacekeepers.  The Hutus believed if 
their peacekeepers were killed, Belgium would remove its troops.   
Dallaire sent a fax, soon to be known as the genocide fax, to Secretary 
General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan.29  The fax was filled with 
classified information about possible hints and movements towards 
genocide. Annan responded that Dallaire should not get involved 
militarily in the situation.  He also said, “Such situations and alarming 
reports from the field, though considered with the utmost seriousness 
by United Nations officials, are not uncommon within the context of 
peace-keeping operations.” 30  The information received in the fax was 
passed on to President Habyarimana and the American, French, and 
Belgian Embassies. The U.S. did not want to intervene and prevented 
other countries from executing a large intervention as well.31  
 After President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, ten 
Belgian peacekeepers were shot while trying to protect the Rwandan 
prime minister. As a result, Belgium removed its troops and other 
countries followed. The country immediately erupted into civil war.  
The United States had the information, troops, and supplies to prevent 
the genocide in Rwanda but did not use any of its resources. 
Ironically, the United States was captivated by other events at 
the time, such as the release of Steven Spielberg’s film Schindler’s List.  
On April 8, 1994, Prudence Bushnell, a deputy assistant secretary of 
state for African affairs, gave a short speech at a State Department 
conference, explaining the evacuation of U.S. citizens and the violent 
conflict in Rwanda.32  Ironically, the next speech, given by Michael 
McCurry, talked about the international community’s reaction to 
Schindler’s List.  Many countries were preventing the movie from 
being shown.  Just minutes after the genocide in Rwanda was 
mentioned, McCurry said, “This film movingly portrays the twentieth 
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century’s most horrible catastrophe and it shows that even in the 
midst of genocide, one individual can make a difference.  The most 
effective way to avoid the recurrence of genocidal tragedy is to ensure 
that past acts of genocide are never forgotten.”33   Two speeches about 
genocide made within minutes of each, yet, the second speech 
overshadowed the first one.  The U.S. was compelled to help those 
who survived the Holocaust.  Despite this, the American public failed 
to recognize the genocide in Rwanda as a pressing issue.   
The United States did not publicly define the crisis in Rwanda 
as genocide.  Although the U.S. would not publicly acknowledge it, 
unclassified documents by the Department of State, show that the 
government did know a full-blown genocide was occurring in 
Rwanda.34  With consent of the Clinton administration, the word 
genocide was finally used on May 4, 1994, in a speech given by UN 
Secretary General Annon.  A declassified government document 
showed the U.S. government had extensive knowledge and 
information regarding the genocide in Rwanda. The document warns 
governmental officials not to use the word genocide or the U.S. will 
have to commit themselves to stopping the genocide.35   
It is argued that radio jamming could have prevented thousands 
of deaths.  The genocide was encouraged through the radio station 
Milles Collines.  The station said, “We will not repeat the mistake of 
1959.  The children must be killed too.”36  The United States had the 
capabilities to jam the radios to prevent the spread of genocide.  Upon 
General Dallaire’s request to jam the radio, the U.S. requested eight 
thousand dollars an hour to complete the mission.37  The U.N. could 
not afford to support this cost. A human rights advocate said that 
radio jamming was “the one action that, in retrospect, might have 
done the most to save Rwandan lives.”38  
The U.S. secretly considered offering radio-jamming equipment 
to other African nations.  In a de-classified document, the issue was 
raised that if the U.S. jammed the radio, they would be forced to play a 
larger role in the conflict.  The U.S. did not want to become heavily 
involved in the crisis in Rwanda but felt they had to do something.  
The U.S. believed it could offer radio-jamming equipment for others 
to intervene.  The unclassified document made public by the Freedom 
of Information Act suggested that the U.S. offer its equipment to a 
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neighboring African country.39  The U.S. tried to get other countries 
to intervene in the crisis but would not use technology or force to end 
the genocide themselves. 
In a 1998 speech at Rwanda, President Bill Clinton said he felt 
that Rwanda was his greatest failure.40  He knew the U.S. had failed to 
react to a worldwide crisis that could have been averted.  Video 
footage of the massacre showed how brutal and inhumane the 
genocide was; the world witnessed men, women, and children perish 
by means of a machete.  New technology such as radio jamming could 
have been used to prevent the spread of the genocide.  Rwanda was 
one of the great tragedies of the twentieth century and the U.S. 
directly contributed by not recognizing the genocide and by not 
offering military assistance and humanitarian support. 
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FOOD AND FRIENDSHIP:  
MEALS AND SOCIAL INTERACTION BETWEEN WOMEN 
ON THE OVERLAND TRAIL 
 
Rachel E. Elam 
 
 
During the mid to late 19th century, many people traveled 
across the unsettled plains of the American West to pursue a new life. 
Some went for gold, some for land, and some just went in the spirit of 
adventure. The paths that they chose were numerous. Some went to 
California and others to Colorado. Some traveled Platte River Road 
which “followed the Platte River from the Missouri River through 
Nebraska to western Wyoming.”1 Whatever their path or purpose, 
these pioneers were seeking out the vast area for a new home. Among 
these people were women, many of whom were wives of men seeking 
the new life, just along for the trip. Along the way these women had to 
maintain a sense of home in an unfamiliar setting. As part of any 
home, food and cooking were important aspects that women needed to 
attend to as part of their sphere of influence. Women asserted their 
control over their lives and families with activities like cooking.2 
 Women sought companionship with other women to feel at 
home out on the open road, and cooking was a communal, as well as a 
necessary function, among groups of traveling women.  Women 
critically needed other female companions for many other reasons as 
well. Even things as simple as privacy for dressing and bodily 
functions were difficult to accomplish without another woman to be a 
shield.3 But friendship also helped women make the trail seem more 
like home. There is a correlation between food and social 
relationships. Women needed both, and sometimes they were one in 
the same, though the two needs were not mutually exclusive. Women 
might find companionship or social interaction because of food. 
Sharing of food among members of a wagon train made meals a sort of 
social institution. 
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 Women’s companionship and their interactions in food 
preparation were central to their survival on the overland journey, 
both physically and psychologically. Women were often put into a 
difficult situation by leaving all that they knew and traveling to an 
unknown land to start a home over again. Some women had yet to 
start a family, while others were with child when they left on their 
journey. Most of the time, childbearing had no affect on whether or 
not a husband and wife would decide to leave.4 Because of this, strong 
social ties to other members of their traveling party were important. 
Women needed to feel that they could count on other women to help 
in their time of need, whether for childbirth, extra food, or loneliness. 
 The experiences of two women analyzed in this work are 
Catherine Haun and Ellen Tootle. Catherine and Ellen made the 
overland journey and experienced these needs. Both spoke of receiving 
help from others in regards to food and both spend much time 
discussing food and cooking. Haun also discusses her interactions with 
other women, showing the importance of such activities, which were 
the basis of their socialization and the focus of the efforts to make the 
trail more hospitable. 
 Social ties were very important to women on the Overland 
Trail. By embarking on the journey, their entire social world was 
thrown upside down. Women left behind their social network, 
including family and friends. This could be very distressing, causing 
some women to become apprehensive when starting out on the trip. 
Catherine Haun wrote in her 1849 journal that “a strange feeling of 
fear” overcame her on the outset and she was “almost dazed with 
dread.”5 One woman even gave the advice, “If you own a home and are 
comfortably fixed stay with it and let the other fellow do the 
traveling.”6 But not all women were “trudging mournfully after the 
wagons,”7 dreading the very thought of leaving home. Even Haun was 
able to hide her fears from her husband and continue on without 
incident.8 Many women were excited at the prospect of a new life just 
as much as their husbands. But one thing that was critical was the 
availability of a social group of women. 
 Women on the trails needed the support of other women. 
Often the wagon trains consisted of groups of kin or friends that 
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formed a large caravan.9 The women from these groups bonded over 
the daily chores that they had to perform. Johnny Faragher and 
Christine Stansell note in their article, “Women and Their Families on 
the Overland Trail to California and Oregon, 1842-1867” that women 
and men faced the same struggles and circumstances, but the women 
were not as included in the cultural make-up of the time and therefore 
had no defined role to make sense of the suffering.10 Hence, the 
commiseration of women with each other during western migration 
lightened the “depressing necessity” of daily chores, including some 
that would have been considered “men’s work.”11 
 The notion of women doing men’s work is interesting, for at 
this time period, men and women had very distinct, “separate spheres.” 
Jeanne H. Watson made the observation in her article “Traveling 
Traditions: Victorians on the Overland Trails” that this “separate 
spheres” idea was not always applicable to pioneer families because 
men depended on women to work with them side-by-side to develop 
and build up a successful home on the trail and on their new 
homesteads.12 These jobs could include “cooking out of doors, driving 
the oxen, collecting buffalo chips and weeds, helping to pitch the tent, 
[and] washing on river banks.”13 Watson does point to a blending of 
ideals that allowed women to do necessary, difficult jobs and still 
maintain a Victorian lifestyle of propriety.14 The particular chores 
listed above, for example, are more domestic aspects of traveling, 
which are divided from jobs a man might do.15 
 Women often worked together, performing daily tasks as a 
group. From one account, “Often washdays became a community 
affair.”16 Women also helped each other out among the wagon trains. 
The travel was taxing and possibly exhausting. Everyday chores and 
activities were not as easy and monotonous when being performed in a 
covered wagon on the way to a new home out west. Childbirth and 
sickness were particularly difficult. Women would work together to 
help other women out when these situations came up, even visiting 
other wagon trains on horseback when they heard of someone needing 
help.17 The diary of Lydia Allen Rudd is full of stories of sickness and 
death. In one specific instance, she told of a man who became very ill 
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on the trail. According to Rudd, “We doctored him what we could but 
he was to [sic] far gone.”18 Jane Gould Tortillott wrote in her diary, 
“We called to see a woman who had a sick husband. They are 
emigrants. Have only been here a week, are waiting for him to 
recover. He has the typhoid fever.”19 Women were able to provide 
support in this way for  ill and struggling families. 
 Women gave each other moral support as well. Families were 
the main social unit on the trail.20 But women needed companionship 
outside the family. It was typical for wagon trains to get together and 
visit during the evenings after a long day of travel. Often music 
accompanied these evenings; “After the singing and dancing, people 
generally gathered in groups to talk awhile. Imagine the whole 
population of a small town assembled in an area less than a block 
square and you get the idea.”21 Inevitably, the women and men divided 
themselves into groups. Women talked about their hardships or did 
work in groups instead of joining the men.22 
 During the day, women visited as well. They walked 
together, or possibly took a small side trip together as the journey 
wore on.23 Women called on each other to “exchange news, 
information, advice, and recipes as well as sunbonnet patterns.”24 They 
visited with other women and participated in activities such as 
knitting and sewing.25 Women enjoyed the company of other adult 
women, sometimes without their children around. Flora Bender 
recalled that her mother did not include her daughters when she went 
calling, but did when it was time to do the washing and go to church.26 
Rebecca Woodson, a young mother, became friends with the oldest 
girls from a family of ten children, stating “Oh those happy days” 
about her time with these new friends.27 Women enjoyed the times 
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when they “visited, cooked together, or went swimming” and felt 
frustrated when they were unable to socialize with other women.28 
 The bonds between women traveling the trails were so 
strong that when troubles arose among members of different wagon 
trains, the women were struck with the fear of being separated. 
Friendships were “strikingly intimate and deep” and losing these 
would have been heartbreaking to the women.29 Wagon trains often 
reached an impasse at certain points of the trail, and some decided to 
part ways. When wagon trains broke down, women might be left 
without any other females to socialize with.30 Fights were recorded in 
many women’s journals because a fight might mean separation from 
the company of women in another wagon train.31 After such a 
separation, women became preoccupied with looking out for a new 
wagon train with women in it.32 This shows how important women’s 
relationships with each other were. The journey itself took women out 
of their comfort zones of friends and family and put them in a situation 
possibly void of this comfort.33  Women found comfort among other 
women on the trail, and when it was again taken from them, it was 
very detrimental. For women to survive they needed friendship and 
community like they experienced in their homes back east before they 
headed out. 
 Along with companionship, food was one of the overarching 
components that bonded women together on the trail. Deciding how 
much food to take and how to cook it while traveling were of utmost 
importance. Women, alone or together, were usually the cooks, as 
cooking was part of the normal field of work for women. Women were 
in charge of keeping life as normal as possible, and meals were 
possibly the largest part of this normality.34 Meals could be considered 
the biggest social institution on the trail because it brought people 
together and was sometimes a social event as well as a necessity for 
living. 
 Before embarking on the trip west, one of the most important 
things to consider was how much and what kinds of food to bring. 
People looked to others that had already successfully completed the 
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journey for information about what to bring. Joel Palmer wrote what 
to bring in his journal: 
For each adult there should be two hundred pounds of 
flour, thirty pounds of pilot bread, seventy-five pounds of 
bacon, ten pounds of rice, five pounds of coffee, two 
pounds of tea, twenty-five pounds of sugar, half a bushel 
of dried beans, one bushel of dried fruit, two pounds of 
saleratus, ten pounds of salt, half a bushel of corn meal; 
and it is well to have half a bushel of corn, parched and 
ground; a small keg of vinegar should also be taken. To 
the above may be added as many good things as the 
means of the person will enable him to carry.35 
This is a very long list. However, it would be better to have more than 
enough than not enough. Some groups, toward the end of the trip, 
barely scraped enough to survive on. One man had to live on frogs and 
roseberries to survive.36 
 Food showed up regularly in overland diaries. Some women 
would write down every day what they cooked and ate, relating what 
they did and what their problems were.37 Cooking outdoors with 
different utensils and over an open fire changed the way many women 
had to cook. Weather, insects, dust, and many other mitigating 
circumstances affected individual and group experiences.38 Margaret 
White Chambers, a young woman traveling with her husband and his 
team, had to cook for the entire company at only eighteen years old. 
She was faced with this difficulty of cooking outdoors with 
questionable fuel sources.39 The most questionable of these fuel 
sources was buffalo chips. Buffalo chips were the droppings left behind 
by buffalo along the trail. These provided a useful source of fuel to 
cook with, although not palatable to most travelers. References to 
buffalo chips are found in many journals. Their presence or absence 
was important enough to mention in the daily accounts.40 Buffalo 
chips were a last resort to many groups, used when grass and weeds 
ran out in the dusty deserts out west.41 
 There are many anecdotes relating to the gathering and use 
of buffalo chips. Everyone, including children, had to participate in 
collecting buffalo chips because their survival depended on it. Children 
occasionally formed some kind of competition to make the job less 
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tedious and disgusting.42 Some wagon trains would laugh at each 
other while collecting chips to make it less unpleasant.43 Women 
especially found the job unpleasant. Henry Hazard, an eight year old 
boy, recalled: “The ladies in the train started on a fast immediately 
after we got onto the Platte—the fuel was not the proper kind. After 
we had been there about a week, however, they got grandly over 
that.”44 Sarah J. Cummins told another amusing story about women 
and buffalo chips, recalling “All along this part of the road there was a 
great scarcity of wood and many times we were compelled to cook our 
food with buffalo chips. This caused many ladies to act very cross and 
many were the rude phrases uttered, far more humiliating to refined 
ears than any mention of the material used for fuel could have been.”45 
The indelicacy of these women’s actions dwarfed the indelicacy of the 
actual buffalo chips. But these times added to the social institution of 
meals, because to create a meal, people had to work together to even 
start a fire. 
All women faced these problems, but not all of them had to face 
them alone like Margaret Chambers. Women would sometimes 
collaborate on meals for the whole wagon train. For a special occasion, 
women might prepare a large meal together.46 Women also helped 
each other cook when a crisis occurred. Ruth Schackelford witnessed 
her friend suffer a “terrible accident” when one of her horses upset her 
raising bread. Mrs. Schackelford shared what she had prepared with 
her neighbor and they all had a nice meal.47 This adds another aspect 
to women needing the company of other women while on the overland 
trail. To be able to help out or just commiserate with another woman 
about cooking under these unpredictable circumstances was important 
to the social order of women. 
Catherine Haun and Ellen Tootle had very different traveling 
experiences, but many aspects regarding food and friendship were the 
same. There are many mentions of food and companionship in each of 
the diaries. These diaries stress the importance of food especially, but 
also socialization and working together as well. Both women mention 
food and cooking many times, sometimes in the context of working, 
but also sometimes as just a particular enjoyment of an otherwise 
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bland day. Through their diaries, evidence of the social institution of 
mealtimes can be seen. 
Catherine Haun and her husband left Iowa in 1849 to follow the 
gold rush.48 Haun wrote her account of her travels many years later, 
so it is not the typical day to day diary that many emigrants left. 
Nevertheless, Haun’s account was very well written and provides very 
specific information about her trip. One of the first things she 
mentioned in her journal was a list of all the provisions they brought. 
Flour, bacon, alcohol, dried meats, fruits, and vegetables were all 
brought, as well as luxuries which consisted of “a gallon each of wild 
plum and crabapple preserves and blackberry jam.”49 Not all wagon 
trains could afford the space to bring such luxuries, but Haun’s wagon 
train was “large, well equipped, and experienced.”50 That she would 
mention this list of provisions shows how important it was to know 
how much food was brought. 
Another reference to food in Haun’s diary is the fact that their 
wagon train employed a cook. Unfortunately, that did not last long, as 
Haun described “In the morning our first domestic annoyance 
occurred. The woman cook refused point blank to go any further.”51 
This was particularly distressing to Haun because she did not know 
how to cook. According to Haun, “I surprised myself by proposing to 
do the cooking…having been reared in a slave state my culinary 
education had been neglected and I had yet to make my first cup of 
coffee.”52 Luckily, it seems as though Catherine was able to get along 
fine without a cook, although pancakes were not her specialty.53 
Haun made several more references to food, mainly when the 
food was something special. Haun enjoyed the times when their 
wagon train could get delicacies such as milk. One of the members of 
the wagon train had cows for most of the trip, so when butter or 
buttermilk was made, “We all were glad to swap some of our food for 
a portion of these delicacies.”54 Milk was not always easy to come by, 
so to have someone with cows in the wagon train would have been 
quite a boon to the rest of the travelers. Haun also mentioned 
Christmas dinner. She and her husband had made it to California, but 
were still living in a tent. Her Christmas dinner was as follows: “a 
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grizzly bear steak for which we paid $2.50, one cabbage for $1.00 and 
–oh horrors—some more dried apples.”55  
Besides food, Haun also mentioned of how she spent some of 
her time and the social connections she made on the trails. She very 
much enjoyed the group of people she was traveling with—“a 
wonderful collection of many people with as many different 
dispositions and characteristics, all recognizing their mutual 
dependence upon each other and bound together by the single aim of 
‘getting to California.’”56 Haun recognized the need for other people 
during the trip. She also wrote about the other women in the wagon 
train and what they did together during the long traveling days. They 
visited other wagons, took walks, did needlework, and swapped food 
and recipes to keep themselves busy. Haun apparently had a vibrant 
social network and enjoyed the company of the other ladies she was 
traveling with.57 
The diary of Ellen Tootle offers a somewhat different 
perspective of the westward journey. Tootle left on her journey with 
her husband in 1862 to the mines in Colorado.58 Tootle has a different 
writing style than Catherine Haun, as her diary was written in a day 
to day style, rather than all at once at the end of the journey. Ellen 
Tootle has several references to food and cooking as well. Although 
she does not mention as much about social relationships with other 
women, there is mention of other people and how they provided help 
with food.  
Ellen Tootle’s journey began in Plattsmouth, NB, which was 
the starting off point for the trip to Colorado. She and her husband 
remained there for several days before they began the actual trip. 
Tootle did not begin her diary with a list of provisions brought, as 
other overland diaries. She did, however, usually write what they ate 
every day. Like Catherine Haun, Tootle was not an accomplished cook 
when she undertook the journey with her husband. There are several 
humorous anecdotes related to Tootle’s supposed lack of cooking 
ability and clumsiness around the kitchen. In one such story she 
wrote: “Mr. Tootle says I cannot do anything but talk, so would not 
trust me to make the coffee. Boasted very much of his experience. He 
decided to make it himself.”59 Mr. Tootle proved himself to be not 
much of a cook when the coffee turned out wrong, but he claimed she 
had not given him proper instructions. 
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Mr. Tootle also bemoaned his wife’s experience in the kitchen 
when the following mishap happened: “The first day, the cork came 
out of the whiskey bottle and spilled more than half to Mr. Tootle’s 
great disappointment. Indeed I don’t believe he has recovered from it 
yet.” Fortunately for them, Mrs. Tootle was able to make fine coffee 
and cook a good dinner, although she was very nervous about 
trying.60 
These small anecdotes show just how important food and 
cooking were on the trail. Besides needing sustenance, meals provided 
enjoyment, and if they were not prepared well, there would be no 
enjoyment. Tootle also got enjoyment out of specific kinds of food that 
were not always available. Canned peaches, milk, buttermilk, and the 
occasional piece of cake while visiting a town were very enjoyable and 
very much appreciated.  Most of the time, they got these special foods 
from other people, whether fellow travelers or people living in the 
towns. The first night of their trip they arrived at their campsite very 
late and only because a fellow traveling partner gave them some 
rhubarb pie did they get dinner. They also received milk and cake 
from a lady at a stage office on their way west.61 
These two diaries give different stories of westward journeys, 
but have similar references to food and companionship. There are also 
some other similarities between the two journals. First, both 
Catherine Haun and Ellen Tootle were young brides traveling with 
their husbands and no children. Both women did not have children 
until later in their lives. It is not clear when Catherine Haun had 
children or how many she had, but we do know that she dictated her 
journal to her daughter later in her life, so she did have children at 
some point. Ellen Tootle had at least three children, one of which died 
in infancy.62 Also, both women place a significant importance on food. 
How much and what types of food they brought and ate feature 
prominently in both journals. 
These two accounts, however, are very different. There is a 
thirteen year time difference between when Catherine Haun and Ellen 
Tootle left on their journeys. Haun was traveling to California while 
Tootle was going to Colorado. Catherine specifically mentions other 
women and the activities that they pursued together. It is not clear 
how many other women traveled with Ellen. She only mentioned 
another woman once, the wife of her husband’s partner, but she never 
mentioned her again, and this other woman may not have even been 
on the journey with them. The only other person really mentioned in 
Tootle’s journal is her husband, so whether other women were even 
on the trip or not is not known. Despite the differences in accounts, 
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Catherine Haun and Ellen Tootle’s overland diaries show the 
importance of food and relationships and how they were sometimes 
intertwined on their trips to the future Western United States. 
Overall, food and friendship were both very important to the 
overland emigrant women. The absence of these elements would cause 
problems for the women and their wagon trains. To quote Kathryn 
Troxel’s article, “Food of the Overland Emigrants”: “Many of the 
emigrants…traveled in groups for reasons of safety, mostly, but often 
simply because a large family with their friends were attracted at the 
same time by the golden promise of the West.”63  They also traveled 
together to maintain social ties that gave women a sense of home and 
to share in relationships that were necessary for women’s survival. 
Catherine Haun wrote: “Upon the whole I enjoyed the trip, spite of its 
hardships and the fear and dread that hung as a pall over every 
hour.”64 Maybe this enjoyment came from the food and friendship that 
she experienced while on the dangerous trip. 
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A TALE OF TWO CLOTHS: THE TRANSITION FROM 
WOOL TO COTTON UNDERGARMENTS IN ENGLAND 
DURING THE VICTORIAN AGE 
 
Rachael Harzinski  
 
 
The trendy and fashion conscious have been dismissed as 
inconsequential—at best cute and at worst useless—in the eyes of 
history. Fashion and dress, after all, are not vital when compared with 
wars, political instability, or dramatic economic changes. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that fashion’s alliance with cotton in the 
Industrial Revolution has been overlooked. Cotton’s replacement of 
wool as the primary material of the English textile industry would not 
have been possible without the demands of the fashionable elite during 
the nineteenth century.    
 The shift in fabric popularity hardly commanded the 
attention of the world, even though it still affects the world today. 
Even fashion and economic historians do not spend a great deal of 
time discussing the change. They are likely to explain in passing that 
the cause was multi-facetted, combining politics, health, and 
economics. There was little understanding of the health needs of the 
body during the Victorian Age (although there were some great 
improvements) and politics were not a factor after the Manchester 
Act. Above all, none of those three categories explain why cotton, a 
difficult plant to cultivate, surpassed the patriotic wool. 
The missing pieces of the “why” behind the shift from wool to 
cotton lies in the efforts of the fashion beaus, dandies and ladies of the 
Victorian Era. It was the prudish middle class that selected cotton as 
the fiber of choice. Cotton was a brilliant, foreign fiber that could be 
woven into thick, soft, towels or nearly sheer, silky, cloth. Cotton’s 
versatility for clothing or housewares was second to the ability to hold 
brighter colors longer than wool or other materials. Cotton did not 
gain popularity, particularly in the domain of underwear, until the 
upper and middle classes decided that it was chic. Although in the 
modern day, underwear is not heavily considered, the focus on 
underwear is necessary to establish the importance of the link between 
fashion and cotton’s popularity. During the nineteenth century, 
underwear was the only aspect of fashion to go through serious 
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changes. Custom and fashion are two terms that are often at ends with 
one another. Custom has years or generations of support for it; 
fashion, however, is sporadic and is marked by periods of restlessness 
and change.1 This would also be an accurate way of describing the 
Industrial Age. What is unusual about the clothing of the Industrial 
Age is that instead of moving against former ideas of modesty as 
fashion is apt to do, the fashions went so far as to define modesty.2 A 
narrow waist with fuller hips was the order of the day, even though 
the bosom had been the focus during the Napoleonic Era. This new 
style was called the bell silhouette. 
 The introduction of the bell silhouette into fashion during the 
Victorian age meant a staggering amount of underclothing for 
women. The difference in underwear and underclothing is essential: 
underclothing is a garment worn under the outer, and underwear is an 
article of clothing which prevents chaffing, absorbs perspiration, and 
stops the outerwear from slipping.3  The amount of underclothing 
required for a proper woman at the time led one writer to say: “[a 
lady’s] underclothing had become, as it were, an integral part of her 
personality.”4  As the Industrial Revolution picked up steam, the 
middle class’s ranks swelled, as did the trend toward prudishness.5 It 
was no longer proper for women to be seen without the armor of 
undergarments to protect her virtue and to appease Mrs. Grundy.6 
A wealthy woman wore seven separate pieces of flannel or silk 
undergarments. She would start her day by putting on her chemise, an 
unshaped garment of varying length with a low square neckline, 
possibly with narrow frills. While these garments were normally 
homemade, they were available through stores by 1850. This was later 
replaced by a cotton bodysuit called the combination.7 
The next step was the petticoat, the long for winter and the 
short for summer. A long petticoat had an attached bodice, buttoned 
at the back and a drawstring neckline. A short petticoat tied at the 
waist. Around the hem of the petticoat was the only location where 
decoration, simple embroidery, was considered acceptable throughout 
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7 Cunnington and Willett, The History of Underclothes, 79. 
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the whole of a woman’s undergarments. A woman would wear four to 
six of these, one on top of the other, depending on the season, to lay 
the foundations of the bell shape.8 Following the petticoats was the 
crinoline, also known as the horsehair petticoat. Made with horsehair 
and a stiff woolen fabric called weft, it ended at the knee with some 
measuring six feet in diameter. This petticoat needed to be made 
stronger; it was the key to achieving the bell shape until the steel 
crinoline cage.  
After the crinoline was the drawers, which achieved 
acceptability for women by 1843, after years of being considered a 
male-only garment. Drawers were the first real example of underwear. 
A simple panted garment that went to the knees, drawers had a 
drawstring waist with a front closer of three to four buttons.9 Drawers 
began in France where they were called pantaloons. While women 
there were wearing them as early as 1800, they were not really 
accepted until Princess Charlotte wore them in 1811. Proper English 
women did not wear them except when riding until 1843.10 Doctors 
approved overwhelmingly of drawers, proclaiming them as extremely 
sanitary. The Handbook of the Toilet, the guidebook for all things 
dealing with undergarments and private functions, said in 1843, 
“Drawers are of incalculable advantage to women who expose 
themselves to a variety of diseases from the usual form of their 
clothes.”11 Previous to the acceptance of drawers, women wore 
nothing under their multiple petticoats which would have allowed 
easy access to the genitals, a favored location for any type of disease.  
Despite the praise drawers received for the sanitary benefit to 
both sexes, drawers were eventually replaced by the combination. The 
combination was a cotton body suit which buttoned down the front 
and at the crotch. It was accepted by 1883 along with the sanitary 
corset, a rubber and cotton creation which molded to a woman’s form 
and did not require tight lacing.12 
The final stage took the longest and remains to this day the 
most infamous: the corset. By the 1850s, the corset had been expanded 
to cover the shoulders and the hips of a woman (pregnancy was not an 
excuse for neglecting a corset).13 It would take nearly a quarter of an 
hour to put a corset on, and it would take three pulls. A woman would 
grip the edge of something, take a deep breath, and another woman 
would pull the strings as tight as she could. There would be a small 
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break to let the woman breathe before the procedure was repeated 
twice more.14 Ideally, a woman’s waist would be drawn in about 
fourteen inches, creating a stiff walk and preventing a woman from 
sitting or breathing properly. One nobleman noted that when his 
daughter had bent to pick up something, her lacings had burst with 
such a racket that “the house worried she had exploded.”15 The corset 
was normally made of linen or silk with first whale bones, then spring 
steel, forcing the female body into the desired shape. The eyeholes for 
the laces where reinforced with steel to prevent a woman’s movement 
from tearing the fabric. As the incident with the girl bending down 
and bursting her corset shows, however, it did not always solve the 
problem. 
Tight lacing was frowned upon by doctors for the strain it 
placed on the ribs and organs. When doctors began noticing the 
shocking number of miscarriages caused by the pressure put on the 
hips by the corset, the outcry against them grew.16 In compromise, the 
fashion world did two things: created an elastic bottomed corset that 
stretched over the stomach of a pregnant woman, and demanded the 
expanding of the skirts which helped create the illusion of a tiny waist 
without such tight-lacing.17 Men in the world of medicine were not 
the only ones concerned with the unhealthy nature of corsets; 
husbands and fathers were too. Women, not men, demanded the 
corset. It was believed that a girl would not develop good posture 
unless she wore one, which resulted in the creation of night corsets so 
that a girl’s spine would theoretically form properly.18 Many men 
confessed confusion about why they were supposed to find “a waist 
like an ant to be attractive.”19 There are several records of husbands 
requesting that wives abandon tight lacing, due to health reasons and 
because many husbands simply did not like the look. When the 
crinoline cage widened skirts to such a diameter that a normal waist 
looked slimmer, many women gratefully loosened the corset, although 
it was not abandoned altogether.20  
The startling amount of underclothing that was worn during 
the Victorian age was the direct result of prudishness following the 
increase in the middle class’s numbers. By the 1850s, fifteen percent of 
the population in England belonged to the middle class.21 Certain 
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characteristics defined the middle class: untitled, highly educated, 
piety and prudishness. In many ways, the middle class of the Victorian 
Age was a marvel of humanity for taking prudity to the point of 
eroticism.22 The color white and virginity were more closely 
associated with each other and with constant repetition; eventually it 
became what was attractive at the time.23 
 The previous decades had been a witness to the lax morality 
due to wartime. Fashion focused on illuminating the human figure, but 
paid particular attention to feminine curves. Loose, flowing garments 
with the high Empire waistline24 allowed women to dress in the barest 
of underclothing. Some of the more daring, or scandalous, women 
abandoned the corset completely.25 When the war was over, such 
dress was no longer acceptable, resulting in the astonishing levels of 
underclothing.  
Not only did the number of required items for a proper young 
woman increase, but their appearance was strictly regulated in the 
eyes of society. Clothing, in particular the petticoat, was a sign of 
wealth and prestige in the nineteenth century.26 Until the end of the 
Victorian era the only color that was available – for proper people – 
was white. The evening petticoat’s hem, as stated before, was the only 
place on underclothing that was considered acceptable to decorate. In 
the 1870s, however, while the exterior of clothing was drabber with 
the increased popularity of the black suit, underclothing became 
colored. Wearing colored undergarments became a sign of success and 
class since dyed items were more expensive.27 Cotton’s popularity 
would increase enormously during this time. 
The most common explanation for the popularity of cotton is 
price; it was cheaper than wool and therefore took control. If price was 
all that mattered, however, the lower classes, not the middle, would 
have been the first to use the fabric. Cotton would have been regulated 
down to a “worker” fabric, and considered unseemly for the image 
conscious wealthy to wear. 
The lower class could not wear clothing that matched the style, 
demands, or even the materials of the middle class. Working class 
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families made under £300 a year,28 and a well-to-do person of the 
lower classes made only twenty seven shillings a week.29 The first 
thing a worker’s salary went to was rent and food. A working class 
family of seven’s weekly budget in Lancaster allocated for rent of a 
two story home at three shillings and six pence, and food totaling 
about thirteen shillings and one and a half pence for food for a week. 
After schooling for two children to learn to read, a bucket of coal for 
heat, and soap and candles, there was a surplus of six shillings and 
eleven pence. 30 Clothing and alcohol were not considered in this 
budget and the surplus is not enough to purchase clothing yearly for 
the family. The cloth would have to be purchased and the clothing 
made at home by the mother. It was not until the late 1880s that 
clothing began being sent pre-made into stores, and it was later still 
until such clothing became truly affordable for the laborer unless it 
was through second or third hand shops.31  
Fabrics such as fustian, a tough denim-like material, corduroy 
and low grade flannel were “worker’s fabrics.” Moleskin, a fabric made 
by combining corduroy and woolen linen, became the most popular 
and common “worker’s fabric”.32 Even with these cheaper fabrics, 
however, the estimated cost of clothing an average family, two parents 
and eight children, near London was £12 a year: families had only one 
set of clothing per member for daily wear and another for “Sunday 
best.”33  Cotton was cheaper to manufacture than wool, but since the 
lower class was not the one wearing it regularly, price fails to explain 
cotton’s popularity. 
Health is another common explanation for the switch from 
woolen cloth to cotton, particularly in the case of underwear. There is 
no solid evidence, however, that doctors were aware of the health 
benefits of cotton’s wicking property. The wicking property refers to a 
fabrics ability to hold or dispel water. Doctors preached the wonders 
of wool even after its dominance was fading. Cotton, according to 
them, was a substandard cloth that would not allow the body to retain 
heat and result in more sickness. Most doctors viewed cotton as an 
inferior fabric to wool, but acceptable if it was loosely woven into a 
towel.34  Heat retention is an important aspect of outerwear, but 
underwear has different demands. For once, fashion and health 
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combined to negate medical arguments for wool, and cotton rose to 
power as king.   
As an animal fiber, wool was meant to protect from weather, so 
when it gets wet wool will actually bond tighter to itself to protect the 
skin.35 This would eventually cause shrinking and tightening of the 
clothing rather unpredictably if the article was not allowed to fully 
dry. The most important aspect to the fashion world was not if the 
clothing would shrink or what the market for it was; the most 
important thing was if it could retain a dye. Wool, like human hair, 
looses the ability to retain a pigment over time. Additionally, wool has 
a tendency to yellow after being exposed to the sunlight.36 This, more 
than anything else, insured wool’s fall from dominance. 
To doctors however, there was no finer fiber to wear than wool. 
Porous and hydroscopic, it conducts heat poorly and while it absorbs 
water, it does not release it quickly. Water and air cause evaporation 
and heat. By trapping this evaporation close to the skin the body stays 
warmer. In the chilly English climate, this would be vital. In 1841, the 
initial thought of women’s poor health was because of too much 
exposure of the skin to cold and doctors told women to wrap 
themselves in wool flannel bodysuits.37 
While doctors made an excellent point about wool’s ability to 
keep someone warm, a fabric which retains water for long periods of 
time is not a good idea to keep around the genitals for either sex, but 
specifically for women. Moisture kept near the genitals leads to yeast 
infections or other forms of vaginal disease. In an area which is 
already kept moist and warm by the body, adding more moisture 
meant bacteria could grow. While regular bathing was strongly 
recommended, most doctors agreed that drawers and combination 
suits needed only to be washed once a week.38 This, however, did not 
help the lower class who could not bath daily or wash their clothes 
weekly. 
Unlike wool, cotton “breathes”. This “breathing” effect is caused 
by the fact that cotton is quick to release moisture, which means 
bacteria have a more difficult time lingering. This also means that 
cotton does not retain heat very well, the main reason why doctors 
were so adamantly against it to begin with. For the purpose of 
underwear, however, it is much healthier to have cotton than wool or 
even silk. While there is no strict evidence that doctors and the public 
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were fully aware of this, around the 1880s, the sanitary corset and 
combination suit were advertising that is was safer and healthier for 
the body because it was made of cotton and had button openings at the 
crotch.39 
Cotton’s struggle for medical support was simple compared to 
the political sphere. Britain’s empire served not only as a source for 
raw materials, but it also established more markets for the finished 
product. Cotton was a foreign material that pushed the domestic 
product to the side. This was an anomaly for the world.  
For centuries, Britain had been the leading manufacturer of 
wool products. Cost was minimal, jobs were ample for the populace, 
and there was a sense of pride in the international market. Not only 
was it patriotic, but wool, in comparison to cotton, was easy to 
manufacture. After being sheared from the sheep, it was washed and 
then carded to remove impurities. The carded wool was spun into 
yarn on a spinning wheel; the make-up of wool makes it very easy to 
spin into yarn. Woolen fibers run parallel to each other in a single 
direction, which meant less snarls and breaking while spinning.40 The 
yarn was turned over to a weaver and woven into a variety of cloths. 
This process was perfect for the cottage industry; a whole village 
could be dedicated to shearing, carding, or spinning for one weaver. 
This meant that whole villages could be invested to produce wool 
thread cheaply for factories. 
The Enclosure Act, which reverted broad amounts of farmland 
into private holdings under the pretense of efficiency, had very little 
effect on wool’s popularity. The shift from the cottage industry to the 
mill system, the eventual result of the Enclosure Act, did, however. 
The mill system allowed an increase in fabric availability, lowered 
costs, and created a larger market for wool. The availability of wool 
on the British Isles was soon surpassed by the demand for it as a cloth, 
and England had to purchase wool from its colonies, mainly 
Australia.41 Even with the decrease in price, wool still failed to retain 
the interest of the wealthy. It did not have the same mystery and class 
status as cotton. 
Cotton, called the vegetable lamb in ancient times, is not only a 
finicky plant to grow, but also a difficult cloth to prepare. The fluffy 
white boll is meant to protect the seeds inside, but the seeds need to be 
removed for cloth. This was done by hand until the cotton gin was 
invented. Quality of cotton was decided on by how long a thread could 
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be produced after ginning; generally, the longer a thread, the finer the 
cotton.42  
Cotton was a popular fabric in India, Egypt, South America, 
and China before colonization occurred. The cotton fabric was 
brought over to the Middle East, who traded it with Italy and then 
with Spain. The first appearance of cotton in England occurs in the 
Bolten Abbey inventory of candle wicks around 1200.43 There was not 
a lot of bother about it outside of candlewicks, embroidery threads, 
and occasional mention as lining for doublets. During this time, 
England was busy trying to get Flemish weavers to increase the wool 
trade. These same weavers, however, may have stimulated the cotton 
production as well.44 England would continue to purchase cotton from 
Germany, the leader of cotton in Europe at the time, until the 1600s 
when the East India Trading Company officially opened to sell off 
surplus wool. In the later part of the century and into the next, cotton 
printing plants would open across England for the new Indian cotton 
cloth that was being brought in.45  
The trendy new cloth from India was immediately grabbed up 
by the wealthy to such a degree that wool manufacturers demanded 
that Parliament do something to stem the tide. In 1666, Parliament 
passed an act that said all of England’s dead had to be wrapped in 
wool or a small fine would be levied. In 1700, another act was passed 
which outlawed Indian silks and calicos for clothing or housewares at 
a fine of £200 to the wearer.  Despite this, by 1708, upper class 
women were willing to risk getting caught for the ability to wear 
Indian cotton. Finally, in 1736, Parliament passed the Manchester 
Act, which forbade all Indian cloth goods inside England and allowed 
the creation of cotton and wool mixed calicos.46 The act failed to stop 
the trend of cotton; it gave Lancashire, which purchased cotton from 
the future United States, a monopoly on the printing, manufacturing, 
and sale of cotton cloth.47 Though the monopoly on printed fabrics 
was a marginal achievement at first, as the middle class’s strict 
thoughts of prudishness vanished and colored underclothes and 
underwear were acceptable, it grew into a solid investment. Cotton’s 
inception as the most popular fabric in the modern world has been 
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passed off as economic. It has largely been accepted as simply a 
natural progression of the inventions and advancements of the 
nineteenth century. Another argument is that cotton’s supremacy was 
linked with colonialism and the source for raw materials, and therefore 
is more politically linked. Without the elite demanding more cotton, 
which led to the invention of products which eased the manufacture, 
wool may have continued to be the most used fabric. While there 
exists no solid evidence that the healthy effects of cotton were realized 
at the first stages of its popularity, without the continued pressure and 
efforts of the wealthy individuals of England’s wealthy and sociable, 
the healthy properties may never even have been analyzed by doctors. 
Cotton’s growth is linked with the middle class’s wealth and desire to 
display that wealth through foreign items placed on display.  
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IVAN IV: A MACHIAVELLIAN TSAR 
 
Robyn E. Carswell 
 
 
Dating back to Riurik,1 Russia has always had strong leaders 
who stopped at nothing to ensure the success of the throne.  With a 
couple of noted exceptions, the rulers had the luxury of growing up 
witnessing the rule of their fathers.  Ivan IV had no role model, no 
mentor, and no one to instruct him on how to be a leader.  Before 
assuming the throne, he looked elsewhere for information on how to 
be a proper sovereign.  Beginning with the Primary Chronicle,2 he 
would have looked back at previous rulers and what methodologies 
made them successful.  At this time of growing contact with the West, 
he may have also looked outside of Russia, perhaps to Machiavelli’s 
The Prince.  Also influencing Ivan’s reign were the bitter feelings he 
had for the boyars during his childhood.  Historians have traditionally 
divided Ivan’s regime into two periods, the good half and the bad half.  
This essay will center on the “good-half,” when Ivan focused on 
reform, land conquest, and reshaping the monarchy.  Ivan wanted 
something that was unlike anything that had preceded it; he reformed 
and changed Russia in an attempt to unite it under the supreme 
sovereignty of an absolute Machiavellian ruler—the Tsar. 
To understand Ivan’s state of mind when he became the 
sovereign, it is important to look at his childhood.  Ivan’s father, 
Prince Basil III, died when Ivan was three years old.  Five years later 
his mother died, which Ivan attributed to poisoning.  Ivan recounted 
the years that followed in his “Own Account of His Early Life.”  Ivan’s 
account asserted that the boyars usurped the power of Tsar and left 
Ivan and his younger brother without proper care.3  The ruling boyars 
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ignored the young Ivan, left him ill fed, improperly clothed, and failed 
to instruct him educationally.4  In short, Ivan was not prepared in any 
way to assume the role of ruler.  In 1557, however, Ivan asserted 
himself, and upon claiming the throne at age fifteen, he literally “put 
[his] kingdom in order”5 and crowned himself ‘Tsar.’  This title was 
deliberate; it transcended ‘Grand Prince,’ which, in Ivan’s opinion, 
insinuated that he was only the first among equals.  Ivan was 
determined to unite Russia under something more than just a prince. 
As mentioned, Ivan had no real tutelage in the ways of being a 
ruler, and therefore, formulated his rule through a combination of trial 
by fire, wit, and perhaps Machiavellian influence.  While there remains 
no written evidence that Ivan studied Machiavelli, his actions, 
reforms, and style of reign are definitely Machiavellian in style.  It is 
also possible to follow some of those linked with The Prince, to 
establish the distribution of the manuscript, and its possible arrival in 
Muscovy.  Machiavelli first wrote The Prince in 1513, in an effort to 
help then ruler Lorenzo De’ Medici stay in power and unify Italy.  
Machiavelli did not live to see The Prince distributed, as it remained 
unpublished until 1532, five years after his death.6  From this point, 
the circulation of the manuscript is sketchy, but one can follow the 
lives of those connected with it. 
The Medici family fell from power in 1494 and fled Italy.  Their 
daughter, Catherine, eventually reached France and their son, 
Giovanni, Rome.  Catherine later became the Queen Regent of France, 
and Giovanni ascended to the papacy as Pope Leo X.  Catherine was 
reportedly a disciple of Machiavelli, and both Leo X and his successor, 
Clement VII, sought advice from the Italian philosopher.7  In 1559, 
however, Pope Paul IV added Machiavelli’s work to the list of 
prohibited books.8  As does anything prohibited, the manuscript 
spread quickly. 
The arrival of Machiavelli’s Prince to Russia during Ivan’s reign 
is difficult to substantiate.  The arrival of other manuscripts, however, 
is not.  Ivan kept a large library, containing several hundred books in 
various languages.9  He also sent emissaries to Western Europe to 
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persuade specialists, including teachers and artists, to come to 
Russia.10  Those who did venture to Russia brought with them many 
manuscripts, among those, possibly, The Prince.  By pure observation 
of Ivan’s method of rule and reforms, one could reasonably argue that 
it so characterized Machiavellian theories it deserves further attention.  
Ivan aimed the majority of his early reforms at restoring a 
kingdom, which, in his opinion, laid waste through years of boyar 
misrule.  He resented the boyars for their mistreatment of him as a 
youth as well as their mismanagement of his inheritance, and he grew 
more suspicious of them as the years passed. From the earliest 
accounts, Ivan, plagued with conspiracies, felt it was necessary to be 
strongly proactive in his own best interest, perhaps following the 
template of Machiavelli.  Machiavelli wrote that a prince is highly 
esteemed and “not easily conspired against”11 and further stated that 
in order to secure oneself from such conspiracy he should avoid “being 
hated and despised…by keeping the people satisfied with him.”12  In 
Machiavellian manner, Ivan sought to reach the people and keep them 
satisfied.  Out of this need, he created the zemskii sobor.13  The first 
gathering of the zemskii sobor, in 1549, allowed Ivan’s subjects the 
opportunity to voice complaints and present opinions concerning 
matters of the kingdom, although notably no townspeople were 
present at this first gathering.14  Some historians, reflecting on the 
lack of townspeople, instead prefer to identify this meeting as the 
‘Council of Reconciliation.’15  At the meeting, Ivan spoke of the cruelty 
and mistreatment he had suffered at the hands of the boyars during his 
youth, but agreed to forgive them and called for them to be 
reconciled.16  Despite Ivan’s grace, the boyar disloyalty would again 
resurface.  Ivan tactically chose to defer his resentment of the boyars 
and move on to more pressing issues, such as reform. 
Ivan’s early reforms also addressed the organization and 
distribution of power, something he wanted to change early in his 
administration.  A new Royal Law Code, the Subednik, introduced in 
1550, was among Ivan’s firsts.  The new Code circumscribed many of 
the powers of the boyars.  It promoted rights of elected local 
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representatives, while decreasing the powers of the namestniki.17  The 
Law Code also established a means of punishment for officials who 
were guilty of abusing their powers. Other articles contained within 
the Code dealt with rights concerning the various classes of Russian 
society.  Historians Andrei Pavlov and Maureen Perrie consider the 
Code Ivan’s attempt to achieve “political consensus amongst the 
various social groups in the country, in order to overcome the 
consequences of the social and political crisis, which had been 
provoked by ‘boyar rule.’”18   
Ivan sensed the need for unity in all aspects of Russian life, 
including Orthodoxy, one of the pillars of Russian society.  Again, one 
can look at Machiavelli and determine that Ivan’s motives here were 
not spiritual in nature but served to further his hold on power.  
Machiavelli’s instructions in this area encouraged princely intellect 
over faith, which he assumed would result in the prince being able to 
“overcome those who have relied on their word.”19  In 1551, a church 
council convened to hear inquiries presented by the Tsar concerning 
church abuses and difficulties in standardization.  The Tsar called 
certain rituals into question, such as the practice of crossing oneself 
with three fingers, as was practiced in Novgorod, or two as was 
common among the Muscovites.  To avoid a split in the church, or 
more likely because it was the practice of the Tsar, the council 
accepted the two-finger crossing as standard.  Several other 
discrepancies were resolved in favor of the Muscovite way, despite the 
alternative being canonically more correct.20  One could argue that 
had the decision been in favor of preserving the Novgorodian way, the 
Great Schism of 1666 might have been averted. 
Ivan transformed the military, in Machiavellian style, during 
this period as well. Machiavelli stated that a wise prince should “never 
in peaceful times stand idle, but increase his resources with industry in 
such a way that they may be available to him in adversity, so that if 
fortune chances it may find him prepared to resist her blows.”21  Ivan 
enlarged the military by allowing sons to inherit rank and nobles to 
assume certain levels based on station.  Prestige would be associated 
with service, encouraging young nobles to pursue a military career.  
Ivan hoped the favor placed on nobility would result in their loyalty.  
The system had difficulties; boyar families frequently squabbled over 
rank, causing problems within the military, most notably during times 
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of battle.22  Russian autocrats would spend the next three centuries 
undoing this particular reform.  
The age of Russian reform and relative peace between Ivan and 
the boyars came to end because of the events of 1553.  Ivan became 
seriously ill and asked the boyars to swear allegiance to his son, 
Dmitrii.  Quarrels arose among the boyars, which infuriated the Tsar, 
after which he demanded they “kiss the cross to the heir,”23 who was 
then only five months old.  Pavlov and Perrie have expanded upon the 
incident with added information, which lessens the disparaging picture 
historians have painted of the boyars. They state that the Tsar had 
become so gravely ill during the early months of 1553 that he was 
unable to recognize many of the people around him.  Considering this, 
he most likely was unable to ask for the boyars to pledge loyalty to the 
Tsarevich.  Furthermore, he would have been unable to make the 
speech of demand for loyalty. Several of the boyars, however, did 
swear allegiance to Dmitrii while still others refused; concerned that 
because of his young age the power of Russia would fall into the hands 
of the Tsaritsa’s family.24  Whether the boyars refused Ivan directly or 
not, the result was the same. When the Tsar recovered, he questioned 
the loyalty of his boyars, setting up the crises, which would continue 
until the end of his reign.    
The dishonesty of those within Ivan’s realm reached beyond the 
boyars and did not go without notice to outsiders.  Later in the same 
year as the Tsar’s illness, Captain Richard Chancellor appeared in 
Ivan’s court.  He had left England earlier that year in search of a 
northern passage to China.  Chancellor describes the conditions in 
Moscow as well as the treatment he received, but most notably, he is 
aware of the deceitfulness of those within Ivan’s court.  He writes, 
“The Duke [Ivan] gives sentence himself upon all matters in the law.  
Which is very commendable, that such a Prince will take pains to see 
ministration of justice.  Yet notwithstanding it is wonderfully abused: 
and thereby the Duke is much deceived.”25  One must consider 
however, that the Captain was writing in order to make a case for the 
invasion of Russia.  Undoubtedly, he would have presented the ruler 
as unwise and ignorant about the activities of his kingdom. 
The mistrust that Ivan held for his boyars finally manifested 
itself in 1564.  Ivan left Moscow in December of that year with a large 
entourage and upon arriving in Aleksandrova Sloboda, he sent back 
word that he had abdicated the throne.  He listed his reasons as deceit 
                                                 
22 Pavlov and Perrie, Ivan the Terrible, 70. 
23 Ibid., 80. 
24 The Tsaritsa (Ivan’s wife, Anastasia) was a member of the Romanov 
family who were a powerful boyar family.  Ironically, after a period of years 
without a Tsar, Michael Romanov was selected to become Tsar. Ibid.   
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and disloyalty on behalf of the boyars.  This date traditionally marks 
the beginning of the bad half of Ivan’s reign and one could argue that 
a separate sovereign (at least in behavior) conducted the second half in 
that it was markedly different from Ivan’s early years as the autocrat.  
He began a reign of terror that even Machiavelli would have 
questioned. 
During the good half of Ivan’s reign, however, he managed to 
hold his emotions in check and unify Russia.  His self-control, desire to 
please the people, and reconcile with the boyars demonstrated the 
diplomatic elements of Machiavellian thought.  Later, considering the 
poor treatment they afforded him as a youth, the mismanagement of 
his kingdom during his minority and the lack of support they showed 
during his early years as sovereign, Ivan pivoted, as a Machiavellian 
prince would do when backed into the corner.  Acting as Machiavelli 
recommended, “it is necessary for him to have a mind ready to turn 
itself accordingly as the winds and variations of fortune force it, yet, as 
I have said above, not to diverge from the good if he can avoid doing 
so, but, if compelled, then to know how to set about it.”26 
Ivan IV redesigned the Russian monarchy, leaving a heritage 
that later Russian leaders followed.  Devoid of proper royal 
instruction, Ivan looked to the past to find that many of his 
predecessors struggled with the same problems he faced upon his 
ascension.  Russia was not alone in her troubles; other kingdoms were 
suffering difficulties as well, such as a divided Italy, for whom 
Machiavelli originally intended The Prince.  Trade routes and 
increasing contact with the west opened up new resources for Ivan, 
including the possibility of acquiring Machiavelli’s manuscript as well 
as his political philosophies.  His lack of training proved to be the 
foundation for his quest for the establishment of an entirely new style 
of sovereign.  To the Russian people, Ivan’s name, ‘Grozny,’ invokes 
exactly what Ivan intended—complete reverence for awesome power.  
Machiavelli would have been impressed. 
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THE SLAVERY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
Ryan Ervin  
 
 
From September 17, 1787 to the present day, the United States 
Constitution has been the subject of much debate.  Its vague language 
and ambiguous wording have created disputes for generations about 
the true meaning of particular clauses or the original intent of the 
Framers.  In its essence, the Constitution is a framework, an outline, 
for government, leaving future generations to add color and depth to a 
broad, somewhat undefined blueprint.  James Madison’s detailed notes 
on the Convention have partially illuminated the struggle going on 
behind the closed doors of Independence Hall, but they have also 
raised still more questions.  It seems as though the more we know 
about what the delegates believed during the summer of 1787, the 
harder it is to link their spoken words with their written ones.   
The Constitutional aspects of slavery are one of those problems 
historians have disagreed about the most.  How could staunch 
antislavery delegates allow the continued enslavement of millions 
under the government they helped form?  More generally, did the 
delegates to the Constitutional Convention betray the principles of the 
Declaration of Independence by forming a union that seemed to 
restrict such principles to a select portion of the population?  From the 
documentation provided thus far, it seems as though popular opinion 
fully supported emancipatory efforts.  A detailed overview of the 
slavery debates can help to answer this contradiction, but historical 
interpretation is just as useful.  Indeed, historians view the very same 
clauses in markedly different ways, and it is important to trace the 
reasons for these differences in order to better judge the Framers’ 
words and actions. 
The neo-Garrisonians have dominated the historical debate on 
slavery and the Constitution for the past fifty years.  Using the 
nineteenth-century abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison’s description 
of the Constitution as a “covenant with death and agreement with 
Hell” as their creed, they have chiefly criticized those northern and 
middle state antislavery delegates for their inability, or lack of will, to 
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end slavery at the Convention.  Neo-Garrisonians also depict the 
southern slave owning delegates as staunchly proslavery, unified in 
defending the institution, and expert bargainers.  Paul Finkelman is 
perhaps the strongest critic of the founders.  Depicting the southern 
delegates as a slave lobbying group, he writes “Rarely in American 
political history have the advocates of a special interest been so 
successful.  Never has the cost of placating a special interest been so 
high.”  When Finkelman asks whether the framers could have done 
more to slow slavery’s growth and weaken its permanence on the 
American landscape, he says, “surely yes.”  In fact, the delegates’ lack 
of conviction in doing anything substantial about slavery “is part of 
the tragedy of American history.” 1  
Neo-Garrisonian criticism has not only focused on the three 
specific clauses which historians have generally agreed mention some 
aspect of slavery; they have also cited any clause which tends to 
reinforce slavery rather than diminish it.  For example, Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 15 provides for the militia to suppress insurrections; 
Article IV, Section 4 protects the states from domestic violence; and 
the slave states gained added representation in Congress and 
therefore, through the Electoral College, “their votes for President 
were far more potent than the votes of northerners.”2  Jack Rakove has 
wondered whether northern accommodation “had to go as far as it 
did.”  “Did the electoral college have to give southern states additional 
votes on behalf of their slaves,” he asks, “when it could have been 
argued that if this form of property deserved any representation, the 
House alone would suffice?”3   
John Hope Franklin laments that the nation’s highest law of 
government “authorizes the continuation of the slave trade for at least 
another twenty years, asserts the right to count three-fifths of the 
slaves for purposes of representation in Congress,” and demands that 
runaway slaves be caught and dragged back to perpetual servitude.4  
And while certain compromises were vital to forming the Union, they 
came, in Richard B. Morris’s words, “at a terrible price.”5   With so 
many peripheral concessions, Finkelman says it is difficult not to 
conclude that the Framers “knew the problem was there.  They chose 
to ignore it.”6 
                                                 
1 Paul Finkelman, “The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little 
Gained,” 415-417. 
2 Finkelman, “Garrison’s Constitution: The Covenant with Death and 
How It was Made,” 242. 
3 Jack Rakove, Original Meanings, 93. 
4 John Hope Franklin, “Who Divided this House?” 28. 
5 Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union, 287. 
6 Finkelman, “Founders and Slavery,” 447. 
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The charges leveled by the neo-Garrisonians are, in a way, easy 
to make.  They have two hundred years of historical hindsight to 
stand upon, including a brutal Civil War, decades of lynches, and a 
civil rights struggle still unfolding to this day.  From this perspective, 
it seems unusual and indeed absurd that the men who wrote the 
Constitution did little, if anything, to place slavery on the road to 
extinction.  In the late 1780s a small window was opened by the 
recent wave of natural rights ideology brought on by the Revolution, 
and it seems as though the Framers missed the one golden 
opportunity they had to abolish forever the inhumane practice.  On 
face value, this theory has some merit.  Slavery was not abolished in 
1787, and there were compromises made during the Convention that 
allowed for it to continue.  But compromise is a two-way street, and 
the southern proslavery delegates may have given up just as much to 
keep their slaves than antislavery delegates yielded to their demands.   
Southern delegates conceded much to the antislavery forces at 
the Convention, including the “strengthening of the National 
Government, especially with respect to the regulation of commerce 
and the levying of taxes.”  Provisions also allowed Western states to 
enter the Union “on an equal footing with the original States.”7  Earl 
M. Maltz has described what the “ideal Constitution” would have 
looked like from the slave state perspective.  If the slaveholding 
delegates had gotten all they wanted, “Congress would be apportioned 
according to population, with slaves counted fully in the basis of 
representation.”  In addition, slaves “would not be considered in 
determining liability for capitation taxes.”  Only a supermajority in 
Congress could pass navigation acts, and the power to tax exports 
would be an exclusive state power.  Finally, South Carolina and 
Georgia, “the two most radical slave states,” would have expressly 
forbade Congress from ever interfering with the slave trade or even 
taxing those slaves imported.  From this perspective, it is difficult to 
suggest that the compromises over slavery reflected an 
“overwhelming victory for the slave states” at the Convention.8 
When slavery was brought up during the Convention, South 
Carolina’s Charles Pinckney defended the practice on historical 
grounds, and Connecticut’s Oliver Ellsworth “on grounds of 
expediency.”  Despite these justifications, “the defenders of slavery 
were an isolated and embarrassed minority.”9  A clear majority of not 
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only states, but individual delegates, wished to either end the practice 
or at least sanction it and restrict its growth.  This is reflected in the 
final draft of the Constitution, which did not establish any general law 
endorsing slavery, but instead “established laws to regulate a 
condition already existing.”  The primary purpose of those laws and 
regulations “was to confine slavery to those places where it then 
existed with the view of setting slavery on a course of eventual 
extinction.”10  The containment powers under the Constitution were 
the only means of promoting both liberty and equality at the time, 
because slavery was a precondition that directly and indirectly affected 
millions of people.  As noted earlier, in the South it was a practice 
inherited from previous generations, rooted in economic necessity.  
Therefore, it is remarkable what the delegates did do to restrict an 
institution, and indeed, even a way of life. 
“One of the most important, if fleeting, consequences of 
Revolutionary Northern abolition and the resulting legal sectionalism 
of slavery,” writes Anthony Iaccarino, “was the fact that the delegates 
to the Convention explicitly restricted slavery’s legality to state, not 
federal law.”11  Iaccarino is correct on one level: the slave trade clause 
prevented the federal government from ending the trade for twenty 
years, and the fugitive slave clause allowed citizens of one state to 
retrieve their fleeing slaves from another.  However, relegating 
slavery to state control prevented the federal government from ever 
approving the practice in its higher law.  With such words as “justly” 
and “lawfully” removed from the final draft, it was implicitly defined 
as a local state custom and not higher law, thus reflecting its dubious 
nature.12  This careful phrasing “carried no implication of national 
sanction or protection of the institution, and it lent no explicit 
reinforcement to the idea of human property.”13  While Finkelman 
states that southerners tried to avoid using the actual term slave in the 
Constitution because “they did not want unnecessarily to antagonize 
their colleagues from the North,” it is still significant that the 
document is free of the word.14  Nowhere is it specifically recognized, 
thus adding weight to the argument that the “language of the 
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document conveys a stance towards slavery that can be fairly 
characterized as a stance against it in principle.”15 
Throughout the debates, the southernmost states threatened to 
leave the Convention if certain concessions regarding slavery were not 
made.  These eventual compromises not only extinguished this serious 
threat of disunion from South Carolina and Georgia, but they also 
prevented those states from establishing a separate confederacy free of 
any limitations on slavery.  Historians have thoroughly studied the 
need for compromise in order to preserve the Union.  Martin 
Torodash writes that “Failure to recognize the institution would have 
resulted in failure of the scheme of the Constitution.”  Daniel Waite 
Howe says that “it is certain that South Carolina and Georgia would 
not ratify the Constitution without the concessions made to slavery.”  
“To expect the southern states to join the Union…was both 
unreasonable and unrealistic,” writes Earl Maltz.   
Peter S. Onuf has called attention to “the problematic character 
of the union—and the very real possibility of disunion,” during the 
years immediately preceding the Convention.  Conflicts over access to 
western lands, anger over a feeble navigation treaty, the slow pace of 
the Confederation Congress, and widespread dissatisfaction with taxes 
led many to consider “radical alternatives”, including “the creation of 
new regional confederations.”16  In late November 1787, after the 
Constitution had been distributed to the general population, George 
Washington still believed that “there are characters who prefer 
disunion, or separate Confederacies,” saying that “nothing in my 
conception is more to be deprecated than a disunion.”17  John Jay 
warned a month earlier that “politicians now appear, who insist…that 
instead of looking for safety and happiness in union, we ought to seek 
it in a division of the states into distinct confederacies or 
sovereignties,” and Alexander Hamilton said that “we already we hear 
it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new 
constitution, that the Thirteen States are of too great extent for any 
general system, and that we must of necessity resort to separate 
confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.”18   
Clearly the most important objective at the Convention was to 
preserve the Union, and the compromises on slavery reflect that goal.  
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The Slave Trade And The Constitutional Convention 
Many of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention 
understood that the slave trade could only be sanctioned, and perhaps 
prohibited, by investing the federal government with broad powers.  
At the same time, though, there was strong opposition towards any 
proposal which limited the practice, most notably from South Carolina 
and Georgia delegates.  These southern delegates used the threat of 
disunion to gain leverage in the debates, claiming that an end to the 
slave trade would prevent them from signing the Constitution.  For 
example, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina declared that his state 
“can never receive the plan if it prohibits the slave trade.”  He added 
that if each state was left to either stop or continue the trade, as was 
the practice under the Articles, “South Carolina may perhaps, by 
degrees, do of herself what is wished…”19  Fellow South Carolinian 
John Rutledge said that the “true question at present is, whether the 
Southern States shall or shall not be parties to the Union.”20  Rutledge 
himself delivered a special committee report on August 6, proposing 
that Congress can neither prohibit the importation of “such persons as 
the several States shall think proper to admit,” nor tax them.21   
The small contingent of southern delegates who wished to 
protect the slave trade faced a strong opposition from the northern 
and middle states, including upper-south delegates from Maryland 
and Virginia.  These delegates opposed the trade for various reasons.  
Some believed the entire practice of slavery to be morally wrong.  
Virginia’s George Mason called the trade an “infernal traffic” and 
famously opined that “Every master of slaves is born a petty tyrant.  
They bring the judgment of heaven on a Country.”22  Others, such as 
Massachusetts delegate Rufus King, thought that an increased slave 
population would invite domestic insurrection and foreign invasion.  
“Shall all the States…be bound to defend each,” he asked, “and shall 
each be at liberty to introduce a weakness which will render defence 
more difficult?”23  Despite the various reasons for opposing the trade, 
the majority opinion in the Convention universally wished for it to be 
sanctioned, or prohibited, under the Constitution.   
The South Carolina and Georgia delegates maintained that 
their respective states would not agree to any federal government that 
ended the slave trade.  Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles 
Pinckney’s cousin, said plainly, “South Carolina and Georgia cannot 
do without slaves.”  If the Convention rejected the report on the slave 
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trade, it would mean “an exclusion of South Carolina from the 
Union.”24 Georgia’s Abraham Baldwin said that a national 
government should take on “national objects” only, not local practices.  
If his state were left alone, “she may probably put a stop to the evil.”25  
Hugh Williamson of North Carolina thought “the Southern States 
could not be members of the Union if the clause should be rejected, 
and that it was wrong to force any thing down, not absolutely 
necessary….”26  Rutledge spoke the loudest when he stood to declare 
an ultimatum.  “If the Convention thinks that North Carolina, South 
Carolina and Georgia will ever agree to the plan, unless their right to 
import slaves be untouched, the expectation is vain.  The people of 
those states will never be such fools as to give up so important an 
interest.”27  
Virginia’s Edmund Randolph undoubtedly spoke for many 
when he wished “that some middle ground might, if possible, be 
found.”  If Rutledge’s proposal, forbidding any federal interference 
with the trade, became a part of the Constitution, Randolph and many 
other northern and middle state delegates would have to deal with 
angry antislavery constituencies in open revolt.  “On the other hand,” 
he said “two States might be lost to the Union.”28  This dilemma 
brought the delegates to the table of compromise for the sake of the 
Union.  On August 24, the special committee returned with a revised 
clause, which stated, “The migration or importation of such persons as 
the several States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not 
be prohibited by the Legislature prior to the year 1800, but a tax or 
duty may be imposed on such migration or importation…”29  The next 
day, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney asked that the trade be kept opened 
until 1808, and several other delegates called for a ten dollar 
maximum tax on each slave imported.30  Both motions were agreed to, 
but James Madison reminded the delegates that “Twenty years will 
produce all the mischief that can be apprehended from the liberty to 
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import slaves.  So long a term will be dishonorable to the American 
character than to say nothing about it in the Constitution.”31  In 
twenty years, Congress would in fact outlaw the slave trade, thus 
exerting its authority the first year it could do so.   
Despite these limiting actions taken both in 1787 and 1808, 
historians have not been unified in their praise for the founders.  
Finkelman is critical that the Constitution “prevented the national 
government from stopping the African slave trade or the domestic 
slave trade for at least twenty years.”  He also notes that in 1787 no 
state was in fact importing slaves.  Therefore, “it is reasonable to 
believe that the Slave Trade Clause was unnecessary to secure support 
for the Constitution.”32  Matthew E. Mason decries the twenty year 
window in the clause because from 1803 to 1807, South Carolina alone 
imported “tens of thousands of new slaves…a number far in excess of 
the state’s need for labor.”33  Eric Foner more generally criticizes the 
Convention, saying, “Whatever its other merits, the Constitution 
represented a step backwards when it came to slavery.”  Indeed, as 
Don Fehrenbacher writes, recent historical accounts are “virtually an 
indictment of the members of the Constitutional Convention.  They 
are accused of passing up a golden opportunity to take action against 
slavery and of drafting instead a frame of government that legitimated 
and protected the institution.”34   
There are several important aspects of the slave trade clause, 
and the overall history of the trade, which must be addressed in order 
to demonstrate that these historians are mistaken.  First, the history 
prior to the Convention shows that the slave trade was prohibited by 
all the states only under duress, when war with Britain required a 
unified trading prohibition.  More importantly, the Continental 
Association of the Revolutionary years was a purely voluntary 
commitment, neither binding nor enforceable.  The states individually 
agreed to end the slave trade for a period of time, and some eventually 
chose to start it again.   
This was the same situation among the states under the 
Articles of Confederation.  Several states outlawed the slave trade in 
their respective legislatures, while others continued the trade as 
needed.  This “state sovereignty” approach stands in contrast to 
Congress’s national authority under the Constitution.  Despite the 
twenty-year continuance, ending the trade was a power expressly 
granted to Congress.  James Madison reiterated the importance of this 
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new federal power during the Virginia ratifying convention in 1788.  
“We are not in a worse situation than before,” he said.  “The union in 
general is not in a worse situation.  Under the articles of 
confederation, it might be continued forever: But by this clause an end 
may be put to it after twenty years.  There is therefore an amelioration 
of our circumstances.”35   
The very wording of the clause itself is also significant, because 
in every instance, the language is at odds with slavery.  The first 
portion, “The Migration or Importation of such Persons,” says 
nothing of slaves or slavery.  While it is acknowledged that “such 
persons” meant slaves, it is critical that the word is not in the clause, 
nor in any part of the Constitution.  John Alvis recognizes this 
important omission, writing that “the avoidance of any explicit 
acknowledgment of slavery suggests that one cannot look to the 
supreme law of the land for authorization in owning human beings.  
Ownership of men will not derive from federal authority.”36  
Designating slaves as “persons” also conferred upon them some level 
of rights under the broad definition Jefferson outlined in the 
Declaration of Independence.  “Persons” have natural rights, such as 
the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  The use of 
“persons” is a clear sign that those antislavery delegates at the 
Convention sought to offer slavery the least possible protection under 
the new government.   
The second portion of the clause pertains to “any of the States 
now existing.”  This subtle phrase gave Congress federal power to 
prohibit the slave trade in any new states admitted to the Union.  
Congress was only barred from legislating against the slave trade in 
the thirteen states existing in 1787, and more specifically, to those 
southern states who did in fact engage in the practice.  This 
restriction, when read in conjunction with the Northwest Ordinance 
of 1787 which outlawed slavery in the Northwest Territory, “indicated 
a general disposition to view slavery as the exception rather than the 
rule in an expanding government.”37  Alvis has said that with this 
important qualification, “at least one door was closed to the admission 
of slaves into new lands.”38 
The last provision of the clause says that a maximum duty of 
ten dollars may be placed on each slave imported.  This tax was not 
meant to demean slaves as being equivalent to taxable goods or 
merchandise.  Indeed, during the Convention debates, Roger Sherman 
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of Connecticut said he was against laying taxes on slaves, “as 
acknowledging men to be property, by taxing them as such under the 
character of slaves.”  Massachusetts’s Nathaniel Gorham asked 
Sherman to reconsider, “not as implying that slaves are property, but 
as a discouragement to the importation of them.”39  Many southerners 
realized the crippling affect that taxing slaves would have on the 
South. During the South Carolina ratification debates, Rawlins 
Lowndes said that even with the twenty year concession, “care had 
been taken to make us pay for this indulgence.”  “Negroes were our 
wealth,” he said, “our only natural resource, yet behold how our kind 
friends in the North were determined soon to tie up our hands, and 
drain us of what we had.”40  When the final draft of the clause is 
compared with John Rutledge’s original proposal, which barred 
Congress from either interfering with the slave trade or taxing any 
import, the result was a positive gain for antislavery proponents.  
The need for compromise in order to preserve the union has 
been thoroughly studied, but few historians have taken the next 
logical step to ask what the plight of slaves would have been under a 
southern confederacy.  Would they have been better off under a 
southern union of states rather than the Constitution, or is such 
postulating ahistorical by nature?  For as much as neo-Garrisonians 
have criticized the founders, they have at least acknowledged the 
consequences of disunion.  Finkelman states that if the northern 
delegates had tried to outright end slavery nationally, “most of the 
delegates from south of the Mason-Dixon line would have walked out.  
Rather than creating a ‘more perfect Union,’ the delegates might have 
destroyed the Union altogether if they had pushed for abolition.”  But 
rather than emphasize the importance of compromise for the sake of 
keeping that very Union together, he says, “It is not unreasonable to 
ask if the Framers might have been better off creating two separate 
nations, one based on slavery and one based on liberty.”  Finkelman 
believes that the problem could have been solved by cutting off the 
problem, thus making it a non-issue.41  
What Finkelman fails to recognize is that the threat of disunion 
highlights the necessity for compromise on the slave trade.  Every 
time slavery was subjected to criticism during the Convention debates, 
the South Carolina and Georgia delegates threatened to leave the 
Union. Finkelman has been highly suspicious of these threats, 
claiming that the creation of a separate Southern confederacy seemed 
at best “unlikely.”  He says that if the framers had done nothing about 
the slave trade, “it is likely the Constitution would have been ratified” 
and that South Carolina “might have pouted for a while and perhaps 
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not been one of the early states to ratify.  But the state would have 
quickly realized that it was in no condition to go it alone.”42   
Finkelman’s theory rests on the dubious assumption that the 
South would be weakened without the defensive protections offered by 
the Union, and he fails to realize the enormous gains the slaveholding 
states would reap without any limitations on slavery.  An independent 
Southern confederacy would be free to continue the slave trade 
indefinitely; it would certainly not tax any slave imports, and the 
institution in general would largely be free of criticism.  James 
Madison echoed this fear at the ratification debates when he reminded 
his fellow Virginians that South Carolina and Georgia would not have 
joined the Union if the slave trade was immediately outlawed. 43  The 
framers never entertained the thought of splitting the states into two 
countries, because the consequences would have been detrimental to 
the entire nation. 
 Finkelman’s “all or nothing” approach indeed would have 
benefited neither the northern or southern states.  George Anastaplo 
has reasoned that if the work in Philadelphia had ended without 
agreement and the Union was disbanded, “The South would have been 
left as an independent, slavery-dominated country.”  There were 
“reasons to believe that [a Southern Union] would have been…an 
expansionist power, moving with its slave codes into the Gulf of 
Mexico, Cuba, Mexico, and even further South.”  In contrast to 
Finkelman, he says that “such a Southern move to go it alone probably 
could not have been stopped in 1787.”44  “What, then, was in the 
interest of the slaves,” he asks.  “[T]o be abandoned completely to the 
control of a country governed altogether by the slaveholding interests 
or to be left in a country in which compromises had to be made with 
slavery in order to preserve” the Union?”45  From this perspective, it is 
not only reasonable that such compromises, and even concessions, 
were made at the Convention, but it was the only way to prevent 
slavery from being sealed off from attack in a separate sovereign 
confederacy.    
Anastaplo’s theory has merit, because the rising antislavery 
opposition detailed earlier was at the time still diffuse and lacked the 
structure it would develop in the nineteenth century.  Pennsylvania 
Quakers and Methodist and Virginia Baptists had been petitioning 
Congress for restrictions on the slave trade since the early 1780s, but 
there never was any coordination to their efforts, and instead their 
petitions amounted to complaint letters.  At the time of the 
Convention, slavery was “supported by the laws of every state except 
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Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts,” while the practice and 
acceptance of the institution had been entrenched in the southern 
mind for generations.46  It therefore is extraordinary that not only was 
the slave trade limited and ultimately abolished, but that a nascent 
antislavery opposition made significant Constitutional gains at a time 
when slavery was the accepted norm.   
In addition, the ideal slave state Constitution which Maltz 
describes adds further proof that the final product was antislavery in 
its overall language.  The final draft consigned slavery to state custom 
and gave it no direct federal protection.  Simultaneously, it established 
a national forum, the United States Congress, where the issue could be 
questioned and debated.  Although by 1787 slavery was deeply 
ingrained in the country, the Constitution gave the government the 
means to restrict its growth, and the opportunity to discuss its merits. 
 
Debates Outside The Convention 
During the ratification debates in the state legislatures, the 
slave trade was the most contentious of all the slavery clauses.  
Delegates to these conventions held numerous opinions on the 
compromise, and their arguments for and against the trade 
demonstrate a real concern that the greater institution of slavery 
would ultimately be either expressly legalized or entirely criminal.  In 
northern conventions, delegates eased their constituents’ fears by 
pointing to the fact that the word “slavery” was never mentioned in 
the Constitution.  “Northern delegates could return home asserting 
that the Constitution did not recognize the legality of slavery,” writes 
Finkelman.  “In the most technical linguistic sense they were perhaps 
right.”47   
Here, Finkelman misjudges the importance of such an omission.  
If the framers sanctioned that which they could not bring themselves 
to name, what does this say about the Constitution they wrote?  Most 
assuredly, that such a term was anathema to them.  On another level, 
putting slaves on par with other persons speaks to the document’s 
universal nature.  If the framers intended to keep slavery protected in 
the Constitution, then why was it only vaguely referred to?  The 
answer cannot be that “persons” would be more palatable to northern 
ears, because if everyone knew that “persons” meant slaves, then why 
go through pains to not have slavery written into the document?  The 
only logical answer is that the framers intended to write a charter of 
government that transcended the present local perplexities and 
customs within various regions, one that spoke to current and future 
                                                 
46 David Brion Davis, “The Significance of Excluding Slavery from the 
Old Northwest in 1787,” 81. 
47 ibid., 242. 
 
 
108
 
generations, even for those who in 1787 were doomed to perpetual 
servitude. 
The slave trade clause was discussed more than any other issue 
related to slavery in the ratifying conventions, mainly because of its 
potential to limit the trade in the future, but also because many 
believed it amounted to a delayed power of abolishment.  Many 
northern citizens lamented the very practice, but looked toward a 
promising pattern emerging in many states.  Simeon Baldwin of 
Connecticut said that most “of the southern & middle states have 
made salutary provision by law for the future emancipation of this 
unfortunate race of men,” and it was enlightening that the southern 
states had “consented to [the slave trade clause] in our new 
constitution evidently calculated to abolish a slavery upon which they 
calculated their riches.”48   
Even before the Constitution was sent to the states for debate 
and ratification, the political propaganda and campaigning had already 
begun.  In early October 1787, just weeks after the Convention ended, 
Pennsylvania state representative Robert Waln wrote to his brother 
in Philadelphia about the Constitution’s power to influence slavery.  
Waln thought that “as each state is still at liberty to enact such laws 
for the abolition of slavery as they may think proper, the Convention 
cannot be charg’d with holding out any encouragement to it.”49  Noah 
Webster believed the Constitution wisely allowed each state to decide 
on emancipation, because an “immediate abolition of slavery would 
bring ruin upon the whites, and misery upon the blacks, in the 
southern states.”  During the twenty-one years before Congress could 
outlaw the slave trade, each state was free to “pursue its own 
measures.”50   
Northern newspapers were filled with abolitionist and 
antislavery tracts, and they led the initial assault on slavery and the 
slave trade in the fall of 1787.  The Providence United States Chronicle 
referred to the trade as the “horrid Practice” and “that Heaven-daring 
Wickedness.”51  Tench Coxe wrote that the slave trade clause laid a 
“solid foundation…for exploding the principles of negro slavery.”  He 
reasoned that any “temporary reservation…must be deemed an 
admission that it should be done away.”52  Samuel Hopkins, however, 
did not agree that the slave trade clause benefited the cause.  The 
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delegates, Hopkins wrote to Moses Brown, “have carefully secured the 
practice of it in these States for 20 years…They have taken it out of 
the hands of Congress.”  Hopkins also believed that compromises such 
as this were necessary to establishing the Constitution.  He knew that 
the southern delegates had insisted on the slave trade provision, and 
“obstinately refused to consent to any constitution, which did not 
secure it.”  Therefore, it was apparent to him “that if this constitution 
be not adopted by the States, as it now stands, we shall have none, and 
nothing but anarchy and confusion can be expected.”53 
William Rotch was less forgiving than Samuel Hopkins, and in 
a letter to Moses Brown in November 1787, he wrote that “it is 
evident to me [the Constitution] is founded on Slavery and that is on 
Blood…”54  Both Rotch’s and Hopkins’s views on the Constitution 
relate the essence of northern opinion on the slavery provisions: they 
were seen as either a necessity to ward off greater evils (like disunion), 
or they were atrocities added purely to placate southerners in some 
underhanded bargain.  Benjamin Workman strongly voiced his 
disapproval of the Constitution, writing how strange it was “that the 
professed enemies of negro and every other species of slavery, should 
themselves join in the adoption of a constitution whose very basis is 
despotism and slavery.”  The plan of government, Workman said, 
“militates so far against freedom, that even their own religious liberty 
may probably be destroyed.”55  Oliver Ellsworth, writing in the 
Connecticut Courant, was more optimistic.  “The only possible step that 
could be taken towards it by the convention was to fix a period after 
which they should not be imported.”56 
In the Pennsylvania convention, Thomas McKean rejoiced that 
the “abolition of slavery is put within the reach of the federal 
government.”57  Anthony Wayne, like so many others, compared the 
clause to the lack of any restraint under the Articles of Confederation.  
James Wilson worked to persuade others that the slave trade had been 
dealt a fatal blow.  He said that at present “states may admit the 
importation of slaves as long as they please,” but “by this article after 
the year 1808, the congress will have power to prohibit such 
importation…”  Wilson thought that Congress’s powers would, or 
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should, extend to outright abolition.  Combined with the power to tax 
imported slaves, he believed the twenty year limit laid “the foundation 
for banishing slavery out of this country; and though the period is 
more distant than I could wish, yet it will produce the same kind, 
gradual change, which was pursued in Pennsylvania.”58  Believing that 
the tax on imported slaves was “an immediate advantage,” Wilson told 
his fellow delegates that during the subsequent twenty years, “the new 
states which are to be formed, will be under the control of 
congress…and slaves will never by introduced amongst them.”59  In 
his view, the clause was one of the more “lovely” features in the 
Constitution.  “Yet the lapse of a few years,” he said, “and Congress 
will have power to exterminate slavery from within our borders.”60 
A large portion of the delegates to the Massachusetts ratifying 
convention were uneasy about the slave trade clause.  While many 
voiced concern that the trade would continue for twenty years, a 
strong group of Federalists worked to ease such fears.  Reverend Isaac 
Backus explained that “we have now gained a check which we had not 
before,” hoping that “in time we shall stop the slave trade.”61  He 
would also reason that with the delayed prohibition, “a door is now 
opened” to end the trade.62  General Samuel Thompson stood to 
elaborate on Backus’s rationalization, reminding the convention that 
under the Articles of Confederation there was no such prohibitive 
power.  The Constitution, however, provided “that Congress may, 
after 20 years, totally annihilate the slave trade; and that all the states, 
except two, have passed laws to this effect, it might reasonably be 
expected that it would then be done.”  In addition, because “all the 
states, except two, have passed laws to this effect, it might reasonably 
be expected, that it would then be done.”  In the meantime, “all the 
states were at liberty to prohibit it.”63 
William Heath reminded the Massachusetts convention that 
while compromise meant northern states acquiesced to southern 
demands protecting the trade, the slave states did not get what they 
entirely wanted either.  “The federal Convention went as far as they 
could,” Heath said.  The “migration or importation, &c. is confined to 
the States now existing only, new States cannot claim it.  Congress by 
their ordinance for erecting new States…declared, that the new States 
shall be republican, and that there shall be no slavery in them.”64  At 
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the same time, though, he cautioned radical antislavery advocates that 
in 1808 many southern states would not emancipate their slaves.65 
On January 30, Heath elaborated on his conviction that the 
north could not force the south to abolish slavery.  “Each state is 
sovereign and independent to a certain degree,” he said, “and they 
have a right, and will regulate their own internal affairs, as to 
themselves appears proper.”  Heath was expounding upon the notion, 
born out of the Revolutionary era, that the individual should ideally be 
at liberty to possess private property free of government intrusion.  
Bluntly stating that “we are not in this case partakers of other men’s 
sins, for in nothing do we voluntarily encourage the slavery of our 
fellow men,” he at the same time drew a line between northern 
antislavery and southern proslavery ideals.66   
The location of slaves influenced the arguments used in the 
ratifying conventions.  As Fehrenbacher has said, “advocates of 
ratification were likely to stress [the Constitution’s] proslavery 
features in the South and its antislavery potential in the North.  
Opponents of ratification tended to do the reverse.”67  David Ramsay 
of Charleston, South Carolina said that though “Congress may forbid 
the importation of negroes after 21 years, it does not follow that they 
will.  On the other hand, it is probable that they will not.”  Ramsay 
believed the rice crops would increase business in the north, and they 
would in turn allow for the slave trade to continue.68  In such upper 
south states as Virginia, however, it was difficult to frame the 
Constitution either way, because there was a strong mixture of both 
pro- and antislavery sentiment in the area.  At the Virginia 
convention, George Mason and James Madison both pointed out that 
the clauses concerning the general welfare and defense, and those 
pertaining to taxation, could be interpreted as expressly opposing 
slavery.  “Their expressed concerns should give pause to historians 
who suggest that the Constitution was an unequivocally proslavery 
document,” writes Anthony Iaccarino.69 
The genuine disagreement in Virginia over whether slavery 
would be protected or abolished under the Constitution highlights the 
institution’s potential vulnerability at the time, and shows that all did 
not agree that it was safe from federal intervention.  Patrick Henry 
thought that several confederacies would best protect slavery, and he 
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believed such a framework was possible at the time.  “Compared to 
such a consolidation, small Confederacies are little evils,” he said.  
Virginia and North Carolina “could exist separated from the rest of 
America” and they would not be “swallowed up” in any Union they did 
not agree to.70  Zachariah Johnston reminded his fellow Virginians 
that, though slavery was at least acknowledged under the 
Constitution, the document as a whole was better than anything yet 
produced.  “This Constitution may have defects,” he said.  “There can 
be no human institution without defects.  We must go out of this 
world to find it otherwise.  The annals of mankind do not shew us one 
example of a perfect Constitution.”71 
A dissolution of the union was on the minds of many citizens 
when they read the slavery provisions, and they realized that such 
concessions were needed in order to maintain a solid union of states.  
Governor Edmund Randolph gave an impassioned speech on the 
consequences of failure.  “I entertain no less horror at the thought of 
partial confederacies,” he wrote.  A confederacy composed of southern 
states would be weighed down by their slave populations; their ability 
to defend themselves would be diminished “by the mixture of unhappy 
species of property.”72  George Washington also believed secession 
was not only dreadful, but a very real possibility.  “I am fully 
persuaded it is the best that can be obtained at this Time,” he said, “and 
that it or Disunion is before us to choose from.”73  Still, there were 
many who supported Simeon Baldwin’s view that “an odious slavery, 
cruel in itself, degrading to the dignity of man, and shocking to human 
nature, is tolerated, and in many instances practised with barbarian 
cruelty.”  Threat of disunion or not, Baldwin scorned the delegates for 
missing a prime opportunity to abolish the institution.74       
As mentioned earlier, Virginia’s George Mason emerged as the 
leading opponent of the slave trade, but his criticism conflicted with 
his firm belief that slavery within the states should be protected. On 
June 11, 1788, he spoke of “the continuation of this detestable trade,” 
but then complained that “there is no clause in the Constitution that 
will prevent the Northern and Eastern States from meddling with our 
whole property of that kind.  He argued for a clause “to secure us that 
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property, which we have acquired under our former laws, and the loss 
of which would bring ruin on a great many people.”75  Incredulous, 
Henry Lee explained that Mason “abominates [the Constitution], 
because it does not prohibit the importation of slaves, and because it 
does not secure the continuance of the existing slavery!”  Lee asked, “if 
it be reprehensible in the one case, it can be censurable in the other?”76   
Mason tried to elaborate on his position, explaining that “the 
augmentation of slaves weakens the States; and such a trade is 
diabolical in itself, and disgraceful to mankind.”  He even said that he 
“would not admit the Southern States into the Union, unless they 
agreed to the discontinuance of this disgraceful trade,” because it 
would weaken the Union.77   It seems Mason opposed the slave trade 
more because he thought it weakened the nation’s defensive 
capabilities, and less because of its “disgraceful” nature.  Indeed, it was 
difficult for him to criticize a trade providing the landed gentry of 
which he was a part with the very species of property he wished to 
protect.  On the contrary, Mason had ample reason to abhor the trade 
but tolerate the practice of slavery.  In 1787-88 Virginia had a surplus 
of slaves and did not need anymore; slave owners sought to sell the 
excess slaves to planters from other states, and therefore wanted 
greater protection for a commodity that was scarce elsewhere.   
James Madison, rising to answer Mason’s charges, agreed that 
such a clause would seem imprudent, “if it were on of those things 
which could be excluded without encountering greater evils.”  Such an 
evil was disunion, Madison explained.  “The Southern States would 
not have entered into the Union of America, without the temporary 
permission of that trade.  And if they were excluded from the Union, 
the consequences might be dreadful to them and to us.”78  Turning to 
the language of the clause itself, Madison said, “We are not in a worse 
situation than before.”  Virginia already prohibited the trade, and they 
were free to continue its proscription.  Even the Union was better off 
with the clause, because “an end may be put to it after twenty years,” 
and a tax “may be laid in the meantime.” 
The slave trade compromise, when compared to no sanctions or 
rules under the Articles, provided “an amelioration of our 
circumstances.”  Madison again reminded Mason and others that, 
“Great as the evil is, a dismemberment of the Union would be worse.  
If those States should disunite from the other States, for not indulging 
them in the temporary continuance of this traffic, they might solicit 
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and obtain aid from foreign powers.”79  George Nicholas readily 
agreed with Madison that disunion was worse than twenty years more 
of the slave trade.  “As the Southern States would not confederate 
without this clause,” Nicholas asked “if Gentlemen would rather 
dissolve the Confederacy than to suffer this temporary inconvenience, 
admitting it to be such?”80  The point was clear: the southernmost 
states would not have signed the Constitution if slavery was abolished.    
If the northern, middle, and upper south ratifying conventions 
demonstrate a consistent belief that the slave trade was put in 
jeopardy under the Constitution, then it seems that Deep South 
conventions should conversely be pervasive with defenses of the trade, 
and praise for its continuation.  Instead, many southerners were upset 
that the trade would be subject to review in twenty years, and they 
criticized their delegates for bargaining away their rights to import 
slaves.  For example, in the South Carolina House of Representatives 
Rawlins Lowndes asked pointedly, “Why confine us to 20 years, or 
rather why limit us at all?”  He thought “this trade could be justified 
on the principles of religion, humanity and justice,” and without 
slaves, “this state would degenerate into one of the most contemptible 
in the union.”  While slaves “were our wealth, our only natural 
resource,” the northern states “were determined soon to tie up our 
hands, and drain us of what we had.”  Citing the lack of any 
restrictions on New England importations, Lowndes wondered why 
anyone would “call this a reciprocal bargain, which took all from one 
party to bestow it on the other?”81   
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, who had bargained for the slave 
trade clause in Philadelphia, tried to answer Lowndes’s charges.  
Pickney said that the South Carolina and Georgia delegations “had to 
contend with the religious and political privileges of the eastern and 
middle states, and with the interested and inconsistent opinion of 
Virginia, who was warmly opposed to our importing more slaves.”  
The southernmost states could not acquire an unsanctioned slave 
trade; they had to bargain for any allowance.  Turning to the clause 
itself, Pinckney highlighted the advantageous portions for the House 
members.  “By this settlement we have secured an unlimited 
importation of negroes for twenty years; nor is it declared that the 
importation shall be then stopped; it may be continued.”  In addition, 
the south would have “a security that the general government can 
never emancipate them, for no such authority is granted.”  When all 
the circumstances were considered, Pinckney thought “we have made 
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the best terms for the security of this species of property it was in our 
power to make.”82  Robert Barnwell stood to support Pickney, saying 
that “Congress has guaranteed this right for that space of time, and at 
is expiration may continue it as long as they please.”83  Picnkey and 
Barnwell were correct in a sense, but in another, the limited power of 
the new government with respect to slavery implicitly acknowledged 
that such powers needed to be stated.  The very act of stating powers, 
or restrictions on power, implies that they have been challenged, 
either in the Federal Convention or in public opinion throughout the 
country.  That such powers and restrictions were necessary to settle 
disputes of ambiguity points to a certain degree of slavery’s 
vulnerability.  To men like Rawlins Lowndes, the delegates had not 
attained a ringing endorsement of slavery, but only a temporary 
continuation of a vital “resource.”      
During the North Carolina ratifying convention slavery was, 
for some, a problem with no clear solution; the slave trade clause 
presented an opportunity to limit at least one aspect of the practice.  
On July 26, 1788, James Iredell said that “were it practicable to put an 
end to the importation of slaves immediately, it would give me the 
greatest pleasure; for it certainly is a trade inconsistent with the rights 
of humanity, and under which great cruelties have been exercised.”  
While he believed that emancipation “will be an event which must be 
pleasing to every generous mind, and every friend of human nature,” 
he added that “we often wish for things which are not attainable.”84  
The final version of the clause settled upon, Iredell explained, “was the 
utmost that could be obtained.”  Wishing that more could have been 
done, he asked the convention delegates, “Where is there another 
country in which such a restriction prevails?  We, therefore…set an 
example of humanity, by providing for the abolition of this inhuman 
traffic, though at a distant period.”85  James Galloway also spoke in 
favor of the clause, saying he wished “to see this abominable trade put 
an end to.”86    
The debates over the slave trade in the state ratifying 
conventions suggest that the majority of delegates voting on the 
Constitution wished for the trade to end as soon as possible, while 
many also despised the larger practice of slavery.  Only in the Deep 
South was slavery, much less the importation of slaves, viewed as 
something along the lines of a positive good.  Those advocates such as 
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Charles Pinckney, who judged the slave trade clause as great 
concession to the south, were in the clear minority, but the fact 
remains that it was indeed added to the Constitution.   
Despite the fervent antislavery stance in the northern and 
middle states, the established government would allow for the slave 
trade to continue.  It is clear, however, that while the Constitution 
indirectly acknowledged slavery to exist within the states, this was in 
no way a positive endorsement of the institution, much less the 
importation of slaves.  The slave trade clause was the most forceful 
stance a fledgling country could take at a time when disunion was a 
genuine threat.  A nation that had cut ties with slave states would 
never see the problem diminish, but only expand and grow at an even 
faster rate.  The slave trade clause restricted this expansion and 
stunted this growth. 
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THE CHEROKEE NATION AND THE CIVIL WAR 
 
Wade Ellett 
 
 
The Civil War was the most tragic of American wars. It pitted 
neighbors against neighbors, sons against fathers, and the citizens of 
America against their fellow citizens. Amidst the men caught in the 
maelstrom, Native Americans fought admirably on both sides of the 
conflict. America was divided, but not often remembered was a similar 
division driven through the Cherokee Nation, that was as bad if not 
worse than that of America as a whole. For the Cherokee, the war was 
not fought for the same reasons as it was for white Americans. The 
division within the tribe was not simply North versus South, or 
merely pro-slavery versus abolitionist, but also had within its confines 
a division of full-blood versus mixed-blood and in some ways, a 
division based upon whether or not the Cherokee should trust the 
American government. One of the most paramount of the divisions 
was based upon the feud between John Ross and Stand Watie, which 
had existed for decades. Watie had been one of the four leaders who 
had signed the treaty in the 1830s that moved the Cherokee to the 
reservation in Oklahoma.1 The decision divided the tribe, although 
most were not in favor of relocation. After arriving in Oklahoma, the 
feud between Watie and Ross fermented over time. Because of this 
feud, the Cherokee nation had its own civil war that finally appeared 
to end when principal chief John Ross and Stand Watie shook hands 
and signed a treaty that established one Cherokee government, 
recognized all Cherokee land claims, and pardoned all who had signed 
the removal treaty.2 The feud between the two men and their 
respective factions seemed to die as the Cherokee nation rebuilt itself. 
Where there was once two factions there existed one tribe that 
seemingly worked together to empower its government, educate its 
children, and strengthen its infrastructure.3 Unfortunately, as time 
would tell, the Civil War would again divide the tribe along the same 
fault-lines as the earlier feud, splitting the Cherokee into factions more 
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distinct than they had been in the past. This division ultimately caused 
significant losses for the Cherokee Nation, in terms of economy, 
government, and the lives of its people. 
In 1860, John Ross, then principal chief of the Cherokee, was 
determined to keep his tribe neutral, and he encouraged the 
surrounding tribes to do the same.4 But, maintaining neutrality was a 
difficult task. Southern tacticians saw the benefits of an alliance with 
the Cherokee Nation. Indian Territory was perfectly placed to provide 
sustenance for Southern troops, to build bases for raiding the Union, 
and it offered a clear route to Texas.5 Having access to Indian 
Territory would prove most beneficial to the Confederates and they 
quickly and aggressively sought the favor of the territorial chiefs, 
most notably John Ross.6 
As the Confederacy maneuvered to gain an alliance with the 
Cherokee, the tribe began to divide into two factions, one supporting 
the Union and the other the Confederacy. In addition to the old line 
drawn between Ross and Watie, there emerged new differences for the 
factions to fight for. Each group saw benefits where the other saw 
drawbacks. Ross originally favored neutrality because he longed to 
avoid bloodshed and the loss of his people, but Watie envisioned all 
that could be gained by siding with the Confederacy. As a slaveholder 
who had become invested in both agriculture and commerce, Watie 
felt that the Civil War was an opportunity for those investments as 
well as an opportunity to topple John Ross’s political power.7 Ross 
was also a slaveholder, but he and many of his supporters were wary 
of the Confederacy because many of the Southerners seeking an 
alliance were the same men who had been involved with the 
confiscation of sacred lands.8 While Ross’s supporters were wary of 
the Confederates, Watie’s supporters were not. Watie already had 
many followers due to his success and involvement in the Cherokee 
pro-slavery group, The Knights of the Golden Circle.9 In spring of 
1861, the Confederacy asked Watie and his followers to join them. By 
July of the same year, Watie was commissioned in the Confederate 
army as a colonel. His support quickly grew, and he rallied many more 
Cherokees to the Confederate cause.10 
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Initially, Ross successfully maintained neutrality, but as time 
passed, he realized that the Confederacy completely enveloped 
Cherokee land and that Watie and his followers had already allied 
themselves with the Confederacy.11 The Cherokee Nation was 
essentially an island in the ocean of the South. The Confederates 
continuously wrote letters and sent delegates offering the Cherokee 
enticing benefits to an alliance such as permanent ownership of their 
territory, large annuity payments, and representation in Confederate 
Congress.12 John Ross handled the pressures and the temptations 
throughout the various meetings and letters until it became apparent 
that Watie’s group had already formed a regiment and had been 
armed by the Confederacy.13 Knowing that Watie’s group would use 
these weapons to attempt to depose him, Ross called a general council 
on October 7, 1861, following his reception of a final letter from the 
Confederacy proposing a beneficial alliance and explaining that the 
majority of the other tribes in the Indian Territory had already made 
treaties with the Confederates.14 At that point in time, it appeared that 
the South would be victorious, meaning that the nation would remain 
divided, and since Indian Territory was geographically positioned in 
the South, it made sense for the Cherokee Nation to support the 
Confederacy.15 Thusly, it was not surprising that at the general 
council, which was open to all Cherokees, Ross and his followers 
explained that given the situation in which they found themselves, the 
wisest course of action for the Cherokee would be to ally themselves 
with the South.16 
The Confederacy proved to be an unpleasant ally to the 
Cherokee Nation, however, and the alliance would not last. After the 
Confederacy forced the Cherokee to attack a band of Creeks led by an 
old friend and ally, Opothleyohola, at the battle of Red Fork on 
November 19th, the battle of Bird Creek on December 9th, and finally 
on December 26th of 1861 at Chustenahla, Reverend Evan Jones plead 
Ross’s case before the Indian Commissioner  W.P. Dole.17  Jones cited 
lack of protection by the Union, threats from the Confederacy, and the 
alliance of neighboring tribes in defending Ross and his decision to 
ally with the Confederacy.18 Ross was eventually given a chance to 
explain his actions to the Union and to repudiate the treaty he signed 
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with the Confederates.19 Ross reaffirmed his and his tribe’s loyalty to 
the Union upon meeting with President Lincoln in Washington D.C.20 
A friendship even developed between the president and the principal 
chief, who remained in Washington for the reminder of the war, 
eliciting a promise from Lincoln that the treaty with the Confederacy 
would not be held against the Cherokee.21  
For all practical purposes, Ross was doing all he could to 
protect and preserve the Cherokee nation, but at this point, the tribe 
itself was divided in a way that mirrored the secession of the 
Confederacy from the Union. A rebel group of Cherokee, led by Stand 
Watie, remained loyal to the Confederacy. Meanwhile, Watie viewed 
Ross’ stay in Washington as desertion and took the opportunity to 
seize control of the tribe and become the principal chief of the 
Cherokee.22 
Watie proved to be a very capable military leader, even though 
his soldiers were often poorly armed and lacking in food and 
supplies.23 Although his troops would sometimes commit what whites 
would view as barbaric atrocities, they did not engage in blind 
terrorism; they always followed, and almost always achieved, a 
military objective.24 Watie and his troops, unlike many Native 
American troops that were viewed as disorganized and poorly trained, 
fought exceptionally well during the Civil War, impressing many 
Confederate officials and earning Watie the rank of General.25 
On the adverse side, many loyal Cherokee fought against the 
Confederates. Many of these men lost their lives in battle but even 
giving their lives and killing their own people would not gain them 
any post-war consideration from the United States.26 
During the war, a great many of the loyal Cherokee who did 
not fight were simply refugees, living in Kansas, without adequate 
food and clothing.27 They were a great burden on Kansas, who 
demanded that the Union do something to alleviate the strain. The 
Union army made many forays into Indian Territory to reduce 
Confederate forces there. When they felt they had made Cherokee 
land safe for the refugees to return home and plant crops, they ordered 
them to do so.28 Upon their return home, however, they were attacked 
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by Watie’s forces, and those that survived were ordered to leave 
immediately and to seek refuge at Fort Gibson in Oklahoma. Fort 
Gibson was subsequently attacked by the Confederate Cherokee; 
however, they were out numbered and out-gunned, and so retreated. 
Shortly afterwards, a large number of Union troops left the area, 
leaving the loyal Cherokee to their own devices. Just as they had 
feared, it was not long until they were attacked again when Watie 
returned.29 
The Civil War was brutal, and the Cherokee were caught right 
in the middle of it, despite Ross’s initial attempts at neutrality. The 
Confederate Cherokees had won many decisive battles, and these 
victories greatly encouraged the Confederacy and frightened the 
Union. But as time pressed on, the major fighting of the Civil War 
drifted eastward, away from Cherokee territory, and the Union began 
winning more decisive battles. Eventually, it would become clear that 
the increased number of Union victories marked the beginning of the 
end for the Confederacy.30   
Like America itself, the division within the Cherokee nation did 
not subside at the end of the war. Watie held the distinction of being 
the last general of the Confederate army to surrender.31 Following his 
military surrender, however, his faction of the Cherokee nation did not 
simply go away. The peace that followed Watie’s surrender was only a 
military peace; the two factions still aggressively sought control of the 
Cherokee Nation.32 While Union Cherokees were anxious to return to 
their homes and begin rebuilding, most Confederate Cherokees were 
afraid to return to their homes, as retaliation seemed inevitable, and 
many felt that a permanent division of the tribe was the only way to 
find true peace and safety.33 
Ross and his group of loyal Cherokees argued against the idea 
of officially dividing the tribe, believing that such a division would 
weaken and inevitably shorten the life of the Cherokee Nation.34 The 
Loyal Cherokee Council met on July 13, 1865 and came to the decision 
that they would grant a pardon to all Cherokees that had served with 
the Confederacy, with the condition that the rebel Cherokees swore an 
oath of loyalty to God and the Union.35 This offer of amnesty was 
offered to all Confederate Cherokees, with the exception of Watie and 
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his closest supporters, who were still in favor of permanently splitting 
the tribe.36 
The Cherokee Nation faced many problems shortly after the 
Civil War had ended. One of the greatest was that even though a large 
portion of the tribe had served the Union during the war, the United 
States government reneged on Lincoln’s promise to Ross, and decided 
that since the Cherokee Nation had forged an alliance with the 
Confederacy they had “forfeited and lost all their rights to annuities 
and lands.”37 New treaties would have to be arranged but before that 
could occur, a decision had to be reached about who was the legitimate 
principal chief of the Cherokee Nation, John Ross, or Stand Watie. At 
a meeting between commissioners and delegates from Watie’s and 
Ross’s factions, commencing on September 8, 1865, the United States 
government agents tried to finalize a treaty. Ross was unable to 
attend the meeting until September 14, when he was informed that he 
was not recognized as the principal chief of the Cherokee and viewed 
as an enemy of the Union, most likely because Watie’s faction was 
more responsive to the government’s agenda.38 
The commissioners representing the United States seemed 
responsive to the idea of splitting the Cherokee nation, possibly 
because Watie’s faction was willing to accept all the stipulations of the 
treaty they were being urged to sign, with the exception of allowing 
former slaves to become Cherokee citizens and detribalization under 
governmental supervision. This led to the common practice among 
commissioners of dealing with the cooperative Watie faction, rather 
than with the loyal Cherokees. But, the United States changed its 
viewpoint before the end of the treaty process, and encouraged the 
Cherokee to remain one united tribe, despite their differences.39 The 
Loyal Cherokee reaffirmed John Ross as their principal chief in 
October of 1865, and he, along with a set of delegates from his party, 
set out at once to arrange a treaty with the United States that would 
not divide the Cherokee nation, even as Watie’s faction did everything 
it could to undermine Ross’s efforts and his authority as principal 
chief.40  
In the end, the Cherokee, as a whole, were forced to sign a 
treaty that weakened them and robbed them of even more land. Since 
the Cherokee Nation had sided with the Confederacy at one point in 
time, they were all treated as disloyal. Finally, Watie and Ross agreed 
on something; their contention with the treatment the Cherokee 
Nation received from the United States. This did not end the feud 
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between them, however, and many of Watie’s allies still settled in a 
separate section of the territory than the loyal Cherokees.41 Ross died 
shortly after the treaty was ratified, but he died knowing that the 
Cherokee nation would not be officially divided, although the 
Southern Cherokees were given authority to elect their own council 
representatives and local offices.42 The treaty was ratified by the 
United States, even though the Southern Cherokees did not support it 
or even sign it. But the government had decided to treat the Cherokee 
as one nation, not two separate nations, and thus, the treaty applied to 
both factions within the Cherokee Nation. This treaty, as Grace Steel 
Woodward summarized, “abolished slavery forever; proclaimed a 
general amnesty; and repealed confiscation laws imposed on southern 
Cherokees during the war and restored to these Cherokees their 
confiscated property.”43 But the treaty also established federal courts 
and military posts within Indian Territory and required the tribe to 
cede the Neutral Land and the Cherokee Strip to the United States.44 
Not surprisingly, given that a division had existed long before 
the war, dating back to the pro-removal and anti-removal parties 
present in the 1830s, the division in the Cherokee Nation between the 
two factions remained beyond the Civil War. 45 Feelings of 
brotherhood between the two factions were non-existent and the 
bitterness simply would not dissipate.46 At a time when the Cherokee 
nation suffered from a reduced population, striking poverty, and a 
desperate need for unity, the two factions still feared one another.47 
The same lingering Ross-Watie family feud that had caused problems 
before the war still haunted the Cherokee Nation during 
Reconstruction, and as it had done during the war, it brought them 
nothing but problems.48 The Cherokee did their best to rebuild their 
nation. Population slowly increased, as did their prosperity.49 Still, the 
division in the tribe remained. 
Eventually, the two parties of the Cherokee reconciled, but it 
was a slow and laborious task, despite the apparent political unity that 
emerged in the late 1860s through the early 1870s.50 Many Cherokees 
worked harmoniously to rebuild the nation, but personal fears and 
animosities still existed. The true process of uniting as one people was 
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a gradual one that involved taking small steps little by little to move 
towards forgiving the past and becoming one nation.51 Slowly, fears 
shrank, people forgave, and the tribe came together. Cherokee unity 
took much longer than the reconciliation of the Northern and 
Southern states.52 
The Civil War was an incredibly bloody war that tore a nation 
apart. Within the midst of it, the Cherokee Nation was torn apart as 
well. A decades old feud was re-ignited, and it lead to the bloodshed of 
Cherokees by Cherokees. This split not only forced Cherokees to fight 
their own people, but almost created a permanent division in the 
tribe’s government, organization, and worst of all, its people. Like the 
United States as a whole, there was no easy way to reconcile such 
divisions after the war. For the Cherokee the situation was just as bad; 
at least one quarter of the Cherokee population had died, the tribe was 
poverty-stricken, and their lack of unity slowed the rebuilding of their 
nation and caused multiple governmental and organizational 
problems.53 These problems could only be solved by the Cherokee 
themselves, because until 1875, when Judge Isaac Charles Parker was 
appointed and became determined to restore peace to the Indian 
Territory that fell under his jurisdiction, government officials took 
little interest in the tribe beyond the possible uses of its land.54 
It could be said of the Civil War that the Confederates were not 
the losers, but rather the Native American tribes, like the Cherokee, 
that were caught in the middle. They fought on both sides of the war, 
and in the end, regardless of their allegiance, received no restitution 
for their service. In the case of the Cherokee Nation, all were 
punished, even those that had fought on the side of the Union. The 
Cherokee, having been forcibly removed from their homes merely 
decades prior, were once more reduced to a poverty stricken nation. 
The Civil War tore their nation in half, diminished their population, 
and in effect, took away even more Cherokee rights and land.55 All the 
work they had done since relocation was in vain; they were in the 
same position that they had worked so hard to get out of. What the 
Trail of Tears had done to the Cherokee nation, the Civil War 
renewed. It was the Confederates who surrendered the Civil War, but 
it was the Cherokee that lost.  
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BUCK v. BELL 
 
Ryan D’Arcy 
 
 
In an age of discrimination and racism, the Supreme Court 
interpreted the constitution in ways allowing the use of police powers 
to control the characteristics of the American population following 
eugenic theory, which was beyond the authority granted to the federal 
government. Buck v. Bell (1927) was a keystone case for the practice of 
eugenics in the United States. Eugenics was a theory in which a 
population tried to control it’s characteristics by determining who 
could reproduce and inject their own traits into that population. This 
dealt with whether the right to bodily integrity of the inmates of the 
State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble-Minded were protected in 
Virginia, especially the rights of Carrie Buck. The constitutional 
question was whether the law requiring the sterilization of such 
people deemed feeble-minded was in violation of the due process and 
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Carrie Buck 
was deemed mentally incompetent because she had given birth to a 
child out of wedlock, as had her mother. It was determined by the 
state that Buck’s daughter was also feeble-minded. The State of 
Virginia decided to sterilize Buck to prevent her from further 
procreating and perpetuating her defect. The case was decided in 
1927, a high period for the eugenics movement in the United States. 
This movement tried to control the genetic makeup of society by 
writing laws governing procreation. The majority opinion in this case 
about eugenics was written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
who was known for judicial restraint.1 
Carrie Buck was at a disadvantage from the very beginning of 
her case. She was in an institution run by Albert Priddy, one of the 
leaders behind the act that would eventually cause her sterilization. 
The other main leader behind the act was one of the authors of the 
state law, Aubrey Strode, who was the defense attorney for the case. 
The reason that the case is called Buck v. Bell rather than Buck v. 
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Priddy is that Priddy died, and Dr. John Bell became the 
superintendent of the Virginia State institution.2 Dr. Bell was 
eventually the person responsible for sterilizing Carrie Buck.3 This 
was not the end of Buck’s disadvantage, however. She was to be 
represented in court by Irving Whitehead, a close friend of Aubrey 
Strode. His lack of effort on her part is evident when one considers his 
actions. He neither called expert witnesses nor called character 
witnesses to testify on her behalf.4 Legal scholar Paul Lombardo said 
that Mr. Whitehead was in fact colluding with the “state’s lawyer to 
guarantee that the sterilization law would remain in force.”5 All of 
this, combined with a country that was very much in the mood to 
believe in eugenics, meant Carrie Buck was never likely to succeed, 
and so she did not. 
Buck was also at a disadvantage because so many things were 
considered to be genetically inheritable at the time. According to Dr. 
Lynne Curry, “eugenicists’ notion of ‘inherited traits’ was quite broad 
when compared with the twenty-first-century understanding of the 
term, encompassing virtually everything one acquired from one’s 
parents, from social and economic standing to eye color and physical 
height.”6 Strode, when addressing the Supreme Court, also noted in 
his statement why Carrie Buck could not offer her own insight. He 
said, “She cannot determine the matter for herself both because being 
not of full age her judgment is not to be accepted nor would it acquit 
the surgeon, and because she is further incapacitated by congenital 
mental defect.”7 Justice Holmes, in his majority opinion, said 
“Experience has shown that heredity plays an important part in the 
transmission of insanity, imbecility, &c.”8 According to eugenic 
thought, the social costs of these less than desirable traits could be 
erased.9 It should be noted that Carrie Buck’s mental incapacity is in 
fact doubtful. As Curry said, “Although Carrie Buck herself was 
described as being capable of working constructively under 
supervision, a social worker asserted that the fact of her illegitimate 
pregnancy was strong evidence of Buck’s feeblemindedness since ‘a 
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feeble-minded girl is much more likely to go wrong.”10 Today, this 
would hardly be grounds to determine someone as feeble-minded. 
To understand why there was only a single dissenting justice 
and why he did not write an opinion, it is necessary to understand the 
mood of lawmakers at the time of this decision. Following eugenic 
theory, many supported limiting immigrants who entered the 
country.11 As stated by Curry, this was because: 
In their view, the massive influx of eastern and southern 
European immigrants bearing criminal and imbecilic tendencies, the 
substantial proportion of the native-born population that was non-
white (and thus self-evidently genetically contaminated), and the 
propensity of degenerates of various stripes to multiply at higher rates 
than their more desirable fellow citizens had all come together to 
create a national epidemic more insidious and more threatening to the 
public’s well-being than any contagious disease.12 
Many ideas were proposed to prevent further contamination of 
American blood, and several were put into place. Many of them were 
not even directed at immigrants but were still based on race. 
According to Paul Lombardo in The American Breed: Nazi Eugenics and 
the Origins of the Pioneer Fund, “eugenicists advocated the elimination 
of ‘suspect biology’ using the legal methods of court-ordered eugenical 
sterilization, criminalization of interracial marriage and prohibitions 
on immigration of groups with ‘inferior genetic potentiality.’”13 
White men of Anglo-Saxon descent were in power politically at 
that time in history. These men held themselves to be the “normative 
standard by which all humans were to be judged.”14 It should be noted 
that “Virginia successfully passed both its compulsory sterilization law 
and the Racial Integrity Act in the same year the immigration quotas 
became national policy.”15 These all seem to be directed at maintaining 
white supremacy. The next logical step was for those in power to 
make sure that the white race remained in power and a strong race. 
This can be done by eliminating the threat of those people with either 
real defects or with undesirable characteristics. For example, 
undesirable characteristics could include either immorality, as 
perceived by those in power at the time, or mixed-race ancestry. The 
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whites in power wanted to purify their race. This sounds like the 
policy adopted by the Nazis prior to World War II 
For those politicians who were intent on purifying the white 
race, the final subject to deal with was the control of characteristics 
within that race. They saw what they were doing as beneficial to 
society. The white majority was, after all, the most important part of 
society to lawmakers. Justice Holmes understood how legislated 
eugenics was supposed to benefit society and included it in his opinion. 
He said that “it is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to 
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their 
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from 
continuing their kind.”16 He, in effect, said that it was necessary to 
protect society from itself, which is the perfect statement of the 
principle of police powers, or the power to control aspects of a society 
for the betterment of that society. 
A good statement of the police powers can be found in a later 
case, Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942). In Skinner, Chief Justice Stone said 
that “a state may, after appropriate inquiry, constitutionally interfere 
with the personal liberty of the individual to prevent the transmission 
by inheritance of his socially injurious tendencies.”17 Curry said that 
eugenicists believed that the genetic deterioration of the United 
States’ population justified the use of the police powers as a way to 
infringe on personal liberties.18 Strode used this argument when he 
argued Buck. As his example, he explained how school children were 
vaccinated against their will for the good of society as a whole and 
equated the compulsory vaccination to the compulsory sterilization in 
question in Buck.19 
The imperfection of law was not ignored. Holmes said that “the 
law does all that is needed when it does all that it can, indicates a 
policy, applies it to all within the lines, and seeks to bring within the 
lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as its means allow.”20 This 
means that the laws in question should specifically state what type of 
person is being targeted. However, the laws are not entirely foolproof 
and thus rely on human intuition to apply them accurately. Before 
proceeding, it should be noted that Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) was the 
court decision that limited the application of Buck v. Bell without 
overturning it. The justices in Skinner interpreted the laws more 
narrowly when they said that “strict scrutiny of the classification 
which a state makes in a sterilization law is essential lest unwittingly, 
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or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made against groups or 
types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just 
and equal laws.”21 Thus, only fifteen years later, it was asserted by 
Justice Douglas that the law can do more than just indicate a policy; it 
can also protect people from violations of their rights by that policy. 
But what rights are being violated? Those involved were fully 
aware as they argued against Buck’s rights. Strode knew what 
constitutional questions would be raised and argued against them 
well. He focused largely on the eighth amendment’s protections.22 
Strode said that “In State v. Felin… it was expressly held that an 
asexualization operation… was not a cruel punishment.” He also 
argued that the protection against cruel and unusual punishment was 
intended to protect against torture. Another of Strode’s arguments 
was that it was decided in “Weem’s Case that the provision of the 
federal Constitution (Amendment VIII) does not apply to the state 
legislatures.” The initial act that brought all of this about was an act of 
the Virginia state legislature. Justice Holmes also helped to point out 
rights that people believed were being violated by these compulsory 
sterilization laws. He believed that due process of law was present and 
said so in these words: 
There can be no doubt that so far as procedure is concerned the 
rights of the patient are most carefully considered, and as every step in 
this case was taken in scrupulous compliance with the statute and after 
months of observation, there is no doubt that in that respect the 
plaintiff in error has had due process of the law.23 
Strode also argued that restrictions on those who were deemed 
unsuitable to reproduce had already been protected in Gould v. Gould 
when it was sustained that a statute could prohibit the marriage of 
epileptics.24 
Whitehead argued for her rights without using previous 
precedent to a great a degree. In fact, a good example of his 
arguments for her rights was when he said that “the inherent right of 
mankind to go through life without mutilation of organs of generation 
needs no constitutional declaration.”25 While this fit with the 
eighteenth century federalists’ view that the Constitution need not 
enumerate all of the American citizens’ rights, it hardly helps support 
his argument very strongly. Precedent appeared to be the strongest 
form of support for such arguments, and he did not offer precedent 
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well. He did offer the precedent of the case Munn v. Illinois (1876).26 He 
used this to show how the court defined deprivation of life. The court 
said that it protected against the “deprivation not only of life but 
whatever God has given to everyone with life.”27 According to 
Whitehead, “the inhibition [of the government] against its 
deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is 
enjoyed. The deprivation not only of life but whatever God has given 
to everyone with life…is protected by the provision in question. 
While Mr. Whitehead used the statement from Munn v. Illinois 
out of context, it is still a relevant statement in this situation. God 
gave most people the ability to reproduce; the government does not 
have the right to take that away. The ruling of the court did not find 
Whitehead’s case to be strong enough. 
It is very tempting to compare and contrast Buck with Skinner 
in depth. However, this shall be done briefly because it is important to 
understand how much changed from 1927 to 1942. The people 
targeted by the eugenics movement were obtaining rights that they 
had previously been denied in Buck v. Bell. Justice Jackson wrote in his 
concurring opinion in Skinner that “there are limits to the extent to 
which a legislatively represented majority may conduct biological 
experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality and natural 
powers of a minority – even those who have been guilty of what the 
majority define as crimes.”28 This represents a change in the thinking 
of Americans. The white majority was no longer the “normative 
standard” by which people were to be judged. The Supreme Court 
recognized in Skinner both the rights of minorities and that there were 
limits to the police power when used to accomplish eugenic goals. It 
did not overturn Buck v. Bell, though Justice Douglas acknowledged 
that “[an] Act cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police power, 
in view of the state of scientific authorities respecting inheritability of 
criminal traits.” They merely observed those points mentioned 
without “intimating an opinion on them.”29 
The differing opinions of the two courts within such a short 
time period shows just how unclear the constitutional issues around 
the police powers and the fourteenth amendment were. Taking each 
decision in context can also show how great an influence the opinion 
of the public can have on the Supreme Court as well, even though the 
justices are supposed to be buffered against public opinion by not 
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being popularly elected and being appointed for life. In the 1920s the 
people deemed unfit to procreate were expected to acquiesce in order 
to benefit the larger society. As stated by Justice Holmes: 
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call 
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not 
call upon those who already sap the strength of the state for these 
lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order 
to prevent our being swamped with incompetence.30 
Justice Holmes’ scorn for these people who “sap the strength of 
the state” is very evident. His statement is a very clear and concise 
statement of eugenic thought. Justice Holmes’ prejudice was evident 
when he said “so far as the operations enable those who otherwise 
must be kept confined to be returned to the world, and thus open the 
asylum to others, the equality aimed at will be more nearly reached.”31 
What he implies is that the people being kept in these asylums were 
not being kept there because they were in need of help or were a 
threat to society directly, but were being kept in the asylums because 
they were a threat to society only if they were allowed to procreate 
and reproduce “their kind.” They were not deemed a threat worth 
keeping out of society for any other reason than the transmission of 
their genes and the muddying of the American gene pool. 
When the Supreme Court showed its approval of eugenic 
theory by the Virginia law requiring compulsory sterilization, it 
helped lead a great change, not only in our country, but in the world. 
According to Paul Lombardo, Buck “paved the way for more than 
60,000 operations in more than thirty American states with similar 
laws and provided a precedent for 400,000 sterilizations that would 
occur in Nazi Germany.”32 It was not until Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) 
that the Supreme Court began to think along what most Americans 
today would call “saner” lines. More restrictions on such rampant uses 
of the police power were put into place but not before the harm was 
done and thousands of people had been sterilized for the purpose of 
maintaining the quality of the American bloodline. That the 
fourteenth amendment was considered not to apply yet again in this 
case was no great surprise when considering the constitutional 
conservatism practiced by the Supreme Court at that time. This was 
one example of where a broader interpretation of the amendment 
would have made a huge difference in many lives. Much suffering 
could have been spared for many people if the Court had interpreted 
the amendment and laws regarding the police powers differently. 
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Though the case of Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) made it more 
difficult to pass eugenic laws, it was decided in a time when racism 
was still a strong part of American culture. It should be noted that 
other precedents support mandatory vaccination and laws promoting 
the general health and welfare of the citizens of the United States, so 
Buck is not needed for this purpose. Buck is still a means of control 
over the population that is not needed in the twenty-first century. 
Today, the concerns that fueled the case of Buck v. Bell, such as the 
genetic inheritability of certain characteristics and the befouling of the 
American bloodline, are no longer worries due to a better 
understanding of how traits are truly inherited as well as what can be 
inherited from parents. Buck v. Bell does not serve a protective purpose 
today and could only serve the purpose of the subjugation and 
oppression of a minority group again in the future. However, it has 
never been overturned. Justice Holmes said that “three generations of 
imbeciles are enough” when referring to the Bucks, but the question is, 
was it ever really his place to decide whether it was enough or not?33 
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THE IRISH FAMINE: A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW 
 
Lori Henderson 
 
 
The great Irish famine of the 1840s and 50s resulted in over a 
million deaths from starvation and disease and witnessed the 
emigration of millions more. It has been estimated that Ireland lost an 
eighth of its population from 1846 to 1851. The fact that a disaster of 
this magnitude took place in relatively modern times is as surprising 
as the fact that it took place in a country that was part of the 
wealthiest empire in the world, Great Britain.  However, with great 
power and wealth comes the paranoia that everyone is determined to 
take advantage of that prosperity. The British perception of the Irish 
peasantry was that their reliance on the potato had destroyed their 
work ethic and produced a society of lazy, indolent, and violent people.  
They also blamed the primitive landlord-tenant relationship for a 
backward agrarian arrangement. British policy and aid for the Irish 
through the calamity was thus restrained by their concern that the 
Irish would not progress in reforming their society and would only 
take advantage of any assistance. Historian Christine Kinealy asserts 
that “from the beginning, members of the British government saw 
themselves as being involved in a crusade to bring about social 
changes in Ireland, the enemies being the recalcitrant landlords on 
one side, and the perfidious potato on the other.” 1   
Research on Anglo-Irish relations could fill a library, but it was 
not until the sesquicentennial commemoration that an abundance of 
research on the famine was published.  In spite of the enormity of the 
disaster, the historiography of the famine was extremely sparse up 
until the last decade. This paper seeks to understand what compelled 
historians to first neglect, then revise, and ultimately return to a 
nationalist interpretation of the Irish famine. 
Despite a cast of colorful characters, a tragedy of epic 
proportions, and endless stories of personal suffering that any 
Hollywood screenwriter would envy, the Irish famine received very 
little scholarly attention until the middle of the twentieth century.  
Historian James Donnelly’s research discovered that the scholarly 
journal Irish Historical Studies, founded in 1938, published only five 
articles related to the famine in the first fifty years of its existence.  He 
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also notes that the journal Irish Economic and Social History offered no 
improvement on that record.2  This period of neglect for an event that 
altered the social and economic fabric of Ireland is puzzling. However, 
some historians have developed intriguing theories as to why the 
famine was literally ignored by historians in the century following the 
disaster. 
Hazel Waters theorizes that the famine “has been little 
remarked by historians mostly concerned to distance themselves from 
charges (powerful but not validated) that government policy 
amounted to deliberate genocide.”3  The claims of genocide by the 
British government were a recurring theme of the Irish nationalist 
response to the ineffective and limited aid received during the famine. 
Further discussion of these claims and how they have influenced the 
historiography will be covered later in this paper.  Waters may have a 
valid point; however, Christine Kinealy develops the theory further 
with her claim that Irish historians have enforced a “self-imposed 
censorship” for fear of providing “ideological bullets to the Irish 
Republican Army.”4 Further echoing Waters’ theory is Cathal 
Portier’s argument that the difficulty for historians resides in the fact 
that folklore is often the primary storyteller of the famine. The claim 
is that historians fear folklore carries a nationalist bent so severe that 
accurate and unbiased research cannot be accomplished.5   
 Irish historian Colm Toibin takes a social approach to the 
neglect and speculates on how much guilt plays a factor: 
 [T]o suggest that it was merely England or Irish 
landlords who stood by while Ireland starved is to miss 
the point. An entire class of Irish Catholics survived the 
Famine; many, indeed, im-proved their prospects as a 
result of it, and this legacy may be  more difficult for us 
to deal with in Ireland now than the legacy of those who 
died or emigrated.6 
Toibin claims that Irish silence might possibly be traced to 
Irish guilt as well as a fear of offending the farmers and traders who 
had gained wealth and prestige at the expense of human suffering.  
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Whatever theory historians adhere to regarding the lack of 
scholarly research, it is clear the interruption of that silence began 
with the centenary commemoration and exploded by the 
sesquicentennial. The first century following the famine found 
historians paralyzed by the nationalist sentiment of Irish folklore, 
afraid of stoking further nationalist unrest, and reluctant to offend 
those who benefited from the calamity.  The second century began a 
new chapter in the historiography, and its title was revisionism.  
To commemorate the centenary of the famine, Eamon de 
Valera, serving as Taoiseach7 of Ireland in the 1940s, offered funding 
for the purpose of researching and producing a scholarly book on the 
famine.  The result was The Great Irish Famine: Studies in Irish History 
1845-52.  Published in 1956, too late for the 1945 commemoration, it 
has become the flagship for the revisionist school.  Revisionism 
absolves the British government and lays the blame on Ireland’s 
dependence on the potato, Irish landlords, and a backward agricultural 
economy.  In the foreward of The Great Irish Famine, K.B. Nowlan 
writes, 
Modern research on the administrative and political 
backgrounds to the Great Famine reveals more clearly 
the limitations of men in office who were unwilling to 
rise or incapable of rising effectively above the economic 
conventions of their day and struggling with no 
outstanding success against a disaster that had its roots 
deep in Irish history. The disaster originated in that 
ordering of human affairs which condemned so many to a 
life-long dependence on a single crop. The potato 
economy, the primitive state of agriculture and the bad 
relations between landlord and tenant were but different 
expressions of the same evil, poverty. 8 
The historian James Donnelly, an American of Irish descent, 
claims that the editors “appear to have been quite anxious to avoid 
reigniting old controversies or giving any countenance to the 
traditional nationalist-populist view of the famine.”9 In order to 
accomplish this task, it has been necessary for revisionists to approach 
the famine clinically and analytically, in the process extracting the 
emotional and national component. Professed critic of the revisionist 
school, Brendan Bradshaw claims that “the trauma of the famine 
reveals, perhaps more tellingly than any other episode of Irish history, 
the inability of practitioners of value-free history to cope with the 
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catastrophic dimensions of the Irish past.”10 It has been noted that de 
Valera was disappointed in the project that he funded and envisioned. 
Irish historian, Cormac O’Grada remembered that “he expressed 
unhappiness with the book, presumably because it seemed to 
downplay those aspects of the tragedy that had been etched in his own 
memory.”11 
     If de Valera was disappointed in the revisionist classic, in 
1962 he was able to acknowledge and celebrate a book that took a 
great leap in the opposite direction. Cecil Woodham-Smith’s The Great 
Hunger: Ireland 1845-49 was a bestseller at the time of publication and 
still sells well to this day. Although Woodham-Smith was not a 
professional historian, her work involved over ten years of research.  
O’Grada credits her as a “formidable researcher.”12  Revisionists 
dismissed her work as too emotional and passionate to be taken 
seriously as a scholarly work. In reality, Woodham-Smith revived the 
nationalist interpretation, placing the blame for the famine back at 
Britain’s door.13 While the revisionists were chagrined at the 
publication and subsequent commercial success of her book, de Valera 
finally had the book he had hoped for. President of Ireland at the time, 
he held a dinner in her honor and she was awarded an honorary 
degree from the National University of Ireland.  Toibin reflects on 
Woodham-Smith’s legacy: 
Her crisp style belongs to another age. It is full of 
certainties and judgments about matters which have 
since been surrounded with qualifications and altered by 
shifting perspectives. She presents pen portraits of her 
protagonists of a kind that is now frowned upon. Her 
work is readable- something which later historians of the 
Famine have tried hard not to be. If she relies too much 
on the study of personalities, her command of detail, her 
insistence on the cruelty of those in charge and the 
misery of those who suffered, and her ability to structure 
the narrative, account for the book’s extraordinary 
impact. Reading The Great Hunger is like reading 
Georgian poetry.14 
Despite the success of The Great Hunger, the revisionist school 
was not prepared to give up their cause. First published in 1986, Mary 
Daly’s book, The Famine in Ireland, generated criticism that provoked 
new debate and controversy among historians. Toibin describes the 
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book as “short on emotion, long on detail and cautious 
examination…careful not to blame the administration.”15  In his 
scathing attack on revisionism, Bradhsaw does not spare Daly’s work 
of criticism. He accuses her of isolating herself from the trauma of the 
disaster and in the process isolating her audience. Bradshaw writes 
that her method consists of “assuming an austerely clinical tone, and 
by resorting to sociological euphemism…thus cerebralising and 
thereby de-sensitizing the trauma.”16 Donnelly maintains that 
Bradshaw’s “criticisms appeared to be especially relevant to the 
general scholarly approach to the great famine. That approach had 
long been almost entirely dismissive of the traditional nationalist 
interpretation, which laid responsibility for mass death and mass 
emigration at the door of the British government, accusing it of what 
amounted to genocide.”17  Bradshaw’s essay arrived just in time for the 
commemoration of the sesquicentennial of the famine, a 
commemoration that would yield a plethora of new research and 
publications. Christine Kinealy has been quoted as claiming that “more 
has been written to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the Great 
Famine than was written in the whole period since 1850.”18  This last 
decade of work has seen historians attempting to un-revise the 
revisionists, address the issue of blame, and assess Britain’s role in 
managing the disaster. In essence, a return to the nationalist 
interpretation has been necessary to engage in a more balanced and 
open dialogue to examine the disaster in Ireland in the 1840s. 
The sesquicentennial of the famine was surrounded by a hoopla 
of concerts, speeches, monuments and, in the process, it began a new 
chapter in famine historiography. For years, revisionists had worked 
hard to absolve Britain of blame for the famine. In an ironic twist of 
fate (or perhaps savvy political maneuvering), British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair offended all sentiment of revisionist theory with an 
apology.  Below is an excerpt of Blair’s speech delivered by Irish actor 
Gabriel Byrne in 1997:19 
The Famine was a defining event in the history of Ireland and 
of Britain. It has left deep scars. That one million people should have 
died in what was then part of the richest and most powerful nation in 
the world is something that still causes pain as we reflect on it today. 
Those who governed in London at the time failed their people through 
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standing by while a crop failure turned into a massive tragedy. We 
must not forget such a dreadful event.20 
Of course Blair’s apology stirred a generous amount of 
controversy but it provides an appropriate starting point for the 
journey that witnessed a return to the nationalist interpretation in the 
historiography of the famine. After a century of neglect, there is no 
denying that there are a good number of scholarly works now 
available dealing with the Irish Famine.  There is also no denying that 
these works include the nationalist interpretation; therefore, at this 
point we will examine the compelling evidence that those historians 
relied upon to produce their work.  
In recent works, historians point to the British ideologies of 
providentialism and moralism, along with how these attitudes resulted 
and justified the limited aid and disastrous policies by the British 
government.  The ideology of providentialism espoused that the 
famine disaster was the work of divine providence; the potato blight, 
in other words, was a result of God’s plan to reform Irish society. 
Moralism naturally follows providentialism in the belief that the Irish 
suffered a moral deficiency of character, therefore calling upon them 
the wrath of God in the form of famine.  James Donnelly contends that 
Charles Trevelyan, an influential policy maker and head of the 
treasury during the famine, was a proponent of these ideologies. 
Trevelyan was identified not only with providentialism and 
laissez-faire but also with what has come to be called moralism- the 
set of ideas in which Irish problems were seen to arise mainly from 
moral defects in the Irish character.  Trevelyan and other moralists, 
who were legion, believed passionately that slavish dependence on 
others was a striking feature of the Irish national character, and that 
British policy during the famine must aim at educating the Irish 
people in sturdy self-reliance.21 Underlying these ideological beliefs 
was the ultimate tool for disaster for the Irish people: racism. 
Middle-class public opinion in Britain at the time of the famine 
served to influence government policies.  Public opinion was 
distributed to the masses by London’s newspaper, The Times. Kinealy 
claims that the Times  “was the most influential newspaper of the day” 
and that it “had an impact on parliamentary and public opinion.” 
However, she also asserts that “much of the information upon which 
these stories were based was supplied by Wood and Trevelyan who 
used the powerful medium to their own advantage.”22  The racist 
attitudes of the British toward the Irish are overwhelmingly played 
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out in newspapers as well as cartoons such as Punch.  A reproduction 
of a Punch cartoon is featured in Donnelly’s study, titled The English 
Labourer’s Burden, which  portrays a very simian-like Irish character 
grinning atop a humble, noble, and miserable Englishmen’s 
shoulders.23  What are harsh words for the consciousness of modern 
readers trained in the verse of political correctness, the Times printed 
such text as, “we have to change the very nature of a people who are 
born and bred, from time immemorial, in inveterate indolence, 
improvidence, disorder, and consequent destitution.”24    
Many historians have devoted entire studies to the issue of 
racism during the famine. Among them, Michael de Nie’s article, “The 
Famine, Irish Identity, and the British Press,” focuses on the issue of 
race and the failures of the British government. Even in the early 
years of the famine, de Nie notes that the Times was already setting a 
precedent of otherness and racism. In September of 1846, the Times 
stated that “They have come amongst us, but they have carried back 
neither our habits or our sympathies, neither our love of cleanliness 
nor our love of comfort, neither our economy nor our prudence. Is this 
distinctive character capable of subjugation or change?”25 
De Nie finds that it “is interesting that even in this plea for 
empathy the Irish were held to be to blame for the cultural distance 
between the two peoples. They were incomprehensible because they 
had failed to Anglicize themselves.” He concludes that by employing 
racism the British people accomplished “self-justification by projecting 
the blame for Irish suffering onto the Irish themselves.”26  Edward 
Lengel has produced a book titled, The Irish through British Eyes, where 
he addresses the effect racist attitudes had on British policy making.  
Perhaps the most damaging policy for the relief of the Irish people 
was the amendment to the poor law in 1848 with the addition of the 
Gregory clause. 
The Gregory clause prohibited anyone from seeking relief in 
the workhouses if they held more than a quarter of an acre of land.  In 
essence, this law forced smallholders to give up their land before they 
could seek to feed their starving families. This policy was disastrous 
for the victims of the famine and was added to the arsenal of the 
nationalist cause that accused the British of intentional genocide.  
Donnelly writes of the poor laws defects being so “serious that they 
gave plausibility to charges (then and later) that there was genocidal 
intent at work.”  He also contends that Parliament recognized “its 
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enormous potential as an estate-clearing device.” Gregoryism, as the 
clause came to be known, “became a byword for the worst miseries of 
the disaster- eviction, exile, disease and death.”27  
With ample evidence pointing to the intentional limits on aid 
by the British government, the racist views of the British public, and 
ultimately the millions of deaths of Irish citizens only miles from the 
shores of the world’s wealthiest nation, it is difficult to understand 
how the nationalist interpretation was ever lost to the historiography 
of the famine.  It is even more perplexing as to how the disaster could 
be neglected for so many years.  As we have learned from the theories 
on neglect, complex political and social conventions paralyzed 
historians and stifled any serious scholarly treatment of the famine 
until the centenary.  One hundred years later, historians still felt 
compelled to distance themselves from the nationalist sentiments of 
the folklore and claims of genocidal intent by the British government. 
In order to accomplish this, a new school of thought was created, now 
known as revisionism.  It took another fifty years to untangle the 
revisionist’s model and ultimately open the debate and dialogue as to 
what went so wrong in Ireland during the 1840s.   
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THE EASTER RISING AND THE FALL TO FREEDOM 
 
Margaret Hawkins 
 
 
History regards the 1916 Easter Rising in Ireland as a dismal 
military failure, led by fanatic but condemned rebels resolute in their 
determination to achieve an independent, republican, Gaelic, united 
Ireland.  However, the Easter Rising set into motion the means by 
which Ireland would realize her freedom.  Though the rebels did not 
realize their aspirations, their actions set off a series of events that 
caused Ireland to unexpectedly stumble upon the path that would lead 
them to freedom. This unanticipated fall onto the right path coincided 
with perfect timing. That year, the British Parliament had once again 
pushed Home Rule away from the Irish. Incensed by the 
disappointments of failed constitutional nationalism, they turned to 
revolutionary nationalism, in the spirit of the Rising, to achieve what 
Parliamentary action could not.  The immediate effects of the Rising, 
namely the reaction of Britain, fueled Irish nationalism with the 
indignation of an exasperated people. With the leaders of the Rising 
having been executed, two men emerged from the ashes to lead 
Ireland to independence.  Without the military aptitude of Michael 
Collins and the political resolve of Eamon de Valera, Ireland might 
not have secured its freedom.  However, the combination of timing, 
the actions of the British and the new leaders who were willing to 
travel down that unexpected path was just what the nation needed.  
Inspired by the spirit and the heart of the martyrs, Ireland stood up, 
looked Britain directly in the eye, and said, “No more.” 
Historians agree that a military victory against Britain was not 
feasible.  Some, such as Alan J. Ward, describe the leadership of the 
rebels as disorganized and divided, despite their dedication.1  As early 
as 1926, W. Alison Philips argued that the British reactions to the 
Rising had started the Irish fall to freedom.2  The popular support for 
the revolutionaries that followed, according to Ward, was an anomaly 
in Irish history.  He strongly believed that if the three nationalisms- 
constitutional, revolutionary and romantic- would have been merged, 
the conglomeration would have been a sophisticated political machine, 
effectively led, enforced with popular support, enabling the cultivation 
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of a distinct nationality.3  Unfortunately for Ireland, these three never 
seemed to coincide effectively.  This mishap did not prevent the Easter 
Rising from becoming the cataclysm that began the chain reaction.  
Michael Collins claimed that the Easter Rising awoke “the sleeping 
spirit of Ireland.”4  Richard B. Finnegan and Edward T. McCarron 
argue that the Easter Rising became a symbol of Irish independence 
and a focal point for nationalist identity.  They assert that 1916 was 
given a place of pride in Irish history, despite its “failure.”5   The fall to 
freedom had begun. 
The Easter Rising exhorted the first great push to an 
independent nation with its immediate effects.  It had failed as a 
military venture, it had failed as a political gesture, and it had failed to 
arouse the support of Dubliners.6   The leaders of the Rising had 
assumed that when the Rising began, the people of Dublin, angry at 
British grievances, would join in the fray.  Their initial reaction, 
however, was one of inconvenience and distaste.7  John Redmond, the 
leader of the Irish Party in Parliament, condemned them and accused 
the rebels of obliterating the progress that Ireland had made toward 
the goal of Home Rule.8 
Britain itself had been taken by surprise.  She knew that the 
Irish Volunteers and treasonous activities had been growing, but she 
also knew that, because of the fight for Home Rule, there was no 
widespread antagonism.9  When the Rising caught the attention of the 
British government, its immediate concern went to the current trouble 
in World War I.  David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, 
feared the reaction of his powerful American ally.  This grew in 
importance when Woodrow Wilson told Lloyd George to solve the 
Irish problem and return his attention back to the war.10 
Therefore, Britain attempted to undervalue the gravity of the 
Irish situation.  The Times initially placed blame for the Rising on the 
Germans, stating, “They have striven to provoke it from the outbreak 
of the war, and at last they have succeeded in getting their dupes to 
indulge in an insane rising.”11  The newspaper alluded that the 
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Germans were attempting to use the Rising to disable Britain, but 
Britain was certain that the “lack of alarm” in the United Kingdom 
would prevent its spread.  The Times directly told the world that the 
Rising would be suppressed immediately.12  This, unfortunately, amid 
the subsequent wave of executions, left the world wondering why 
Britain had reacted with such savage punishments for a mere street 
riot.13 
Britain’s mistake was the fifteen executions of rebel leaders.  
The irrationality of these executions manifested itself when a chair 
held up James Connolly, wounded during the actual experience of the 
Rising, in order for him to be shot.  After these needless executions, 
outrage surged throughout Ireland.  The Irish who had previously 
condemned the Rising were shocked,14 and they grew weary of long 
court proceedings and executions each day.15  Observing the conduct 
of those to be executed, Irish public opinion began to swing rapidly. 
The leaders upheld their cause until their death, securing the 
sympathy and support of many Irishmen.  On the eve of his execution, 
Sean MacDiarmada declared, “We die that the Irish nation may live.  
Our blood will rebaptise and reinvigorate the land.”16  Roger 
Casement spoke out to his countrymen, maintaining that self-
government was their right.  He pleaded with them to continue the 
fight, portraying Ireland as a criminal in worldview.  He pledged, “If it 
be treason to fight against such an unnatural fate as this, then I am 
proud to be a rebel, and shall cling to my ‘rebellion’ with the last drop 
of my blood.”17 George Bernard Shaw warned Britain that if Casement 
was executed, he would become a national hero.  He asserted that if 
Britain continued to manufacture martyrs “in fits of temper experience 
has thrown away on her,” she would continue to be governed by the 
Irish.18 These claims went unheard, and Casement was hung in 
August of 1916. The other executions could possibly have been 
sanctioned as occurring in the heat of the moment, but Casement’s 
execution, months after the Rising, was just seen as absurd, and it 
further pushed Ireland’s opinion towards that of the rebels.19 
The Easter Rising alone could not have pushed Ireland into the 
war for its independence.  The actions of the British government were 
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instrumental in turning the majority of Ireland to nationalism.  It 
failed to cultivate the initial belief that the rebels had devastated 
Ireland’s chance at Home Rule, and instead the British turned on 
Ireland in rage. Ward believed that it would have been generous of the 
British to forgive the rebellion, allowing them to keep Irish favor.  
Instead, he said that the executions aroused and focused the latent 
hostility towards Britain, and the British government could not 
control the emotional aftermath of the Easter Rising.20  The martyrs 
became immortal heroes and the Easter Rising became a foundation 
for Irish nationalist identity.21  The sympathy for the rebels turned the 
Irish majority against Britain, gave Irish nationalism the fuel it needed 
to get off its feet, and led to a growing dissatisfaction for the yet 
unsuccessful approaches of Irish constitutional nationalism. 
The Easter Rising signified a change in the Irish approach from 
constitutional nationalism to revolutionary nationalism.  Ireland had 
allowed its nationalists to attempt the realization of governmental 
freedom through Parliamentary action, but to no avail.  A drawn out, 
fervent fight for Home Rule had been thrust aside when World War I 
emerged, revealing the inconsequentiality that the British placed on 
Irish concerns. 
Constitutional nationalism, prior to the Easter Rising, had been 
one of the best political party organizations of the time.  It had 
adequate funding, dedicated and talented leaders, and it compiled 
popular support, which was evident from its election successes.22  
Constitutional nationalists were primarily concerned with the 
establishment of a regional government that could focus on the 
interests and needs of Ireland, not the United Kingdom.23  They saw 
this goal as a means to the final end:  governmental independence.   
The revolutionary movement had been motivated by a hatred 
for Britain, disdain for the failures of constitutional nationalism, and a 
strong desire for political independence.24  Prior to the Rising, 
revolutionary nationalism was purely provoked by hatred of British 
oppression, and its principal concern was removing Britain from 
Ireland’s back.  The dedicated, unorganized and divided leaders of the 
Rising left Ireland with the realization that she deserved better.  
Revolutionary nationalism became devoted to the creation of an 
independent Irish republic, determined to drive out the British who 
refused to willingly leave.25 
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Michael Collins believed that the “valiant effort [the Easter 
Rising] and the martyrdoms which followed it finally awoke the 
sleeping spirit of Ireland.”26  He knew that revolution would follow.  
Collins concluded that the Rising had expressed the Irish right to 
freedom and their determination to have it, and he proclaimed that 
Ireland would challenge the right of Britain to dominate her.27  
Ireland had been put under martial law.  Constitutionalism had lost its 
appeal.  Ireland was itching, resolute to remove the sand from her 
shoe.28  The time for change had come. 
Irish politics had been altered as a result of the Rising.  
Although the faction had no formal role, the press and the 
government hailed it as the “Sinn Fein rebellion.”  This was not 
entirely accurate, but following the Rising, the Sinn Fein officially 
became the political wing of the revolutionary movement.29  The Irish 
people, growing in resolve, began to put nationalists in power.  The 
General Election of 1918 returned a Sinn Fein majority of 73 seats, 
although protest became their parliamentary policy and they refused 
to take their seats, not accepting the legitimacy of the United 
Kingdom’s Parliament.30  The Irish Party temporarily disappeared 
when nationalists, frustrated with a party of moderation, had nowhere 
to turn except to Sinn Fein.31 
It grew increasingly clear to the Irish Party that they had to 
assume more active opposition to the United Kingdom if it was to 
retain credibility in Ireland.  It condemned the executions, but more 
importantly, it abandoned a Home Rule objective.  The Irish Party 
realized that the Irish would not accept limited autonomy, and it 
therefore demanded dominion status.32  Unfortunately, posture now 
was more highly regarded than policy, and Sinn Fein’s militancy was 
proving to be more attractive.33   
Revolutionary nationalism rapidly won political favor and Irish 
support.  It was the support of the Irish-Americans, however, that 
kept it alive.  They viewed Britain as the oppressor of Ireland and the 
traditional enemy of American democracy.34  They had long supported 
the goals of constitutional nationalism financially, but this crumbled 
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when Redmond announced Irish support of Britain’s World War I 
involvement in 1914.35  The money from Irish-Americans then went 
to revolutionary nationalism, which kept the previously weak 
movement strong.36 
Thus, dissatisfied with the disappointments of constitutional 
nationalism, the Irish turned to revolutionary nationalism to attain 
their freedom.  This would prove to be a wise venture, for it ultimately 
would lead to their goal.  This ambition could not have been possible, 
however, without the dedication and leadership of two men that 
emerged from the ruins of the Easter Rising.  Michael Collins and 
Eamon de Valera would prove to be crucial to the events that followed 
the revolutionary conversion until the attainment of freedom. 
At the end of 1916, hoping to improve Irish opinion, the British 
government released many of the prisoners from the Rising.37  This 
proved to be a terrible mistake, for two of those prisoners were the 
men that would damage the union the most – Collins and de Valera.  
Between the years of 1919 to 1921, Michael Collins pioneered 21st 
century guerilla warfare, aided by the sanctuary of a few sympathetic 
people,38 while Eamon de Valera commanded an illegal Irish 
government in order to stabilize the fight of the country.  Collins 
called the period between 1918 and 1921 the “struggle between our 
determination to govern ourselves and to get rid of British 
government and the British determination to prevent us from doing 
either.”39 
Sinn Fein was determined to make Ireland ungovernable for 
Britain. From 1917-1919, the British government authorized 
thousands of raids on private homes. Erratic fighting broke out 
between the Irish Republic Army and the British police. Labour 
arranged transportation strikes to impede British troops. Michael 
Collins led ‘The Squad,’ which was a branch of the IRA that was liable 
for disabling British intelligence through murder, informants and 
double agents. Lawlessness spread through the country.40 Brutal 
murders occurred on each side.  Between January 1919 and December 
1921, the Irish suffered 752 dead and 866 wounded, while the British 
endured 600 dead and 1200 wounded.41 
In 1918, Lord French was summoned to complete an 
investigation of public order in Ireland.  He professed that “a minority 
of rebels” misled Ireland.  He proceeded to extend martial law into 
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nationalist parts of the country, and soon most of Sinn Fein’s leaders 
were imprisoned without a trial on the basis of the “German plot in 
Ireland.”42  Also in 1918, the British Parliament, desperate due to 
World War I devastation, extended conscription to Ireland.  Its effect 
was immediate, overwhelming and unprecedented.43  The Irish Party, 
Sinn Fein, the Irish Catholic bishops and trade unions, united by de 
Valera and John Dillon, rallied to oppose conscription.  Ward believes 
that nothing did more to legitimize the Sinn Fein than this anti-
conscription coalition.44 
Collins contended that all the brutality, disorder and slaughter 
transpired from the British forces.  He publicized murders and wounds 
of innocent men, women and children.  He emphasized that nationalist 
newspapers were suppressed, thousands were arrested for political 
offenses, and nationalist leaders were deported.  The British 
government attempted to stifle the nationalist movement before it 
suffered defeat.  Collins declared that the Irish did not instigate the 
atrocities, but only defended themselves.45  He stated that they broke 
up communications and attacked armed forces and British spies.  
According to Collins, it was because of the British brutality that 
Irishmen hailed the war as “the Terror”.46 
The war led by Collins eventually ended in victory.  By 1921, 
Britain was proposing a truce, having failed to subjugate the rebels.  
The distraction of World War I led to the use in Ireland of poorly 
trained police and military forces that were never properly integrated.  
Britain attempted to succeed by utilizing a large force, which the 
government believed would be necessary to defend possible targets 
from attack and to search out adversaries.47 
The objective of Collins and de Valera was not a military 
overthrow, which they knew was not possible.  Instead, they focused 
on creating propaganda and anarchy in the hopes that the British 
would withdraw from Ireland.48  One purpose of guerilla warfare, 
which Collins used to great effect, is to use calculated aggravation to 
coerce the government to participate in the collapse of law and order.  
Thus, the government becomes the enemy.  The malice of the 
government indicated that the provocation of the IRA was prevailing, 
and the British forces became the problem, not the solution in 
Ireland.49 
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Ireland secured world sympathy, however passive, due to the 
murderous rage of Britain.  Therefore, although Britain could regain 
control of Ireland, she was reluctant to do so against world opinion.50  
Their radical neighbors terrified the Unionists in the North.51  The 
overwhelming support for revolutionaries, according to Ward, was an 
anomaly in Irish history that has since been regretted.52  Thus, the 
Irish understandably turned back to constitutional nationalism once 
revolutionary nationalism had brought Britain to submission. 
While Michael Collins was instrumental in the revolutionary 
tactics that attained independence for the Irish, it was Eamon de 
Valera who ensured that Ireland retained a system of government 
during the war, and it was de Valera who became imperative to the 
conversion back to constitutional nationalism. 
In January of 1919, twenty-four Sinn Fein members of 
Parliament gathered for the creation of the Dáil Éireann, the illegal 
legislature of Ireland.  It established a government for Ireland, and in 
April, de Valera became its president.53  The Dáil instituted its own 
court system, as well as departments of education, labor, fisheries, 
trade, industry and agriculture.  It was not, however, able to 
completely control the IRA, which was still diffused with the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood.54 
De Valera went to America in 1919 to campaign for the Irish 
Republic, the definitive governmental goal of the Dáil.  The British 
atrocities and the Irish suffering won political support in the United 
States, and De Valera earned American recognition of the Irish 
Republic through the American press and people.  His excursion 
renewed America as a financial benefactor.55 
Impeded by Collins’ revolution, the British Parliament 
instituted the Government of Ireland Act in 1920.  This granted 
Ireland two Parliaments, one in the North and one in the South, with 
a Council of Ireland to plan for eventual integration.  The Unionist 
approved this because the Southern Parliament could not absorb the 
North without its consent.  The Sinn Fein declined on the basis that 
the Irish Republic, albeit illegally, had been in effect since 1916.56  
Collins increased military efforts after this slight, but de Valera, upon 
his return from America, willingly went into negotiations with David 
Lloyd George.57 
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In 1921, a series of letters were written between de Valera and 
Lloyd George.  These began with a persuasive document from Lloyd 
George imploring for peace.  He called the conflicts with Ireland an 
“embarrassment to our forefathers.”58  He offered a settlement giving 
Ireland all the powers and privileges which the self-governing 
dominions of Britain had, including control of home defense, police, 
courts, education, transportation and many other local matters.59  
Britain would be allowed free trade, military bases in Ireland, money 
and troops for the military, and aid in the debt of the United 
Kingdom.60 
De Valera, whose primary concern was a republic for Ireland,61 
adamantly refused.  He called dominion status an illusion, and 
maintained that a harmonious relationship with Britain would only be 
achieved through complete separation.62  De Valera informed Lloyd 
George, “The sole cause of the ‘ancient feuds’ which you deplore has 
been, as we know, and as history proves, the attacks of English rulers 
upon Irish liberties.  These attacks can cease forthwith, if your 
Government has the will.  The road to peace and understanding lies 
open.”63 
Lloyd George was willing to compromise for peace, but could 
not accept separation.64  De Valera was insistent on a small nation’s 
right to defend its liberties from the powerful, and he threatened war 
if Britain attempted force.65  In the end, they agreed to meet, after a 
quarrel over Ireland delegates as coming from a sovereign and free 
state.  During the course of these letters, the eloquence and evidence 
the leaders use dissipates, and by the closing stages, they became very 
short, terse, firm and unyielding.  The tension was evident and 
negotiations were set for October of 1921. 
De Valera sent Michael Collins, among others, to the 
negotiations.  On December 6th, the Anglo-Irish Treaty was reached.  
This treaty inaugurated an independent Irish Free State with 
dominion status under the crown and a governor general.66  The new 
state had to assume some of the United Kingdom’s debt, to assist with 
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war and defense amenities for British forces,67 and to submit to a 
boundary commission to determine the line between Northern Ireland 
and the Irish Free State.68 
The Anglo-Irish Treaty split the wartime partnership of 
Collins’ military tactics and de Valera’s governmental strategies.  The 
Civil War in Ireland had begun.  De Valera and others were irate that 
the representatives failed to accomplish a united Ireland, but they 
were absolutely livid at the betrayal of their republic ideal.69  Collins 
upheld that they had maneuvered the best arrangement for the 
circumstances, for Lloyd George had threatened full-scale war if the 
treaty was refused.  Collins knew that the IRA had the power to 
compel Britain to negotiate, but winning a military victory was 
decidedly improbable.  Lloyd George would not tolerate a united 
Ireland or a republican government.  Collins defended his decision, 
stating that the treaty granted “not the ultimate freedom that all 
nations aspire and develop to, but the freedom to achieve it.”70 
As it turned out, Collins was accurate.  The Civil War brought 
a divided Ireland to her knees.  Restoration of civic order was 
arduous.71  A war of erratic guerilla attacks and retaliations ensued, 
creating a brutal war, with many dead and many executed.  The anti-
treaty forces were finally forced to surrender in May of 1923.72  The 
Civil War resulted in the death of Collins, a legacy of blame,73 and the 
ancestors of Ireland’s future political parties, the Fine Gael and the 
Fianna Fáil, from the pro-treaty and anti-treaty factions 
respectively.74 Shortly after the end of the Civil War, Collins’ 
prediction of the treaty as a means to an end came to light. 
By 1932, de Valera became the Prime Minister of the Irish Free 
State, from which he legally abolished the Irish oath of allegiance to 
the British crown.  In 1937, the Irish Free State eradicated all 
allusions to the crown from its constitution, other than that allowing 
the British king to act for Ireland in foreign affairs.  Later that year, 
the Irish Free State adopted an entirely republican constitution and 
renamed the country Eire.  Consultation in 1938 resulted in the 
abandonment of United Kingdom naval bases in Ireland.  Eleven years 
later, in 1949, Eire assumed the designation “Republic of Ireland,” and 
she withdrew from the British Commonwealth.  As stated by 
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Desmond Williams, “By the time the British found the answer, the 
Irish had lost interest in the question.”75 
The Easter Rising of 1916 had set into motion the events that 
led to the creation of the Irish Free State in 1922.  After repeated 
mistakes on the part of the British, they eventually had to surrender to 
the revolutionary force that the Rising and its aftermath incited. 
Ireland was no longer playing the games of the British.  After the 
sacrifices of the Rising, she was inspired, relentless, and angry.  
Collins and de Valera refused to fail, they refused to deter from their 
dream, and they refused to settle for anything less than everything.  
Pearse and the other leaders of the Rising had died for the realization 
of an independent, republican, Gaelic, united Ireland.76  It was because 
of them that Ireland fought in the way that she did, invigorated by the 
support the Rising secured and the leaders that the Rising left behind.  
They died so that Ireland might live, and live she did.  
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NAZISM AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE:  
A HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
Kevin Korst  
 
 
On April 30th 1945, Adolf Hitler took his sidearm, pointed it at 
his head and fired a single shot, killing himself instantaneously.  With 
this, the German Fuhrer quite unceremoniously ended a war that had 
been raging for six bloody years.  Around Hitler’s body, his beloved 
capitol lay in ruins while the reign of his thousand-year Reich was 
abruptly cut short.  Ever since the extraordinary events of April 1945 
unfolded, historians have grappled with the Nazis and their horrific 
chapter in history.  Numerous questions have been raised regarding 
the circumstances of their rise to power and dealings while in control.  
Even more important, however, is the inquiry into the attitudes and 
actions of the common German citizen during this time.  How was it 
that so many people seemingly supported a political organization 
obsessed with racial “purification” and bent on world domination?  
What exactly was their view of Nazism and their racial policies during 
the height of its power?  Such complicated questions require equally 
complicated answers, leaving historians the great task of searching for 
a response through the remnants of Nazism. 
The years following the end of the Second World War saw 
many historians take a sympathetic view toward the general 
population of Nazi Germany.  It was believed that they were victims 
of a great illusion, one ruled by terror in which numerous atrocities 
were allowed to occur.  The issue of German denial helped to 
encourage this type of thinking until historians began to take a closer 
look at the situation, seeking better answers.  From the creation of 
this new partition came two primary schools of thought.  The 
functionalist and the intentionalist groups disagree about the core 
explanations for the Holocaust.  The functionalists believe that this 
tragic event came out of the chaos of the Nazi bureaucracy and the 
increasing desperation of their circumstances.  On the other side, the 
intentionalists see the Holocaust as a preplanned event that came to 
fruition because of a mad man’s twisted dream.  Each of these groups 
offers a different and unique perspective on the Holocaust, giving 
historians several different avenues of thought from which to pursue.         
In 1969, historian Martin Broszat released his work, The Hitler 
State: The foundation and development of the internal structure of the Third 
Reich, which tended to take a functionalist view of Nazism.  Broszat’s 
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book describes the policies of the Nazis and how they operated within 
the structure of the state.  He believes that Nazi policies did not truly 
grow out of their ideology, but were the outcome of the structure and 
conditions of government in Germany.  Broszat specifically focuses on 
a Hitler that, while being the center reference point for the entire 
organization, tended to operate on the periphery of actual government 
decisions. In reference to ordinary Germans, Broszat does not disclose 
much but states,  
Even the excessive Fuhrer cult in Nazi Germany, that 
persuasive belief in the leader which had a meaning and real 
importance far beyond determining ideology, for the integration and 
mobilization of the German people in the Nazi era, cannot be 
understood simply in terms of personality, as a result of the superior 
strength and leadership of Adolf Hitler.1  
Even with Hitler’s rise to power, the “success in overthrowing 
the Weimar Republic and in establishing the Hitler regime was 
primarily due to the collaboration between the conservative opposition 
to democracy and the national Socialist mass movement.”2  In other 
words, the German people who opposed democracy and wanted a 
restoration of conservative and authoritarian principles helped put 
Hitler in power and fostered the growth of his cult-like image.  While 
there were struggles in the beginning as to how the party would be 
run within the German government and who would exert their new 
power, by 1938 Hitler filled this void when he ceased to be the party 
leader and became the Fuhrer.3   
Martin Broszat sees the Nazis as an organization that needed 
popular support to establish its power in Germany.  This was not a 
revolution in the usual sense of the word, but merely an exchange of 
authority. Once the Nazis grasped this authority, however, the 
German people, fueled by Hitler himself, the Nazi propaganda 
machine and their own social expectations, allowed Hitler to become 
the object of a cult of personality that we see today.  His influence 
continued to grow with the successful implementation of Nazi foreign 
policy and only subsided after 1941 with the tide of the war turning 
against Germany.  Overall, Broszat suggests that “Hitler’s special 
authority as Fuhrer was not founded like [Joseph] Stalin’s on the 
control of the central organizational apparatus of the Party and state, 
but in the last resort of charismatic appeal, and the ability this gave to 
integrate the nation as a whole.”4  Inevitably, this was just one part of 
a larger story brought to life with the consent of many Germans. 
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Continuing with the precedent set by Broszat, in 1982 historian 
Detlev J. K. Peukert published a fascinating study of everyday life in 
Germany titled Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition, and Racism 
in Everyday Life.  Peukert seems to take a middle course regarding the 
question of whether German citizens, both young and old, had been 
active participants in Nazism and its subsequent policies.  He focuses 
on the various groups that existed in Nazi Germany, beginning with 
the working class.  In this instance, Peukert reveals that “the Nazis’ 
use of terror in the working-class districts and the continuous 
pressure to conform combined to create a ubiquitous sense of 
persecution and insecurity, as in a city occupied by foreign troops.”5  
He believes that the working class as a whole may have offered some 
small measure of token resistance, but because of the Nazi terror 
apparatus, could not organize in any significant way.6   
Shifting focus slightly, Peukert understands that the young 
people of Germany have a slightly different story to tell.  Peukert 
evaluates the impact of the Hitler youth and sees a program that, 
while at first possessing a major influence, lost its grip over younger 
Germans.  Initially, the systemized Hitler Youth institution offered 
many young people opportunities they would not have normally had 
access to.  However, as the war dragged on, more youth leaders were 
called into service and “the war reduced the Hitler Youth’s leisure 
activities: playing fields had been bombed, official hiking trips were 
cut down and finally discontinued.”7  Because of this, opposition 
groups known as “Edelweiss Pirates” began to form and physically 
harass the Hitler Youth patrols.8  Youths would gather together 
listening to music forbidden by the Nazis, and engage in swing 
dancing, helping to create an atmosphere of passive resistance.  
Peukert reasons that no major resistance was mounted because of the 
Nazi policy of “atomizing” the public, meaning that numerous social 
structures and traditional networks were broken down and swept 
away forcing many to see Nazism as a new center of focus.9       
Even with these small measures of resistance, Peukert 
acknowledges that some aspects of Nazism were generally accepted by 
the population.  He states that  
The terror, directed against political or social trouble makers 
was not only not concealed from the population-as many who pleaded 
for excuses were to suggest after 1945-but was highly visible, was 
documented in the press during the Third Reich, was given legitimacy 
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in the speeches of the Reich’s leaders and was approved and welcomed 
by many Germans.10   
More important was the public policies of Nazi racism, which 
while being decried by churches and some members of society, more 
often than not “were accepted and even approved, provided that they 
were applied within a framework that was outwardly legal.”11 
Throughout his book, Peukert seems to align himself with the 
functionalist camp of Nazism.  In reference to the ordinary Germans’ 
stance on the Nazis, he sees a nation that operates under an umbrella 
of terror and offers some resistance to its oppressors, yet 
acknowledges the dark underbelly of acceptance that did exist.  On the 
whole, Peukert realizes that terror played an important role in the 
Nazis control of Germany, but refuses to believe they were completely 
unaware and unwilling to cooperate in the racially and ethnically 
charged system of government.   
Several years after Peukert released his work, author Ian 
Kershaw contributed to the discussion with his work titled The ‘Hitler 
Myth’: Image and Reality in the Third Reich.  This comprehensive review 
on the source behind Hitler’s control of the government and its 
people, in a minute way, resembles Broszat’s effort.  In his book, 
Kershaw takes an interesting approach to the average German’s 
outlook on Nazism by separating the Nazi party and Hitler into two 
separate and distinct categories.  He claims that many citizens, 
especially in the early years of the World War II, disliked the Nazi 
party and their policies.  However, they adored Hitler to the extent 
that when things went badly or policies backfired, Hitler was spared 
much of the criticism, at least until the defeat at Stalingrad in 1943.12  
Before, though, the German people seemed to gravitate to answers 
that drew attention away from Hitler by claiming that he was being 
misinformed, curbed by the Allies or so engaged in foreign affairs that 
he had no time for the home front.  According to Kershaw, it was the 
Nazi propaganda machine that takes the greatest responsibility for 
this feat and states, “After 1933, Nazi propaganda, largely uncontested 
now that opponents within Germany had been silenced, could almost 
deify Hitler.  Joseph Goebbels,13 as we saw, ranked his creation of the 
public Hitler image as his greatest creation”14 Kershaw also looks into 
the German people’s thirst for a new leader who could unite and 
stabilize a nation which had floundered under the tutelage of the 
Weimar government.  Hitler provided such an opportunity and using 
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Goebbels’ machine, he lured the German masses into a state of trust 
and misguided belief, a trust that, in certain ways, outlasted the Hitler 
and the war itself.15   
While Kershaw does portray the Germans as a “victimized” 
group, in his eyes they are not without fault, especially surrounding 
the circumstances of the Jewish question.  In his book, Kershaw 
recognizes that while many Germans were anti-Semitic before Hitler’s 
arrival, most did not support extreme racial policies.  The Jewish 
question was therefore avoided by fusing the Third Reich with the 
popular and attractive aspects of Nazi rule symbolized by Hitler 
himself.  Kershaw says that “this in itself distracted attention away 
from the seamier side of Nazi policy,” which in turn “ensured at least 
passive acquiescence in if not outright approval for escalating 
inhumanity of Nazi anti-Jewish policy.”16  More frightening are 
Kershaw’s examples of how the Hitler myth, for some people at least, 
continued until the end of the war and beyond.  “In 1968, six percent 
of the West German population (compared with four percent in 1965 
and 1967) reported their willingness to vote again for a man such as 
Hitler.”17  Kershaw exemplifies just how powerful the image of Hitler 
created by his propagandists was, and how far reaching its effects 
could be felt.  He believes that the German people fell under the spell 
of the image of a man who never really existed, but he is not shy about 
condemning their indifference to the most horrific of Nazi policy.   
The aforementioned authors, while having slightly different 
ideas, tend to agree that Germans citizens were both ruthlessly 
deceived and themselves at fault in their sometimes lax views and 
approval of Hitler and Nazism.  However, the topic of rule by terror is 
given only a small amount of reference in proportion to each work’s 
scope.  The treatment of this subject was improved upon in 1990 when 
historian Robert Gellately published The Gestapo and German Society: 
Enforcing Racial Policy 1933-1945.  In his work, Gellately looks into 
the Gestapo and how they managed to control an entire nation with 
only a small core of individuals.  He concludes that it was impossible 
for the terror organization to follow the orders that were given to 
them, especially as their responsibilities grew during the war.  
Gellately claims that “it simply did not have the physical resources to 
accomplish the task assigned to it, especially as these increased in 
number and scope.  And this point stands even when one includes the 
help it could count on from other organizations of the Nazi party and 
German state.”18  How then was this task accomplished with such 
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horrific efficiency?  For this answer, Gellately points to the average 
German citizen as an accomplice to the Gestapo’s mission of state 
control and racial purification.  Since it was impossible for the German 
Gestapo to be everywhere at once, they relied heavily on the 
information and participation readily given by many citizens.19  Why, 
according to Gellately, were Germans so eager and willing to commit 
these acts?  For starters, the Nazis had done such an impressive job 
through their propaganda techniques and examples that many 
believed there truly was an agent on every corner, watching their 
every move.  Gellately presents evidence that a number of Germans 
came forward with information because of petty differences including 
relationship squabbles, heated competition between businesses, and 
disputes involving neighbors.20  This helped to create a society in 
which its citizens engaged in a kind of self-regulation, ensuring the 
Gestapo could easily control a numerically superior target with little 
or no difficulty.   
Robert Gellately’s take on Nazi Germany sees a society in 
which total control was achieved through active participation.  The 
average German seemed to view the Gestapo as an omnipotent being, 
even though evidence clearly points to the opposite.  Even so, 
Gellately says that “one ought to be cautious, however, in 
extrapolating from Wurzburg, the focus of his study, to the rest of the 
country.  Enforcement may have been easier to achieve in smaller 
cities and towns in rural districts.”21  He paints the common German 
in a way that few authors had up to this point.  Through his evidence 
and analysis, they appear much more as aggressors, rather than 
victims.   
Following the course that had been laid out by Robert Gellately 
and others, historian Daniel Jonah Goldhagen took the case against 
the German people to a place few had before.  In 1996, with the release 
of his book Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the 
Holocaust, Goldhagen attacks the German people as a nation that was 
willingly and actively participating in the Holocaust.  Furthermore, he 
asserts that only in Germany could an atrocity on the level of the 
Holocaust have occurred, thanks to Germany’s highly anti-Semitic 
past.  Goldhagen sets up a scenario where anti-Semitism had been 
rampant in Germany for centuries.  He believes this was ingrained 
into the German psyche until a particular situation came along to set 
in motion an event that was literally hundreds of years in the 
making.22  One of the examples he uses to support his thesis is the 
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actions of Police Battalion 101.23  This group of men who were mainly 
composed of regular German police was sent to Poland to commit the 
unthinkable.  While most had no affiliation with the Nazi party, they 
participated in the killings of innocent people, with apparently very 
little remorse.  They even told their friends and family about their 
actions, leading Goldhagen to state that “the Germans’ openness 
about their genocidal slaughtering-making it available to the view of 
so many other German men and women who happened to be stationed 
in Poland-is but an indication of the perpetrators’ obvious approval of 
their historic deeds.”24  According to Goldhagen, this is just one 
example of what countless Germans were ready to do, giving little 
thought to the extraordinary consequences of their actions.   
Hitler’s Willing Executioners created a firestorm of criticism 
upon its release in 1996.  Many historians assaulted the book as 
nonsense, saying that he could not adequately defend many of the 
controversial statements held within his writings.  Goldhagen, in 
return, defended his thesis claiming “that the perpetrators approved of 
the mass slaughter, that they willingly gave assent to their own 
participation in the slaughter, is certain.  That their approval derived 
in the main from their own conception of Jews is all but certain, for no 
other source of motivation can plausibly account for their actions.”25  
If anything, Goldhagen showed that ordinary Germans were much 
more involved in Nazi racial policies than historians initially thought.  
He seems to conform to the intentionalist view of Nazism but includes 
nearly every German in the equation.      However, there are many 
flaws within his argument, especially in regard to his point that the 
Holocaust could only happen in Germany, but for better or worse, his 
assertions led the discussion into relatively uncharted territory.   
Following the storm created by Goldhagen, author Eric A. 
Johnson published his book, Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews and 
Ordinary Germans, in 2000.  Following the lead set by Gellately and 
Goldhagen, Johnson analyzes the Gestapo and their impact on the 
German population.  Reacting as several of the previous authors had, 
Johnson sees the Gestapo as a well-trained and staffed organization 
without the necessary resources to control the targeted population.  
How then did the average German view this organization?  First, 
Johnson claims that most Germans had little or no contact with the 
Gestapo in their daily lives, and for the most part, did not fear them.26  
Also, the citizen informer that previous historians, such as Gellately, 
point to did not truly exist on a large scale, and if a person did present 
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information to the Gestapo, many times it was ignored.  Johnson sees 
that Germany was still indeed a “police state” and that the Gestapo 
was not merely a reactive organization.27  Still, he does not absolve 
Germans for their crimes against the Jewish race.  He believes that the 
evidence of mass deportations reveal that by 1942, most Germans 
knew exactly what the Nazi regime was trying to accomplish, and the 
Gestapo agents who were shipping Jews away from their homes were 
well aware that they were headed to near certain death.28  For their 
part in maintaining silence in view of these crimes, Johnson is not 
afraid to direct blame squarely at them.  Even so, Johnson does reveal 
elements of the resistance movement, such as the church, showing that 
certain sects of German society did fight the Nazis and their twisted 
ideology.29   
Johnson’s work follows a pattern set in the preceding decades 
by fellow historians.  As he states in his book, “A recent trend in 
historical scholarship places the onus of guilt on ordinary Germans for 
the perpetration of Nazi crimes.”30  However, Johnson is careful to 
note that “the recent trend in historical scholarship threatens to 
underestimate and obscure the enormous culpability of the leading 
organs of Nazi terror, such as the Gestapo and to overestimate the 
culpability of ordinary German citizens.  It needs to be remembered 
that some Germans were far more guilty than others.”31  Johnson’s 
book attempts to pursue the middle course, in showing that ordinary 
Germans were a greater factor in the Holocaust than first believed, 
but they were far from the only factor.  Johnson reinforces the idea 
that the Gestapo did not rule by fear alone, and were not the ever-
present demon in people’s lives.  Representing a moderation of the 
extreme views held by Goldhagen and others, Johnson understands 
that culpability and blame is to be shared by many in Nazi Germany, 
but by none completely. 
From 1945 to the early 1980s, a majority of historians pointed 
the blame for wartime atrocities solely in the Nazi party and their 
underlings.  Even in Martin Broszat’s 1969 book The Hitler State, he 
makes only a small reference to the German people and instead 
concentrates mostly on Hitler and the bureaucracy.  Historians saw 
German citizens as victims of an elaborate scheme, one in which they 
entered a state ruled by terror, and the truths of the Holocaust were 
hidden from them.  This interpretation held for over thirty years, until 
scholars began to question what exactly occurred during the Nazi 
reign, along with the German people’s place in it.  Harnessing the 
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burgeoning field of social history, coupled with newer quantitative 
methods, they poured over voting records, Gestapo files, military 
papers, court documents, and other related materials. What they 
found was something quite startling and contrasting to previous 
sentiments.  Historians like Broszat and Peukert saw a Germany 
where many of its citizens bowed before Nazi policies and even wanted 
a figure such as Hitler to obtain power.  They argue, however, that the 
German people did not necessarily actively participate in the killings 
of Jews and other minorities.  Complementing this are historians 
Johnson and Gellately, who see German citizens as holding a greater 
proportion of guilt than had been previously associated, but still 
refraining from the extreme nature of Goldhagen’s thesis.  In addition, 
the concept of the Gestapo has changed dramatically over the last 
three decades, ranging from a nearly invincible organization that 
controlled the whole of the civilian population, to one struggling with 
meager resources and relying heavily on citizen participation.  In the 
end, the field of German studies during the Second World War has 
seen drastic changes over the past sixty years.  Splintering groups 
such as the functionalist and the intentionalists, along with those 
debating the true power of the Gestapo have added dimensions once 
thought impossible.  This rapidly evolving subject continues to divide 
scholars, but ultimately clarifies our understanding of one of the most 
dramatic eras in human history.           
                                           
   
       
 
 
